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
7 January 1983

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1734

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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ARMED FORCES

TRAVEL BENEFITS FOR INVALIDS DISCUSSED

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 27 Sep 82 p 4

[Letter by N. R. Korneyev and M. A. Malyugin with commentary by G. Ishutchenko, chief of department of labor and everyday life of Kirghiz SSR Ministry of Social Security: "Letters with Commentary: Benefits for the Motherland's Defenders"]

[Text] Dear Editors. Several party and governmental decrees have been adopted in recent years about benefits for Patriotic War invalids. Unfortunately not everyone knows about them and at times there is no one with whom to consult. Therefore we ask that you tell about these benefits in the newspaper's pages.

N. R. Korneyev,
Group II Patriotic War Invalid,
Moskovskiy Rayon

I live in the Nizhne-Chuyskiy Sovkhoz of Sokulukskiy Rayon, which is 46 km from the city. I often travel to Frunze. I usually presented identification at the ticket office of the bus terminal, the cashier would write down its number and indicate the seat gratis. The ticket collector also never made a critical remark to the effect that I had no ticket. But on 6 September I submitted my identification at the Frunze bus terminal and the cashier said that I had to pay full price for the ticket. I request that you explain whether or not I have to pay.

M. A. Malyugin,
Group II Patriotic War Invalid.

The party and government adopted a number of decrees which establish benefits and privileges for war invalids. All of them were published in the central and local press. Therefore I will dwell on those matters which are of most interest to the readers.

Regular leaves are granted working Patriotic War invalids at a time convenient for them, and if necessary they can receive an additional two-week leave

without pay. When they leave for a deserved rest they can take advantage of polyclinics to which they were assigned when they were working. They are given a preferential right to receive passes to sanatoriums and rest homes. If they wish, Group I war invalids are issued monetary compensation once every two years instead of a pass to a sanatorium.

In the presence of medical evidence war invalids are issued a Zaporozhets automobile with manual controls or a motorized carriage free without the right of sale or transfer. Those who received personal transportation gratis or on a preferential basis as well as group I and II invalids who acquired an automobile at full cost are paid monetary compensation annually for expenses for gasoline, repairs, maintenance and the purchase of spare parts. Payment of compensation to persons who received means of transportation gratis is from the moment they received it, and for those who acquired it at personal expense it is from the moment they apply at the entity which figured the pension. Maintenance and repair of vehicles are performed out of turn.

Ispolkoms of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies sell passenger vehicles to war invalids at personal expense out of turn. At least 10 percent of the market resources of automobiles earmarked for sale to the populace is made available for sale [to war invalids].

All war invalids have the right of free travel on all kinds of city passenger transportation (with the exception of taxis) regardless of their permanent place of residence; on common carrier automotive transportation (with the exception of taxis) in the rural area within limits of the administrative rayon of the place of residence; and on suburban rail and water transportation and on buses of suburban routes, i.e., within the limits of 35 km from the city. For example, on the lines from Frunze to Kant, Sokuluk and Alamedin M. A. Malyugin has the right of free travel through Sokulukskiy Rayon, but he is obliged to pay full fare on the Nizhne-Chuyskiy Sovkhoz-Frunze route.

Group I and II war invalids are granted the right of free travel on the railroad once a year (round trip) and, in areas without rail transportation, they are granted a 50-percent discount on air, water or intercity automobile transportation. This means that when the travel of a group I or II war invalid from starting point to the destination of a trip can be accomplished by rail transportation, tickets for the travel are issued free. But if any portion of the route or the entire route passes through rayons without rail transportation, group I or II war invalids can travel these sectors of the route or the entire route of their trip by air, water or intercity automobile transportation with a 50-percent discount on the cost of travel. Persons accompanying Group I invalids (no more than one companion) are given a 50-percent discount on the cost of travel by the indicated means of transportation.

Group III war invalids receive a 50-percent discount on the cost of travel once a year (round trip) by rail, or by water, air or intercity automobile transportation in rayons without rail transportation. In addition, all war invalids regardless of the number of trips have the right to a 50-percent discount on the cost of travel by these means of transportation each year in the fall-winter period.

Patriotic War invalids are provided living space on a priority basis. They are granted interest-free loans for individual housing construction in an amount up to 3,000 rubles with repayment in 10 years beginning from the fifth year of completion of the construction. Local construction materials for housing construction and capital repair are allocated to war invalids on a priority basis.

Living space within established norms occupied by war invalids and family members living together with them (regardless of which of the family members is the tenant) is paid for at 50 percent of rent, and excess living space (up to 15 m²) is paid for in a single amount. In addition, war invalids are given a 50-percent discount on the established rate for use of heating, water (including hot water use), natural gas, electricity and sewer. Those living in houses without central heating are given a 50-percent discount on the cost of fuel.

Group I and II Patriotic War invalids are fully relieved of paying agricultural tax, the tax on structures and ground rent regardless of the number of able-bodied persons in their families. All war invalids are relieved of paying income tax. They also have a priority right to the installation of telephones, to joining gardening associations and obtaining places for parking automobiles in general-purpose garages. They are granted the right to priority service by trade enterprises, public dining enterprises and various personal services and cultural and health services.

The war invalid's identity card is the document which confirms the right to benefits and privileges.

6904
CSO: 1801/070

ARMED FORCES

ATHEISTIC TRAINING IN SERVICES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Khaust, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "From the Practice of Atheistic Indoctrination: Help Enlighten"]

[Text] Maj A. Kulagin lifted the telephone:

"Send in Pvt ..." he began his request and immediately hesitated. "Well, that one... what's his name... our believer."

"Pvt Pavlovets," I said, locating the name in my notebook.

"That's the one, Pavlovets," nodded the officer. "He serves in an exemplary manner. Industrious and diligent..."

Some time later a very down-at-the-heels soldier with copper-colored hair entered the office and looked us over guardedly.

"Come in Pavlovets, sit down," invited Kulagin. "We haven't seen each other for a rather long time. Tell me how you are serving."

"I serve as the Presbyter orders," came the answer.

"And does he often send such orders?" I asked.

Finally Pavlovets warmed up to the topic and even acquainted us with the last letter. It was from a girl the same age as the private. She told about news of the commune, that she was spending a lot of time in the prayer house recording church services on magnetic tape; then she hastened to gladden her "brother" with the news that a special album had been made for him and they would send it soon...

A little time would pass and Pavlovets would leave after politely saying good-bye. Maj Kulagin would put out a cigarette in the ashtray with a sharp movement and in a fit of temper say:

"Just think how they coddle him... We try and try, but for now it is all in vain. This Pavlovets is a difficult one, unyielding."

It is worthwhile pondering these words, above all whether or not the collective really is trying to help its colleague become enlightened. It is impossible to ignore the question: Are there unyielding people at all? It seems to me they become such due to the indifference of those who surround them and because of indifference toward their service.

Here I can't help but recall another incident. Pvt F. Shenkel' served in one of the subunits. He had a similar life before the Army to that of Pavlovets. Of course those in the subunit also talked with him, tried to persuade him and tried to prove to him that there was no God. Alas, Shenkel' did not give up his views. Who knows how the destiny of this Altay lad would have shaped up had not Officer A. Yeremenko worked with him in real earnest. He genuinely displayed enviable effort in helping the soldier. It did not happen all at once, but he found out that Shenkel' drew well and that he liked the movies. Thanks to Yeremenko's persistence, one film, then another on an atheistic topic was shown in the enlisted men's club. Then television also began showing the film "Shadows Disappear at Noon." It was viewed by the entire subunit, then discussed collectively. Yeremenko also spoke to the personnel.

"The 'shadows of the past,'" he said, "also roam among us today. And they do not at all appear like hermits. Take Yakov Bayev, presbyter of a sectarian commune..."

On hearing the name of his "spiritual mentor," Pvt Shenkel' was discounted and began to fidget restlessly. The officer told how the presbyter was profiting from the people he deceived. He also mentioned Bayev's past. While calling himself a frontlinesman, he in fact sat it out in the rear, engaging in thievery and robbery.

When the conversation ended Shenkel' went up to Yeremenko and asked where he had gotten such data. In response he saw a letter from his native village, from the kolkhoz chairman.

"I didn't know that," said the private in surprise.

"You still don't know a great deal," said Yeremenko.

The conversation lasted a long while. The officer told about the ship "Jesus," aboard which the first group of slaves arrived in America, and about the "Trinity"--not a religious holiday, but the codename for the first nuclear weapons test by the American pretenders to world domination...

Such conversations also continued later. And each one was for Shenkel' an open window into a new world for him. Then Shenkel' was released to the reserve. A year later Yeremenko received a letter from him containing the following lines: "I'm studying at the university. I put an end to the past once and for all. Thanks for everything!"

Recalling this incident, one automatically goes over the question whether or not Pvt Pavlovets would say "thanks" to his colleagues at any time. For now this is doubtful. The fact is that they have done practically nothing for his

enlightenment. Party and Komsomol members approached him with a verbal "cavalry" attack and gave up in front of a wall of religious dogmas. Soon they also ceased to pay attention to the fact that he is a believer.

But is it possible to re-educate a person at a sloop, especially such a person in whose mind religious prejudices have become firmly entrenched? The fact is that you can tell him all you want without proof that there is no God and he will assert without proof that the "Most High" exists. This means a special approach is necessary, and delicate, thoughtful, nonstandard work is needed. Each time, if you like, a new search is necessary and unique indoctrinational revelations are needed, as happened in the case with Pvt Shenkel' and as was done in another situation.

Everything began with members of the library council of unit "X" checking the condition of books. A letter was discovered in one of the little volumes. It was a strange one, a kind of advertisement for "God's services." The activists were placed on guard, and they reported the find to the party committee.

Then the next Sunday the soldiers' attention was drawn to an unusual announcement. "The Bible states that only God can make a real desert come alive. Hero of Socialist Labor N. Golovatskiy, chairman of the '40th Anniversary of October' Kolkhoz of Taldy-Kurgan Oblast will prove something else. There will be a meeting with him today..."

The veteran was very persuasive when he said that it was not some Most High who had transformed the land and made it bloom, but man--the toiler. It is he who is the real proprietor of the land.

Nevertheless, the unit did not limit itself to this measure, and each succeeding one was more interesting than the last. Soon the name of the religious soldier also became known. By the way, by this time he already had doubt in his belief. The first spark of doubt was generated by a meeting with labor veterans. Later the soldier forgot the past entirely and firmly took the sure path.

Pvt Pavlovets was not invited to such meetings and the battalion did not even think about them. During Pavlovets's service in the unit there was not one activity on an atheistic subject.

I wrote this and recalled another unit and a similar situation. There, in reaction to a rebuke about the neglected state of antireligious work, they finally held an activity. It was assumed that it would be addressed above all to privates V. Vil'khovoy and S. Skumatov, but essentially a blank round was fired. Instead of inviting lecturers from the local section of the "Znaniye" Society who are specialists in exposing sectarianism, the unit organized a presentation by specialists in orthodoxy. The lecturers showed from experiments how the clergymen were deceiving the people by "renovating" icons and making candles "spontaneously ignite," but Vil'khovoy and Skumatov smiled, for they were sectarians and did not worship the cross or icons.

Later when this mistake was pointed out political deputy Maj L. Zhila noted with dissatisfaction:

"We are not specialists in atheism and don't understand the fine points. And we haven't had believers until now..."

When the talk turns to atheistic propaganda one often has occasion to hear: Is it so necessary when there are no believers in the collective? As they say, a religious soldier really is a rare phenomenon. Such a person may not show up in a military collective at all. But despite this, atheistic work in my view must be carried on continuously. It has to be in order to indoctrinate young people thoroughly in a spirit of communist ideology and morality, to help them develop an active position in life in themselves, and to teach them the ability to defend the positions of atheism whenever this should be necessary in life.

That is just what is done in the unit where Capt A. Kuvalaki is the propagandist. There are no believers in this collective but activities on an atheistic theme are conducted. Meetings of party and Komsomol activists at the roundtable also have become regular in the unit. One such meeting was held recently and it was lively, interesting and instructive. Maj M. Plavinskiy told how religion is adapting to the present day. Capt A. Zagrebel'nyy used interesting facts from indoctrinational work with believers to show both its complexity and the most effective paths to the awareness of a person befogged with religion. In short, here they understand the importance of atheistic propaganda and realize that there must be no interruptions in it.

The importance of this work also was mentioned in the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On a Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." It requires the elaboration and accomplishment of specific steps to reinforce atheistic indoctrination and raise the sense of responsibility of party and Komsomol members in the struggle against religious prejudices. This means that political workers and the party and Komsomol activists have to think constantly how best to work in this sector of the ideological front.

...Before departing from a remote garrison I dropped in to the political department, and there was a telephone call. It was the political officer of the adjacent unit. He was asking whether or not it was true that a religious soldier was being transferred to them.

"Is that Pvt Pavlovets," I asked.

"Yes," came the answer.

"And how did you take the news?"

The political worker was silent, then said:

"Let them transfer him. That means they themselves are not able to do the work..."

6904

CSO: 1801/070

ARMED FORCES

MEDICS' FIELD TRAINING DETAILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Capt A. Goncharov, Red Banner North Caucasus Military District: "With the Military Medical Personnel: Right After the Attacking Skirmish Line"]

[Text] The guards motorized rifle regiment was attacking in the mountains. The "enemy" had created a firm system of strongpoints and in order to overcome them it was necessary to display tactical flexibility, proficiency and physical fitness multiplied by the courage of every private and NCO, warrant officer and officer. Machinegunners and rocket launcher personnel were looking vigilantly ahead prior to the attack signal.

It seemed time also stood still for personnel of the guards medical training battalion commanded by Gds Maj Med Serv N. Chernomorets. Today was a difficult day for them. They had to reinforce the guards regiment's medical service, help carry the "wounded" from the battlefield, give them assistance and evacuate them to the rear.

And while the rocket launcher personnel and machinegunners were seeking the carefully camouflaged targets by probing the "enemy" positions with a tenacious gaze, the future medical instructors had inspected in advance the projections, boulders and downed trees behind which it was possible to shelter a "wounded" person, and they planned the most convenient evacuation routes.

Lt Col Med Serv (Ret) G. Korotenko also was inspecting the future battlefield. More lively and energetic than his years would indicate, he willingly took up the suggestion of the commander and his political deputy to share frontline experience with the officers and men. Both company commander Gds Capt Med Serv V. Kim and the physician-instructors heard much businesslike advice today.

The veteran's recommendations about the medical personnel's work during combat came in especially handy. He suggested the direction in which it was best for them to move and helped plan movement routes for medical transportation, which is difficult to do in the mountains.

Gds Pvt Yuriy Mizanov and his comrades also peered into the hills. Gds Maj Aleksey Kiptilyy, the battalion commander's political deputy, also gazed intently.

Just before going into the field a letter arrived in the subunit from Pyatigorsk from former frontline mortarman Aleksandr Akimovich Mizanov. Yuriy read it and went immediately to the political officer:

"Comrade Guards Major, I received a letter from my father."

They read the lines together: "You have a good specialty in the Army, Sergey. Had I not been dragged from danger by a medical orderly when I was seriously wounded, you also would not have seen the light of day. But was it really me alone? And how much it helped us that our medical orderly taught every private and NCO to use individual first aid kits, to stop bleeding and to carry comrades out from under the fire."

"Serve and learn conscientiously, son. And don't be afraid to go into combat should it be necessary. Your comrades will rise more resolutely to the attack if they are sure that you will come to their help at the most difficult moment."

It was then that the guards major decided to hold the "Our Heroic Profession" night in the battalion. They invited Great Patriotic participants.

The future medical instructors learned a great deal then. Lt Col Med Serv (Ret) Korotenko also spoke at the evening gathering.

...The long-awaited blossom of the signal flare blazed out in the blue sky. The motorized riflemen went into the attack. Submachinegun and machinegun bursts struck briefly and maliciously, and the rocket launchers thumped dully.

Work also began for Gds Maj Med Serv Nikolay Chernomorets' subordinates. Vital work went into full swing. Spacious tents of the sorting and evacuation, operating and bandaging, anesthesiological, and hospital squads grew quickly.

It was the first time young officers guards lieutenants med serv K. Abdullin and V. Kravtsov had taken part in such an exercise. The battalion commander had worked with them for long evenings. Twenty years ago he completed the Tomsk State Medical Institute, served in various positions and was senior physician of the regiment. Now, under his command, the battalion consistently achieved goal after goal. Many experienced specialists had been developed here, and the young officers successfully coped with the assigned mission.

Finally everything had been deployed and set up, ready to receive the wounded. The motorized riflemen rose up to meet the "enemy" there in the mountains and medical instructors carried "wounded" soldiers to the rear. They dragged them on their backs, on shelter halves, on pulkas; they carried them across gorges with the help of ropes; and they lifted them up cliffs.

Grigoriy Fedorovich Korotenko looked at the actions of the officers and men and thought. About what? Perhaps about the exploit of medical instructor M. Sizemskiy. The soldier-hero carried 120 persons with weapons from the battle-field.

Or about another medical instructor--18-year-old Komsomol member V. Gaponov, who participated in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation and the assault crossing on the Vistula. He dragged 64 tankmen from burning vehicles.

...And the fight for the pass broke out with new vigor.

Soon the first group of "wounded" was delivered. Gds Capt Med Serv S. Chegulava and his assistants did not lose a second. Sorting, admission, giving urgent medical aid...

The distant fight thundered in the mountains. Officers and men of the medical training battalion were working to their utmost. It was not for nothing later, when results of the field exercise were summarized, that Maj Gen Med Serv G. Petrenko, chief of the district medical service, would commend the personnel.

But this would be later. For now the bursts struck briefly and maliciously and grenade blasts thundered. Young privates were carrying comrades carefully to shelter. High-speed vehicles were delivering the "victims" to the rear, where people in white smocks were treating their "wounds" solicitously. The guards motorized riflemen were learning to fight, and the military medical personnel also were learning.

6904

CSO: 1801/070

ARMED FORCES

MILITARY ORGAN DISCUSSES OFFICERS' COMPETENCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 82 p 1

[Editorial: "An Officer's Competence"]

[Text] In a report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov noted the qualities which are needed most of all now by military personnel. An officer's competence and his drive to improve his political and military knowledge steadily hold a special place among them.

Development of the means of warfare makes the character of modern combat actions ever more dynamic. There is a considerable expansion in scope and a change in the content and conditions for commanders' work in preparing and conducting combat, and problems of managing the daily training and indoctrination process become more complicated. All this requires a constant improvement in professional training, an expansion in the range of knowledge and practical skills, and officers' high competence in command and control of troops and naval forces in a combat situation and in training and indoctrinating subordinates.

A commander who knows his job well is a person who teaches subordinates by personal example, who skillfully arranges the personnel's political and military indoctrination, who conducts combat and political training qualitatively and effectively, who organizes the life of the unit, subunit and ship strictly by the regulation, who maintains discipline and military order at a high level, who shows party concern for people and who has broad erudition. Such an officer is inconceivable without active research work in the operational-tactical, military-technical and military-pedagogic spheres, without participation in the generalization and propaganda of foremost experience, and without constant familiarization with innovations of political, military and fictional literature. A Marxist-Leninist outlook, a detailed knowledge of military pedagogics and psychology and of military affairs, high vigilance, a firm will, and an ability to focus all efforts on performance of a mission which has been received--all this permits the officer to act confidently in any situation.

The training and indoctrination of officers in the guards motorized rifle regiment commanded by Gds Col V. Kryukov has been organized with consideration

of modern demands placed on the training of military cadres. High competency permits him to direct the unit firmly and capably and to resolve the problems connected with an improvement in its combat readiness in a qualified manner. Here it is precisely determined and made known to every officer what he has to know and be able to do in order to perform his official duties successfully. Chief emphasis in determining training content is placed on developing officers' firm practical skills in organizing combat actions, in organizing their comprehensive support, in mastering weapons and combat equipment and in strengthening regulation order and military discipline. As a rule a minimum number of lessons are presented for each class, and they are worked until they are completely assimilated.

The specific nature of Army and Navy command and control makes it mandatory for the military leader of any rank to have an ability to think and act under conditions of an extremely rigid time limit and great moral-psychological and physical stresses. This elevates the role of officers' tactical-weapons training, which is the basis of their field, air and naval schooling and of their detailed knowledge of the provisions of regulations and manuals. It is important that all the complexity of the combat situation be recreated in command classes, exercises, flights and naval deployments and that unexpected operating methods be used widely both on the enemy's part and on the part of friendly forces. This forces the officers to seek methods of the most effective use of the tactical capabilities of combined units, units and ships and to display independence and initiative.

But as the progress of summer combat training indicates, the level of professional training and work style of some officers still does not fully meet today's demands. For example, due to deviations from foremost methodology and indulgences in the training process in the Orsha Guards Tank Regiment (Northern Group of Forces), the time set aside for officer studies often is used unproductively. Self-complacency and indifference on the part of Gds Maj V. Nikulin, the command training instructor, above all led to a situation where class content is not always tied in with practical tasks facing the unit; there is poor supervision over the officers' independent studies; and there is no strict accounting demanded of those who allow an absence from command training and show no concern for its effectiveness.

Life persuades us that it is impossible to improve officers' competency if training plans have not become a guide to action. All forms of training must be subordinated to the development in commanders of firm methods skills and the ability to achieve high end results with the least physical inputs. Constant attention should be given to teaching commanders of all ranks the methodology of conducting exercises, flights and naval deployments, which must become the next level in improvement of command qualities.

Fuller use must be made of the mobilizing capabilities of socialist competition to develop high competency. By permeating officers' professional training, it contributes to an improvement in their operational-tactical, military-technical and special training and their methods proficiency, and to active participation in military-scientific, invention and rationalization work. An officer can count on success in his work only when he keeps in step with the

achievements of military-theoretical thinking, when he himself studies, grows and uses the time set aside for independent studies with maximum productivity.

High competency is inseparable from an officer's responsibility for an assigned task or from party principle and exactingness in evaluating what has been achieved. Establishment of an atmosphere of creativeness and an innovative spirit in subunits, units and aboard ships, development of a Leninist work style in officers, and instilling in them a need to improve their military and political knowledge steadily must be a subject of special concern to senior commanders and to party and Komsomol organizations. Those party organizations proceed properly which regularly hear accounts from officer-party members about their professional studies.

Making full use of all opportunities to improve officers' competence means ensuring strict and qualitative implementation of the intensive plans for the training year and the high socialist pledges in competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation, and achieving new success in elevating the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships.

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ARMED FORCES

PLUSESSES AND MINUSES OF OFFICER TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Col G. Zorin, Red Banner Far East Military District directorate of combat training and military educational institutions: "The Commander and Modern Combat: A Combined-Arms Basis"]

[Text] The final phase of the training year always is filled with control problems and exercises. Naturally we officers of the district combat training and military educational institutions directorate also have occasion to be in the field more often. There in a near-combat situation one sees especially clearly all the plusses and minuses, as they say, in the officers' work and in their professional training.

And so now I return mentally to episodes of one of the recent tactical field fire exercises. The greatest load during the exercise perhaps lay on Maj A. Metkin, the commander of a battalion operating in the center of the regimental combat formation. It is true that the battalion had been assigned necessary means of reinforcement but in such cases much depends on how the commander is able to use them.

Maj Metkin must be given his due. He displayed high command qualities and made competent use of the forces and means at his disposal. In all phases of the exercise the battalion successfully coped with assigned missions. It is typical that in the dynamics of combat the officer demonstrated high proficiency in controlling artillery fire, air defense weapons, and special sub-units attached to the battalion.

Combat support matters including reconnaissance were accomplished skillfully. Thanks to this, for example, Maj Metkin received timely information about the "enemy" preparing a counterattack. This allowed him to take necessary steps quickly. The senior commander's weapons delivered a fire concentration which hindered the "enemy" in moving to a planned line on time. Taking advantage of this, Maj Metkin pinned down the "enemy" from the front with one company and attacked the flank with the other two. The "enemy," who had been preparing a surprise counterattack, was himself caught unawares.

Why am I telling about this exercise in such detail? In my view it is instructive from the standpoint of the commander's work of organizing for

combat. In a difficult situation Maj Metkin skillfully accomplished fire destruction of the "enemy" with all kinds of weapons at his disposal and conducted combat with coordinated efforts of his own, attached and supporting subunits. In short, the officer proved himself to be a mature combined-arms commander with a deep understanding of the nature of modern combat and an ability to make effective use of all-arms forces and means to achieve success.

I am laying stress on this not to emphasize Maj Metkin's command proficiency, although his actions in the combat situation unquestionably merit praise. I would like other officers, especially those who still lack practical skills in controlling all-arms forces and means on the battlefield, to realize how much the combined-arms basis means in each commander's professional training.

Unfortunately, in attending exercises such as in motorized rifle or tank units, one sometimes still encounters officers, including at the battalion-regimental level, with an insufficiently firm knowledge of the organization and capabilities of artillery, aviation and other subunits with which they have to work. Not all of them also are competent in matters of employing the subunits of special troops.

Why does this happen? One can't give a simple answer here, but here is what practical experience indicates: This most often is encountered where motorized rifle and tank subunits usually operate without necessary means of reinforcement in the course of tactical problems and exercises. For some reason some unit commanders and staffs do not attach proper significance to this fact and give little attention to the training of officers in controlling the subunits of various combat arms and special troops. For example, one can judge what this leads to from the following episode.

During an exercise the "enemy" succeeded in wedging into the regiment's defenses in one of the sectors. The commander decided to commit the reserve--the tank battalion commanded by Maj B. Levchenko. It was to throw back the "enemy" and restore the position with a decisive counterattack. Such a mission was fully possible to accomplish but... During its advance to the line of counterattack the battalion had its path blocked by a deep ravine. There could be no thought about crossing it from the move.

At the same time, such a variant of the counterattack was envisaged by the regimental commander's decision. The battalion commander also had been given a possible direction of the counterattack. Had he evaluated the nature of the terrain properly if only from the map, he surely would have had the thought that the tanks would not be able to cross such a ravine without engineer support. But no comprehensive terrain estimate was made and the combat engineer subunit was not moved up to the necessary area. The battalion did not move to the counterattack line.

What do such examples indicate? Above all, the fact that in places officers still are not taught in a genuine manner to see combat in all its manifestations, on varying terrain, and to use all forces and means participating in the combat to achieve success.

There is one other facet to this matter which should be remembered before the final problems. What do I mean? The experience of exercises, particularly field fire exercises, shows that the combined-arms basis of modern combat, if it can be thus expressed, also is not always considered in the training of aviation, artillery and other subunit officers. In other words, officers (in an aviation subunit, let's say), are not taught to see what is occurring on the ground during combat. And they often act without consideration for the tactical situation.

Here is an example. Lessons were being worked during an exercise involving the transition of subunits from daytime actions to nighttime actions. Light support to night combat was assigned to a supporting aviation subunit, but what happened? It was not the defending "enemy" who was illuminated, but the attacking subunits. Is it necessary to mention the consequences to which this might have led in actual combat?

Well then, I have cited only two instances. In one case a commander scorned engineer support in organizing for combat, and in the other the actions of an aviation subunit and Ground Forces subunits participating in an exercise were not coordinated.

In analyzing reasons for what happened it was not hard to see that practical classes to practice lessons of coordination of all-arms forces and means and control of their fire in the dynamics of combat were rarely planned and conducted during command training in the units and subunits in question. For example, in the unit where Maj Levchenko serves (the one who was not able to carry out a well conceived counterattack) officers of artillery subunits as well as of subunits of special troops were hardly included at all for practicing the organization of combat during command classes with officers of tank subunits. Hence the consequences.

Officers of the district combat training and military educational institutions directorate and of the units and subunits mentioned learned the necessary lessons from this. Lately we have begun to make it a more frequent practice to hold joint exercises for units and subunits of various combat arms. Now very careful attention is given to matters of a combined-arms direction in training officers of artillery and aviation subunits as well as subunits of special troops. With a good organization of matters much more can be made up before the end of the training year from what was missed in this regard.

We also drew appropriate conclusions for the future. In particular, in planning combat training for the new training year we envisaged allocating for each unit aviation flight time, engine operating time of engineer and other equipment, and necessary supplies for the conduct of joint exercises by motorized rifle and tank subunits with subunits of other combat arms. Corrections also are being made to long-range plans for improving training centers and tactical fields. A mandatory requirement for them is to ensure the conduct of joint exercises by subunits of various combat arms and practice of lessons on their combat teamwork.

We also see in this one of the ways for further improvement in the professional expertise of officers who have a combined-arms basis in their training.

ARMED FORCES

PRESS SPOTLIGHTS COMMAND QUALITIES, SERVICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Officers' Contact With Subordinates

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen A. Rodnikov, first deputy chief, Political Directorate, Northern Group of Forces: "Always With People"]

[Text] It happened long ago, but my memory of that glorious spring day is still fresh and strong. On 9 May--Victory Day--comrades-in-arms and old friends of my father got together in our home. They were reserve officers Ya. Pischinskiy, N. Kas'yanenko and K. Yefimenko. And they got into a leisurely conversation typical of such situations--they discussed their memories of the war.

They had no difficulty in turning the clock back over the years to the events which occurred at the beginning of their army service, and they recollected battles and engagements which have now become legend. Carefully handing yellowed papers from our family archives back and forth, these elderly, serious people expressed great joy upon recognizing a face on the platoon photograph, and in warm words in letters from former subordinates, acting with surprising youthfulness.

Suddenly they began an argument, with no apparent cause. As I remember, it all started when someone said: "A real commander is not a nanny to a soldier, he must be demanding and strict." It was as if someone had poured oil into the fire, the argument on the qualities required of an officer became so heated. And it came to just as abrupt an end when Kas'yanenko, who said least of all until that time, uttered emphatically: "But a commander is respected not only for his position and rank but also for his knowledge and proficiency, for his wisdom and his ability to encourage subordinates with persuasive words."

Much later, after I graduated from military school and myself became an officer and political worker, I came to understand that at that time, Kas'yanenko was rephrasing the famous words of M. I. Kalinin: "An officer must be...respected not only as a lieutenant or captain but also as an expert in his affairs, as a wise individual, as a political leader."

Among all of the qualities without which it would be difficult to imagine a Soviet officer, the ability to be a political leader, a mentor of the soldiers

is one of the foremost. This quality was possessed by the first Red commanders and commissars, who were there when the officer corps of our army was first formed. This quality was also acquired by their successors--frontline soldiers who carried aloft the high title and honor of a Soviet officer throughout all of the trials of the Great Patriotic War.

So it was. And is. So it will always be. The Soviet officer is a political indoctrinator, the communicator of the party's ideas among the soldier masses, and an older comrade of his subordinates. Such qualities are based primarily on the class essence and the social purpose of our profession, on our fundamental difference from officers in the armies of capitalist countries.

"...the old commanders," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "consisted predominantly of spoiled and perverted sons of capitalists having nothing in common with the simple soldier.... Only Red officers will have authority among the soldiers and will be able to reinforce socialism in our army...." This, so to speak, is the general line which found its place and enjoyed practical embodiment in all stages of construction, development and improvement of our armed forces. A clear example of devotion to the ideals of communism was left to us by the first Red commissars. The offspring of laborers, peasants and soldiers, they were not always well educated. Moreover the literacy of the rank and file was not very high either. And unique methods of influence upon people corresponded to this situation.

But times change, and today we no longer imagine an officer without a higher education, without substantial Marxist-Leninist training. In precisely the same way, we cannot imagine a soldier without a secondary, secondary special or higher education, with diversified spiritual needs. Naturally the concept itself of "political leader" has also become broader and deeper. Today an officer can no longer rely only upon his life's experience, or think, if I may be permitted to phrase it this way, in the categories of just his platoon, just his company. His position requires enormous knowledge and high political culture.

Here is a typical example. Preparations were being made for a question-and-answer evening in the company in which Senior Lieutenant O. Kalashnikov was the deputy commander for political affairs. The organizers had received more than three dozen written questions from the soldiers. Here are a few of them. What does the term "countries with a socialist orientation" mean? What is "mass culture"? What practical benefits is our state receiving from the Siberia-West Europe gas pipeline? Need we conduct antireligious propaganda today, in the era of the conquest of outer space?

As we can see, the range and seriousness of problems concerning the soldiers are such that generalities would not suffice. It is important for the answers to be persuasive and scientifically provable, and for the class nature of the particular phenomenon to be revealed. Clearly the organizers of the evening (as always, they included primarily the officers of the company) had much work to do. But as a result the answers turned out to be deeper and more exhaustive.

This was a case in which there had been a possibility for gaining an acquaintance with the questions beforehand, and for preparing the answers. But it happens

so often that biting, earth-shaking questions are born spontaneously, in the course of a conversation, and there is neither time nor a possibility for checking a reference book or consulting with a specialist. A good answer means honor and praise while a bad one means a setback in authority. And that means a setback in our common cause.

It was no accident that I have focused my attention on the time element. I did so because time does in fact impose its unique requirements. And it is no accident that USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov dwelled specially on the qualities required most of all right now by the Soviet military leader in his speech at the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. Consider the emphasis laid on the terms "right now" and "most of all." A keen feeling for the new was named among these qualities. It must help every officer recognize more deeply his greater responsibility as an indoctrinator of privates and seamen.

And even in this matter there are new things to consider--not only in terms of knowledge and outlook. The style itself of work with people must be more penetrating, flexible, sympathetic and effective. And this means that primitivism, didacticism, arrogance and conventionalism in communication with subordinates must be decisively uprooted. Constantly, every day--at every instant at that--the officer must feel himself to be a person that is close to his subordinates, interested in them, and he must respond tactfully to needs, questions and moods. Nor must he forget that our class opponents have intensified their attempts at exerting a disintegrating effect upon the consciousness of Soviet people. All of this says that today as never before, an officer must be an active political leader in the masses. In this way he is able to participate in the important work of strengthening socialism discussed by V. I. Lenin.

This ideological meaning of the officer's daily work is exactly what we must reinforce in every way possible. This meaning must be keenly sensed by all. This I think is a special area of activity for political workers and party organizations. Without a doubt there are things to think about here for workers of military schools as well, where our tomorrow's officer complement is forming.

There is good reason for bringing up the question as to how one's place in the military is perceived. Unfortunately we still have officers who shy away from political work and indoctrination. Such a comrade sits in his office and reasons: "I am an administrator (financial expert, technical specialist), and my sphere of activity is purely material. Indoctrination is something for the political workers." Other subunit commanders sometimes reason in this way as well. And they are reluctant to look, even mentally, beyond the walls of their offices to persuade themselves with examples from real life that training and indoctrination of the soldiers is an inseparable unity.

Not that long ago Major V. Krasavin's fate was being decided. The man asked for a position in which he would not have to deal with people. It would seem that there should be no difficulty in formally fulfilling his request and finding him an appropriate place. But in practical terms I believe that this is impossible to do: In our army there are no officer positions that are not

associated one way or another with indoctrination, with people. Moreover there are practically no situations in which indoctrination does not go on. On the training ground, at the athletic field, in the combat motor pool, during amateur art rehearsals, on the march and during housekeeping details--in all things and in all times the indoctrination process goes on, perhaps unnoticeably, but continuously. And the duty of the officer is to not isolate and cut himself off from it, but to fulfill his duty as an indoctrinator of the soldiers with a sense of responsibility.

We already discussed the high theoretical training of the modern officer. This does not require any demonstration. But at the same time we can observe cases where an officer is unable to find the way to the soldier's heart. He does not know how to "reincarnate" his own knowledge into a simple, deeply felt, persuasive conversation with subordinates on the problems of political life and on socially meaningful phenomena that elicit the interest of people. Hence we come across overly-scientific lectures, boring political lessons, rehashing of universally known truths, dry, arrogant discussions and an inability to work with individuals. Hence also we encounter estrangement from people. A practical task of importance to many arises in this connection: joining, organically merging high ideological and theoretical training with high pedagogical, propagandistic proficiency and, I would say, the art of understanding man.

Here is something else I would like to share with the reader. Recently the officers of the political directorate studied indoctrination work in one of the tank regiments. They turned attention to the abundance of punishments levied by the commander of an artillery battery, Lieutenant Ye. Kuznetsov. The regiment commander referred to him as one of the most competent and demanding officers. But we acquainted ourselves more closely with the forms and methods of Kuznetsov's demandingness and persuaded ourselves that it often acquires the form of roughness. And when we interviewed the soldiers, we noted that in this case the authority of his position was not reinforced by the concrete methods of his work. Moreover a negative opinion of these methods, upon being generalized in the consciousness of the soldiers, carried itself over to other officers as well.

In my opinion this is an indicative example of how closely everything that a leader does is tied together with public opinion and with the frame of mind of people. It is no accident that the party focuses the attention of communist leaders specially upon the need for always predicting the political, moral and educational consequences of every administrative step, of every decision made, of every act. Making this requirement the norm of one's thinking and behavior is yet another way of strengthening the educational influence of an officer upon his subordinates. We must constantly remember that the entire situation in the unit and subunit has an educational influence upon the soldier, and that this situation is predetermined primarily by the officers.

Another thing we often say is that the daily example of the commander and the political worker itself has an educational influence. However, it is important not to presume this to mean only the capability and readiness to be first in practical lessons and exercises, to discern not just the professional meaning of the concept, but also its social meaning, and primarily its social

meaning. A model of ideological conviction, devotion to military duty, selflessness in labor, military honor, moral purity, high culture, closeness to people: These and other qualities make the officer's personality especially attractive, and people want to serve and live like him. And the example he sets is better than a long discourse about the nature of our army, its class features and its socialist spirit.

Only by constantly remembering his political and educational role can the officer effectively promote an increase in the political consciousness of the soldiers, formation of their active life position and development of high diligence, discipline, unity and a preparedness for combat and for heroism in behalf of the motherland.

Service in Afghanistan Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt V. Krishtopaytis: "We Serve in Afghanistan"]

[Text] There was something magic in sitting down in an airplane at an airport in my home town of Abaz, which is in the Khakass Autonomous Oblast, and reaching the landing strip of Kabul Airport in literally just a few hours. A little "jump" over a mountain range aboard a helicopter, and I found myself at my destination, in the garrison contained within the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Smiling, my friends in the regiment approached me and shook my hand: "Well, the vacationer has finally arrived. Well, tell us, how are things at home?"

Their words brought an involuntary smile to my lips. I distinctly recalled hearing a similar question from almost all of my fellow countrymen: "Well, tell us, how are things in Afghanistan?"

Their question was not at all idle curiosity. One could sense from everything that they feel strongly about the vital concerns of the residents of that faraway country. And a shadow falls over the face of the war veteran when he hears that rebels are continuing to do their dirty work, burning schools and annihilating activists. Workers of the logging enterprise shook their heads sympathetically when he described the difficulties that must be surmounted by the Afghan people as they build their new life. And the faces of the people shone when I gave evidence of the strength of the popular government and discussed the support it was being given by the population. In every such meeting I could sense with special force the degree of respect, trust and warmth which Soviet people show toward soldiers serving in the limited contingent.

Performing their international duty, my comrades tried to justify the trust of the party and people. There are very many examples of this.

Going out for an exercise, the column of motor vehicles was traveling a mountain road. Suddenly an explosion was heard beyond the bend, and then the chatter of automatic rounds echoed through the canyon. This turned out to be another bandit raid. Placing a mine on the route traveled by the local bus, they waited for the explosion and then opened fire on the passengers, among whom

there were old people, women and children. The Soviet soldiers and officers could not remain indifferent to someone else's despair. They rushed to the aid of the casualties. One of the first to carry wounded from the bus was military medic Lieutenant Nikolai Rashinskiy. Working beside him were Sergeant Yuriy Slyusarev, Private Kakhramon Dzhurabayev and other soldiers. Later on the Afghans thanked them with great sincerity and warmth.

"Tshakur, shuravi!" No one had to translate these words for us. Everyone knows that this is the way Afghans express their thanks to Soviet people. These words were heard many times by subordinates of Major A. Stupak, a cavalier of the Order of the Red Star. These soldiers provided help to the local population in repairing buildings and restoring damaged roads. Such words have also been addressed toward Captain of Medical Service V. Sidel'nikov, who is fondly referred to by the local population as "Doctor Volodya." Because they know that they can come to him at any time of the day, and he would not refuse to examine a patient, provide the necessary care and furnish medicines.

We serve in Afghanistan. Thousands of kilometers separate my fellow servicemen from their homes--Belorussian Major A. Kovalev, Siberian Senior Lieutenant O. Proklov, Uzbek Private K. Dzhurabayev, Georgian Private M. Lordkipanidze and other sons of our multinational fatherland. But we do not feel ourselves to be divorced from the motherland, because we sense its concern for us every day, because we recognize our high responsibility for fulfilling our military duty, rendering all-possible assistance to the people of friendly Afghanistan.

Editorial on Commander's Orders

Moscow KRASNAYA AVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 82 p 1

[Text] A commander's orders have always been the main act of military control, one which unites the efforts, abilities and will of people in order to achieve a set goal. In the Soviet Armed Forces--an army of a new, socialist type, in which relationships between chiefs and subordinates are built on common socio-political interests and goals, on the basis of mutual respect and trust in one another--orders have acquired a new social meaning. Perceived as a command to duty, fulfilled consciously, resourcefully and selflessly, they raise and lead people to heroic acts and accomplishments.

To Soviet soldiers, commanders are people invested with great trust of the party and people, and at the same time they are comrades in arms. Nurtured by the Communist Party on glorious revolutionary and combat traditions, they are distinguished by communist ideological conviction, high military-theoretical preparedness and a deep understanding of their personal responsibility for the fate of the motherland and for the combat readiness and battleworthiness of the troops and naval forces. It is to such commanders, standing at the head of regiments, ships and subunits, that the people entrust their sons.

Take as an example Communist Captain Valeriy Mal'tsev, commander of an outstanding reconnaissance company. He is strict and demanding, but at the same time he is tactful, attentive toward people and just. He is always together with his subordinates on hard marches through the hills (the subunit is part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan), at tactical exercises and

during the performance of the most complex missions, ones often carrying a risk to life. For his selfless military labor, Captain Mal'tsev has been awarded the Order of the Red Star. The people see in this commander a model of military proficiency, endurance and will, and they follow him, as it is said, into fire and into water.

Soviet soldiers perceive the orders of a commander as the orders of the motherland, fulfilling them with honor and merit. More than once they have astounded the world with their bravery, steadfastness and heroism. Their high moral-political and combat qualities manifested themselves especially clearly in the Great Patriotic War. The deeds of the war veterans continue to delight the Soviet people today, serving as a model of faithfulness to military duty. Today's defenders of the motherland did not undergo the harsh trials that fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers, but they are faithful to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. When the interests of the country require, the Soviet soldier still appears before the world as a nonself-serving and courageous patriot, an internationalist ready to perform any orders of the motherland and his people.

The orders of the commander are law to the subordinate. However, orders impose high requirements upon the person issuing them as well. His orders must be fulfilled unquestioningly by dozens, hundreds and even thousands of people. And this means that orders must be thought out well, they must account for the real conditions and possibilities, they must be supported by the necessary men and equipment, and they must serve the interests of completing combat and political training missions successfully and strengthening the combat readiness of the subunit, unit and ship. The commander is obligated to boldly and decisively exercise his right to give orders to subordinates, to demand unquestioning obedience. That orders must be fulfilled is emphasized in the manner in which orders are issued. A categorical, decisive tone of the orders and concreteness and clarity of the missions posed to subordinates promote their unquestioning fulfillment and development of the ability to serve obediently in subordinates.

Orders have a great influence upon soldiers. The regulations require them to fulfill them unquestioningly, precisely and promptly. Unquestioning fulfillment of orders is insured through strict control. It is often in view of weak control that missions are not completed in their full volume and that work is not finished all the way. In this connection we should lay special emphasis on the role of the staff, which is called upon to insure prompt and correct transmission of all orders and instructions of the commander and senior chiefs to the subunits and services, and verification of their execution. Now that the new training year is starting, strict control over the execution of previously issued orders and instructions and stern measures against those who are not diligent acquire especially important significance.

An awareness of the firmness of orders is maintained by the entire bent of army and navy life. Wherever established order is strictly observed and the service of the troops and the tours of duty are organized in exemplary fashion, wherever commanders of all ranks--officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers--are demanding of their subordinates every day, there we will find that sharp, precise execution of orders and every instruction

has become a rule of life, a unique sort of habit. To military servicemen, service under such conditions becomes that school of labor and military skill, of moral purity and bravery, of patriotism and comradeship which is so highly valued by our people. Attending this school, soldiers learn mainly from their commanders. And this obligates everyone who is given a command to evaluate his every step incisively, to adhere strictly to the requirements of Soviet laws, military regulations and our moral norms, to be honest and just, and to serve as a good example of adherence to party principles in work with people.

Teaching commanders Lenin's work style is an important task of senior chiefs, political organs and party organizations, which are called upon to show constant concern for indoctrinating the indoctrinators. Party organizations do the right thing when they use all available means to strengthen one-man command and the authority of commanders, when they nurture respect for them in the personnel, when they publicize the experience of the best officers and when they raise personal responsibility of communists and all servicemen for fulfilling orders and instructions.

In these days of rendering an account to the motherland, Soviet soldiers are acting with great diligence on the training fields, during flights and on marches, trying to demonstrate all of the proficiency which they acquired during the year. And the more successfully every mission, every instruction and every order of a commander is fulfilled, the more substantial will be the contribution to improving combat proficiency, fulfilling pledges taken in the socialist competition for an honorable welcome to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation, and to strengthening the combat readiness of the units and ships.

Unit's Drop In Ratings Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 82 p 1

[Article by Lt Col M. Lishniy, correspondent: "Not Enough Exactness"]

[Text] Last year the field communications center commanded by Major M. Mamonov was said to be one of the best in the unit. In particular, it contained the highest percentage of classed specialists among the officers.

But that was all in the past. This year the talk about the subunit took a different turn after an inspection conducted at the end of the winter training period.

Here is what happened. Inspecting the work of the field communications center during a special tactical exercise, a commission from Moscow placed the subunit in conditions that offered no room for laxity and simplification, requiring it to comply strictly with all of the regulations stated in the guidelines. And so it was revealed that the personnel were not trained well enough in action in a situation close to that of real combat; many of the officers, NCOs and enlisted men do not have the knowledge and habits that correspond to their class qualifications. Here is just one incident.

After the personnel of the subunit commanded Senior Lieutenant V. Prikhod'ko prepared itself for its mission, the inspector introduced some interference and

asked the specialists to retune the apparatus. They were unable to do this task. Moreover, further inspection revealed that a number of officers, including the chief of the center himself Senior Lieutenant Prikhod'ko, and many of the enlisted men and NCOs could not justify their class qualification.

What sort of reaction was there to this in the unit?

Unfortunately, even after the inspection, during which serious shortcomings were revealed in the training of the personnel, not all officers of the unit staff took an active part in the fight for quality of the training process and for effectiveness in the competition among the subunits. Here is an example that is indicative in this aspect.

Staff officer Captain Yu. Malygin was ordered to check up on the quality of lessons given to telegraph apparatus mechanics and to test their preparedness. He reported at the appropriate time that everything was in order: The lessons were being conducted in accordance with the established requirements, and the proficiency of the specialists was at the proper level. Soon after, however, it was revealed that things were far from so. To put it mildly, the staff officer exaggerated the state of affairs.

As logic would have it, the unit commander and the staff communists should have made a principled assessment of this fact. But the staff officer who displayed irresponsibility in fulfilling an important order remained unpunished. Of course, this could not but have an effect on the overall atmosphere in the officer collective. Absence of high exactingness toward officials, upon whom both the quality of lessons and the effectiveness of the competition in the subunits depend to one extent or another, naturally could not but influence the results of the training year as a whole, as will be discussed below.

It cannot be said that the unit commander (it was relatively recently that he assumed the post) and the party committee did not take any steps at all to improve the things in the subunits. But they did not display enough exactingness in evaluating what was happening.

Take as an example the class rating of the officers. Providing individual assignments to officers started to be practiced more widely in the summer training period with the purpose of raising class ratings. A number of demonstration and instructor training lessons in special and special-tactical training were provided to all specialists. A field exercise lasting several days was conducted with the purpose of working out the combat training tasks and standards in a situation close tho that of real combat. Nevertheless the proficiency of the officers increased very insignificantly, and among some it even decreased.

One of the reasons for this was absence of the required exactingness toward officers in relation to their professional training, independent study and fulfillment of socialist pledges. Take as an example that same Senior Lieutenant V. Prikhod'ko, who pledged to confirm his specialist 1st class title. He was unable to fulfill his promise. Did anyone dress him down? No. As a result the officer let things slide even more in the subunits subordinated to him.

Nor did Senior Lieutenant V. Kazakov and Lieutenant S. Chebotarev, who had lost their former class rating in spring, improve in professional respects. Once again no one dressed them down in the principled, party way. Need we make mention of the moral losses such an approach to the subject causes? Quite naturally the subordinates of these officers are not shining either.

The district's staff officers also assumed a strange position in this case. Prior to the inspection they had been unable to find the time to visit the signalmen, to study the progress of the combat training and the competition, and to provide help in correcting shortcomings. The recommendations stated by the commission from Moscow were shoved into a file at district headquarters, which was all anyone seemed to think had to be done. Meanwhile the lessons in the communications center continued to be conducted at a low methodological and professional level, personnel continued to be pulled off of duty for housekeeping details, and competitions on tasks and standards continued to be organized poorly. It was only prior to the inspection itself that signal officers from district headquarters appeared in the unit. Discovering the same shortcomings that the commission had noted, they tried to correct them. But is it really possible to rectify a situation by cramming, by a crash campaign (how else would you refer to attempts at correcting in a few days what had been wrong for a whole year)?

As we would have expected, in the final exercise of the year the signalmen were unable to demonstrate the level of knowledge and proficiency which they specified in their pledges, and they did not reach the goals of the competition.

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AIR FORCES

AIR FORCE TRAINING CONTINUES

Need For Knowledge of Pedagogical Principles

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Col Med Serv P. Zhiganov, RSFSR distinguished physician, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "Strictness and Tactfulness"]

[Text] The missile carriers were coming in for a landing. The first to land his supersonic craft was Military Pilot 1st Class Major V. Kozlovtshev. He was followed by Senior Lieutenant G. Semenyuk. But right away the situation unexpectedly became more complex. Flight leader Lieutenant Colonel V. Sharipov transmitted his message to the fighter as calmly as he could:

"Use up your fuel until you have minimum remaining, and then come in for a landing."

The confidence, firmness and the tone itself with which these words were stated transferred themselves to Semenyuk. The air waves carried his calm report. Soon after, he approached for another landing. Once again a clear exchange of radio messages and the calm words of commands and of reports from the aircraft. The highly complex landing was completed without reproach.

It stands to reason that both Lieutenant Colonel Sharipov and Senior Lieutenant Semenyuk demonstrated both professional skill and irreproachable moral-psychological qualities in the highly complex situation. The self-control of the flight leader, the discipline and diligence of the pilot, his strong faith that he would be able to handle the difficulty and the general mutual understanding all helped the officers to act sharply and competently.

Much is now being said about the significance of moral-psychological maturity in the training of a soldier of any profession. The importance of this problem is fully understandable. Victory in combat--the war experience persuades us of this--is achieved by the one with better skill, stronger spirit and firmer will. Moral strength encourages the individual to acts of heroism, and helps him emerge victorious over the enemy. High moral-combat qualities are being nurtured in the soldiers these days as well. Nor would anyone hardly attempt to dispute the great role played by psychological mood in successful completion of a combat training mission. This mood has special significance to a pilot controlling a supersonic craft.

But it also happens that a certain commander taxed by many concerns, both large and small, is too busy to delve deeply into some failure of a subordinate, to cheer him up, and to get down to the essence of the reasons behind unexpected changes in behavior and in attitude toward work. But all of this is extremely important: It is important to know, for example, the sort of mood with which a pilot comes in for a lesson and for training, and how he feels before and after a flight. In one of the subunits mistakes in the piloting techniques of some young pilots, made during exercises in the air, were recorded in the flight leader's log. Later on, in the flight critique, reproaches were addressed toward these pilots. At this point the instructing officer should have thought: Wouldn't the lieutenants that were named wish to do better? But not everything was coming out for them as it should. Their weak professional habits and insufficient training were having an effect. It was also found that there were certain shortcomings in the flight training methods.

As a flight surgeon, I often get a chance to talk with both the pilots and those who teach them the proficiency of an aerial warrior. Frankly speaking, some officers lack knowledge of military psychology. And sometimes this has an unfavorable effect upon the development of more than just the young airmen alone. Typical in this respect is the following incident that happened long ago.

Captain V. Danchuk, a pilot 1st class, was flying within the zone in simple weather conditions. His assignment was not that difficult. But something happened to him out there, in the air. The officer was shaken up, and of course, as he came in for his landing he mulled over his failure. Consequently he did not land the fighter in the best fashion. Dismayed by his carelessness, right away the flight leader, in a temper, dressed him down roughly. Later on the commander, who had not analyzed the reason behind the subordinate's mistake, rebuked him sharply: "You think you're so good, but you fly worse than a lieutenant...." Later on Danchuk's name began to be brought up at official meetings and conferences. The incident was entered into the books as a near-accident.

A month went by. It seemed as if everyone was starting to forget Danchuk's failure. But then an inspector arrived from higher headquarters. Looking over the unit's documents, he became interested in a written remark about that same incident. And so once again everything returned to square one. Naturally Captain Danchuk could not remain unaffected by what was happening: His health began to worsen. The officer was sent to the hospital. There he spoke openly with the physician.

"It all started with an ill-fated mistake," the officer confessed open-heartedly. "Naturally I knew that I had not flown confidently then, and possibly that I'd even did deserve a punishment, perhaps the strictest. But it is one thing to suffer a just punishment, and quite another to experience mistrust. It is like a barrier that is hard to cross."

Thus it happened that following this failure, the simplest inaccuracy in piloting was now raised to rank of a gross error, and the airman's name was once again mentioned every time. And the officer was unable to surmount the barrier of estrangement, coming to doubt his own strengths. He suffered a psychological breakdown. Paradoxical but true: The top-class airman was grounded.

This became known to the district's air force commander, Colonel General of Aviation V. Pan'kin. He delved deeply into the essence of the matter, and after analyzing all of the facts he suggested a repeat medical examination. The appropriate steps were also taken in the unit. Captain Danchuk was allowed to go back to flying. And he quickly recovered his lost habits.

In general, everything turned out for the better in this case. But it is not a secret that roughness, lack of tactfulness and raised voices sometimes become the cause of a worsening in a person's health and deterioration of his performance. Sometimes this is the very reason why an airman is compelled to quit flying while still relatively young and full of strength.

Of course, for the most part aerial warriors are hardened people. Give them any job, and they will take it without flinching. This also raises their morale. Many pilots have a 1st class rating and are masters of combat application. Their sense of personal worth is sorely wounded by inattentiveness, by rough words, even if they are accidental, by a wrong accusation and by manifestations of the slightest mistrust. Unfortunately some chiefs forget this. And when a flight surgeon tries to explain that negative emotions can cause nervous breakdown, some believe this to be a meaningless argument.

It stands to reason that no one is arguing to reduce exactingness. And we cannot turn our eyes away from mistakes, fearing to anger a person with our remarks. But it is important for strictness to be just, and for it to be combined with tactfulness.

I know many experienced exacting chiefs. But I do not recall any of them "grilling" subordinates during flight critiques and official conferences. But this does not diminish the weight of their authority. The style of their work is distinguished by thorough analysis of every mistake in actions of subordinates and deep investigation of the motives of particular acts.

As an example things are moving right along in the outstanding squadron commanded by Major A. Uryvayev. This is to be expected: He is not only an experienced instructor but also an insightful psychologist knowing how to precisely gauge the mood of a subordinate and influence him actively in the interests of the work. I could cite many examples in which Major Uryvayev helped an airman finding himself alone with his doubts and experiences to find the correct solution and to regain faith in his strengths. His authoritative words as a commander, his life experience and his competent approach toward people encourage them to work with greater interest and with full effort. Thus I do not think it is any accident that this squadron is maintaining first place in the competition.

I watched the supersonic missile carrier climb swiftly into the distance. In its cockpit was a pilot encouraged by the great trust shown in him as a defender of the fatherland's skies. He was competently and carefully taught to handle the modern craft proficiently, and he was infused with confidence in the performance of a complex mission. And he climbs into the air with a good soldier's mood, with a desire to win.

Need for Enhanced Flight Safety

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep '82 p 2

[Article by Col A. Yarchuk, USSR distinguished military pilot, Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Although the Accident Did Not Occur..."]

[Text] The airplane piloted by Captain S. Dudkin rolled off of the runway as it landed. The flight leader correctly assessed the pilot error as a near-accident and logged it accordingly in the record book for further analysis and for whatever other steps that had to be taken. This note was addressed primarily to the commander of the pilot who made the error: Whether or not the same thing will happen again would depend, in the final analysis, on how the squadron commander reacts to the incident and what sort of work he does.

Major Yu. Komissarov, the squadron commander, did everything he could to analyze the reasons of the near-accident, since there can be so many. One pilot for example may have a poor knowledge of the requirements of the documents and instructions, another may be undisciplined, careless and rash, while a third may be insufficiently prepared for flying in the corresponding conditions.

Captain S. Dudkin is a disciplined pilot. As it turned out, this time he calculated the force of the side wind incorrectly, which is why he slipped sideways somewhat as he landed, approaching the runway at a slight angle.

The squadron commander immediately convened all the pilots and recalled to them the rules of landing in a wind. Later on, during the flight critique, he thoroughly analyzed the cause of the near-accident, and he explained the essence of the physical phenomena occurring during landing from the standpoint of aerodynamics. Then during the day of preflight preparations he exercised the pilots on the procedures for making the landing calculations in the presence of winds of varying force and direction. The flight commanders exercised the pilots in the aircraft cockpits. In conclusion the squadron commander tested the knowledge of his subordinates.

After this, errors of this sort were no longer observed in the squadron. From the error of one, a lesson was learned by all of the subunit's pilots.

This work style in efforts to prevent air accidents is inherent to most squadron commanders. They do not leave even the slightest errors in compliance with flight regulations unattended, they analyze their causes deeply and comprehensively, and they bring every revealed shortcoming to the awareness of all. Any mistake by the subordinates is treated as a signal for immediate action. They are able to see what is really behind what would seem to be a minor transgression: It may be lack of discipline, poor skills or simply a pilot's inattentiveness. Timely intervention by the commander helps the pilot to correct his shortcoming, one which may quickly transform into a habit if it is not actively fought.

But the squadron commander does not always have a possibility for personally monitoring the actions of every subordinate as he performs a particular element

of flying. This is where he is aided by the flight leader, whose role in accident prevention is difficult to overestimate. Whether or not a commander is accurately informed about all errors of his subordinates, be they even the most insignificant, depends in many ways on the principles and objectivity of the flight leader.

The principles and professional proficiency of a flight leader may be assessed simply by gaining an acquaintance with the near-accident record book he maintains. For example I often come across a situation like this: The record book maintained by Lieutenant Colonel A. Perfilov, a flight leader by official position, always contains double the remarks seen in the books of his colleagues in other units. And I know quite well that flying is organized well in this regiment, that combat training assignments are completed with high quality and that a persistent effort is constantly made to promote flight safety.

The entire truth of the matter is that Lieutenant Colonel Perfilov assesses the quality of the flights very strictly and exactly, and he tries to record every violation. Unfortunately the record books of some of the other units contain only the grossest errors. This in turn limits the possibilities of preventive work by squadron commanders. When such an approach is maintained, as a rule the mistakes repeat themselves, which in the final analysis could lead to a flying accident.

Here is something else we sometimes see: A gross error is logged into the record book, and then it is literally forgotten. In the best case it is analyzed in the squadron in which it happened. But most of the pilots of the regiment are never made aware of it. Once I visited the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel A. Reshetnikov serves as the deputy commander. During a talk with the officers I asked them if they were aware of a near-accident that occurred here a little while ago. Senior Lieutenant S. Komarov, the follower of a pair, was not watching his leader as they recovered from an attack, and he began turning in his direction. The leader changed his bearing and dropped abruptly to avoid the danger of a collision, dropping more than 2,000 meters of altitude in the maneuver. This was a gross near-accident. But almost no one knew about it here, and correspondingly no one learned anything from it.

The entries in the near-accident record book sometimes show that a pilot repeats the same error from one flight to the next. This means that the squadron commander is not working hard enough in the important matter of promoting safety, and that he is not doing everything he can to correct the mistakes of his subordinates. In such cases the regiment commander and his deputy should determine carefully the instructor training level of such a teacher of pilots. Otherwise disaster would not be long in coming. For example Senior Lieutenant V. Kostin exceeded the required bank angle as he recovered from his attack on three separate occasions. The error was logged in, but no one in the squadron took effective steps to correct this flaw in the senior lieutenant's piloting technique, and no one was persistent in getting Kostin to work more carefully on this piloting element during his preflight preparations. It was only luck that the fourth time the pilot made this error, a serious accident did not occur.

Flight recorder data are a dependable support to a commander in revealing mistakes made by pilots in the air. Unfortunately, however, not all squadron

commanders show due respect for the recorder's film. We often come across cases where flight recorder data are farmed out to the chiefs of objective control groups. After this, how could a commander permit a subordinate to fly with a clear conscience?

If the proper respect is shown to it, recorder film can shed light on a great deal. Thus it helped Lieutenant Colonel A. Andriyashin, a squadron commander, to promptly discover that Captain A. Popov had lowered his landing gear at excessive speed and that Captain V. Ivanov landed with too high a vertical speed.

The chiefs of objective control groups can also make a great contribution to raising flight safety. It is good when they process the data in such a way that it would be easier for the commander to "read," decode and use the film in subordinate training. Senior Lieutenant N. Koval', for example, prints photographs and projects the most typical errors on a movie screen. All of this produces good fruits in the effort to insure flight safety.

It would be difficult to overstate the role of the flight commander--the first and immediate mentor of the pilots--in the fight for accident-free flying. He is the one who teaches each officer individually, with a consideration for personality qualities, since the piloting technique of different pilots differs, being characterized by concrete features inherent only to the given pilot. This means that different methods for correcting mistakes are required as well. For example, one may need to spend a little more time with a trainer or inside the cockpit, another might need to study some particular subject in aerodynamics or the instructions, while a third might need to be shown in the air how a particular procedure is performed.

But not all flight commanders are fully prepared for such activity. Many of them are yesterday's rank-and-file pilots without adequate teaching habits and without honed proficiency. This fact proves this: In the training year now coming to a conclusion, half of all of the mistakes qualified as near-accidents in the district were committed at the fault of flight commanders. Instructor training of flight commanders can be improved by courses created specifically for this category of aerial warriors in the district's air units.

Analyzing violations of flight regulations, sometimes we hear the following excuse: "A near-accident is not yet an accident, and everything turned out all right."

Yes, an accident did not occur this time. But to keep accidents from happening in flying practice in general, we need to fight against all near-accidents. We must fight persistently, with a great sense of responsibility for the outstanding flight skills of the airmen.

Military Transport Aviation in "Shield-82" Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 82 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Oliynik, special correspondent: "The Air Bridge"]

[Text] We are at a VTA [military transport aviation] airfield. A long row of winged giants, Il-76s, sinks into the morning mist. The airplanes look as if they are relaxing beside the edge of the taxiway.

I went over to the command dispatching point together with the political worker, Lieutenant Colonel V. Lokhanin.

"There isn't much room for our giants here," the political worker tilted his head in the direction of the herringbone pattern of the airplanes. "But despite the inconveniences, the crews are working efficiently, just as if they were at frontline airfields."

It is not a short distance from this small airfield to the area in which exercise "Shield-82" was being held. Thousands of tons of cargo, dozens of units of equipment, and the personnel of motorized rifle subunits were delivered on time by VTA airplanes to prescribed regions of Bulgaria before the beginning of the exercise. Nor can combat activities proceed now, with the exercise in full swing, without the runs made by military transport aviation. The flights begin at dawn, and the Il-76s return far after midnight. The air bridge is operating reliably.

There are many examples of the use of air bridges in the history of the Great Patriotic War. During preparations for the offensive at Stalingrad in late 1942, hundreds of Li-2 transporters and TB-3 bombers reequipped for this purpose ferried soldiers, weapons and combat equipment to the stronghold on the Volga. During the war, transporters often flew deep into the enemy rear, landing at forest airfields controlled by partisans and delivering weapons, medicines and food to the people's avengers.

"The significance of maneuvering subunits and combat equipment by air is especially great in modern fluid combat," said Colonel General of Aviation A. Volkov, commander of the Air Force VTA, who made his appearance at the airfield. He emphasized: The air bridge operating in this exercise is unique in that the sorties are being flown on a tight schedule, and the landings are being made on airfields of limited size.

The pace of the work during the exercise is being set by airmen of the outstanding squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Mirashov. Here, all craft commanders have their 1st class rating, and they have all flown a total of several thousand hours. The squadron invariably fulfills its mission--air-dropping and air-landing assault forces, cargo and equipment--with a high score.

"Shield-82" is not the first exercise in which military transport aviation subunits are taking part. They worked conscientiously in exercises "Dvina" and "Zapad-81." The unit was awarded the Pennant of the USSR Ministry of Defense for bravery and military valor. For high flight proficiency, many airmen were awarded orders and medals. Included among them were officers P. Yefimov, N. Kaznin, N. Tumanovskiy, A. Kamyshev and others.

A well organized competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation is helping the airmen to complete the difficult missions of the exercise plan successfully. The results of the competition are summarized and the experience of the best performers is generalized each day. In breaks between flying, Military Pilot 1st Class Lieutenant Colonel V. Grebelkin shared his experience of flying in combat formations, and navigators 1st class

Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Drobyshev and Major A. Smolentsev held a talk with young navigators. The political workers constantly keep the soldiers in the mainstream of political events, and pictorial newspapers and flash bulletins are devoted to crews that distinguish themselves.

Brotherhood in arms and warm relationships between soldiers of the armed forces of countries in the socialist fraternity is one of the main topics of conversation among airmen in their few hours of rest. The pilots of military transport aviation, who fly into areas of combat activities, interact closely with Bulgarian fighter pilots, who often escort them.

Together with Bulgarian soldiers and students of a music school, the pilots took part in a harvest day. In a meeting, party committee secretary Ivan Stoyanov, brigade leader Ivan Godarov and worker Ivanka Lechiva thanked the airmen headed by Major V. Chernov for their help and wished them success in the exercise. The Soviet airmen and Bulgarian soldiers who took part in the harvest day were publicly thanked by Army General D. Dzhurov, Bulgarian minister of national defense.

Returning from their runs late in the evening, the VTA airplanes landed one after another. There is more flying tomorrow. The air bridge is operating reliably.

Year's Training Results Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Guards Col V. Sadikov, military pilot-sniper: "Confidence"]

[Text] To an air regiment, a training year means many dozens of flight shifts: sorties to be flown day, night and sometimes even for days on end, as occurred in one of the tactical flying exercises. And the flying must proceed in all weather conditions. But I, the commander, had to be completely sure of a favorable outcome to every sortie before signing the planning table.

I recall the hardest time when we were all going out for a long sortie following a highly complex route. We had to fly not only over land but also over sea, conduct an independent search without the help of a command post, strike a target that was outside the range of visibility, surmount cyclones, operate out of an unfamiliar airfield and refuel in the air. Later on the weather made things even harder for us: A fog suddenly enshrouded the landing strip, and the entire regiment had to go to the alternate airfield. I have always had faith in my subordinates, and I still do. And not a single one has ever let me down. Even those who had trouble at the start managed to complete the assignment successfully. The score we got in that tactical flying exercise was the highest--"outstanding," as it was incidentally in all previous and subsequent exercises of the past year.

One cannot count on luck in this work. Before the start of the training year we developed an entire complex of measures, they were implemented firmly and persistently, and we were soon persuaded of their high effectiveness. Hence we were also confident in the success of each sortie, which in turn had a favorable effect on fulfillment of the flight program and attainment of high goals in the competition.

The first and most urgent measure was to raise exactingness toward compliance with flight laws and regulations, organization and order in flight preparation and precision of assignment fulfillment. Objective control was the first thing that we strengthened. We put the most experienced specialists, communists and Komsomol members, ones who could raise exactingness toward the quality of combat work through their own principled attitude, together into a group. It became the rule for us to present the flight recorder data of one of the airplanes at each flight critique. At random. Such that not only the crews that were behind in the competition or the young pilots and navigators but also the experienced and best had to take the floor. This disciplined and encouraged all to do better. In such critiques, mistakes are revealed and positive experience is disseminated.

The party committee of our unit, which is headed by Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Nagornyak, plays a great role in preventing flying accidents. Lieutenant Colonel Nagornyak came up with a suggestion: reprimanding individuals, as if for near-accidents, for even those kinds of deviations from the established rules which are not yet considered to be gross errors. Why should the approach to evaluating flight quality be made so much stiffer? Because we did have some individuals who often "tottered" on the brink of near-accidents, and who naturally suffered the unavoidable--falling off. Anatoliy Nikolayevich Nagornyak, himself a top-class navigator, began a special record book at the party committee for keeping track of such errors, and he efficiently prepared information on it for every meeting of the party committee and every party meeting. And I should say that the agendas of most of them, while they may not have been associated directly with promoting flight safety, were tied in with the latter in one way or another. This was especially true when the discussion turned to the problems of reinforcing military discipline. In this area, the relationship to supporting accident-free flying is the most direct. Communists came up with a proposal--treating as a gross disciplinary violation any carelessness in piloting technique, in preparing one's self or an airplane for flying and so on. This initiative was supported by the unit collective, it was introduced, and it immediately demonstrated that the communists do not toss idle words into the wind: They insisted that the crew headed by Guards Major V. Pisarenko be relieved of its outstanding title for exhibiting a careless attitude toward fulfilling the responsibilities of their take-off routine.

The party collective of the air engineer service headed by Guards Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel V. Fursa went even farther. The maintenance groups of the unit compete among each other on the basis of points: Points are added for the highest indicators and subtracted for the lowest. The largest number of points--100--is subtracted for a near-accident. If an airplane is returned from the take-off point at the fault of the specialists, or if the crew fails its assignment due to an equipment malfunction, the group loses 50 points. Of course, these severe measures did not have to be implemented against anyone during the year: There was never a single incident of this sort. Thus it is no wonder that all of the groups were deemed outstanding on the basis of the competition results. The maintenance group commanded by Officer L. Il'yayev, which had a previous record of being behind, rose to the top.

I would have to say that in general, the technicians did work truly selflessly this year. I could hardly forget how on their own initiative, specialists of

the technical maintenance unit worked almost around the clock on the eve of a tactical flying exercise, performing maintenance on 10 aircraft. With a feeling of pride for my Guards soldiers, I reported to higher headquarters that 100 percent of the airplanes were ready to fly in the exercise. And once when the engine of one of the craft was tested in the fields and it spewed hot fuel, our comrade, Guards Warrant Officer V. Privalov, rushed toward the flames, and risking burns, he put out the dangerous fire single-handed and prevented possible damage to nearby airplanes.

This year, in which we initiated the competition in the air force, will be remembered by us as a year of unprecedented high enthusiasm and creative inspiration among the soldiers. Thus at the very peak of the competition the collective decided to adopt higher pledges in honor the USSR's 60th anniversary: in addition to the 100 efficiency proposals already pledged, submit another five, and economize twice more fuel and running distance of ground flight support resources than pledged.

These goals were within the means of our Guards soldiers as well. And they were highly beneficial to promoting flight safety. This was especially true of the movement of the efficiency experts. Out of 108 valuable proposals submitted and implemented, the overwhelming majority were concerned with raising the combat readiness and reliability of the equipment.

Officer G. Senokosenko, for example, found an original way to solve a complex technical problem: He eliminated the possibility of jamming of the fire spigot of one of the systems. Now this innovation has been introduced everywhere. Our unit was awarded a special prize by aviation industry. This was a good example for imitation: After all, Communist Senokosenko is not only the chief of a progressive maintenance subunit, but he also leads political lessons in a group which has never gotten less than an outstanding score in 16 years of final exams.

Proposals suggested by Guards Engineer-Major V. Nigovkin and Guards Warrant Officer V. Sokol (seven proposals each), Guards Captain Yu. Klyuchnikov (three proposals) and many others had a sizeable impact, raising the reliability of the equipment.

We exceeded our pledges for reducing the time required to make the subunits combat ready and for economizing on fuel and equipment life. But none of this was ever done in a way detrimental to flight safety, because we worked toward these goals integrally with measures to support accident-free flying. Thus in order to accelerate preparation of the equipment for take-off in response to an "alert" signal at night and in limited visibility, we installed clearance lights on the equipment, organized selective communication with each aircraft hardstand, we set up a console at the command post showing the readiness of each aircraft for take-off, and we did many other things. The fuel savings (which was about 600 tons) was achieved mainly owing to reduction of the operating time of aircraft engines on the ground, especially when taxiing. We made it a practice of towing the aircraft instead of using their engines. This completely excluded the danger of collisions or of airplanes running off of the concrete onto the ground, which could be dangerous in thaw conditions.

We are constantly aware of one important factor of raising flight safety--increasing the qualifications of flight crews and technicians. In this area as well, the achievements of the collective are obvious. Each one of our combat airplanes is flown by a crew with the top flying qualifications. This year we raised four military pilot-snipers and navigator-snipers. It would seem that there is reason to be proud of these successes. But we feel that we have not yet utilized all of the reserves. We still have pilots, navigators and technicians with a 2d class rating. Some of them could have reached the 1st class level this year, but our planning was not thought out completely. We will account for all of this in the new training year.

There are other shortcomings as well. We discussed them in the party way, openly. For example military discipline is generally higher in the subunits than last year, but some crews and detachments still violate regulations and moral norms.

There is reason behind the saying that discipline is the key to everything. Any deviation from the established requirements can immediately have an effect on flight quality and safety. We had one incident in which Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Derbenev, the flight leader, one night gave the command for the next airplane to take off just as another was landing and still on the runway. And rather than reporting that his craft was on the runway, the craft commander Guards Captain A. Lipskiy turned sharply and rolled off the runway. The reason for the accident was a deviation from the established requirements.

Adherence to principles, alertness to the precision with which flight laws and regulations are observed, active inquiry and effective utilization of other reserves for raising flight safety will make it possible to exclude various undesirable "random factors" from combat training. And when the wings are reliable, we see the birth of the confidence with which the unit's personnel boldly take on every difficult task and successfully complete the most complex missions.

The high goals of the year have been achieved. For the fourth time in a row the regiment has won the outstanding title. Prizes instituted in honor of heroes of the Soviet Union S. Kondrin, Ya. Shashlov, A. Nazarov and other valorous veterans of our regiment were awarded to the victors of the socialist competition. The glorious traditions of the flying Guards remain in our combat formation, and they are multiplied by the selfless military labor of the new generation of winged defenders of the fatherland's air borders.

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GROUND FORCES

TANK TESTING, FIRE TRAINING RESULTS, TRAINING NEEDS REPORTED

Underwater Fording of Streams by Tanks

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Panyukov, correspondent: "Testers"]

[Text] This was the fifth time that the two tanks crossed the water obstacle on the bottom one after another.

This means of crossing deep-water obstacles is relatively new to the tank troops. This is perhaps why the picture of tanks moving beneath the water--be it in a tactical exercise or a lesson--is especially impressive. Here at the armored equipment testing range, everyone has gotten used to the maneuver.

He who has been in a tank traveling on the bottom of a water obstacle knows quite well the stress that is experienced in such moments. The heart beats faster, time drags on with exhaustive slowness, and unwittingly the hands feel for the isolating gas mask pouch in the twilight.

"Such sensations are atypical of us," said the company commander, Senior Lieutenant A. Dem'yankov in response to my recollections of my only trip in a tank beneath the water as he hid a smile beneath his full mustache. "We are testers!"

There is so much pride and so much honor in the sound of these words that one really believes that in extreme situations, the emotions of an ordinary person are simply atypical of these people. And even the kind of work they do says the same thing. Fulfilling the numerous assignments of the officer in charge of testing, Engineer-Major V. Bolkhovskiy, the tank crews had already stopped their tanks several times at the deepest point, flooded them and swam out of them. Moreover this work has been proceeding for several weeks. And no one knows how much longer it will continue. On hearing the reports of the tank testers after each assignment, Engineer-Major Bolkhovskiy would make entries into his notebook. Some of the reports would make him happy, and others would cause annoyance. Then he would give the crews their next assignments, and the tanks, obedient to the hands of the soldiers, would once again disappear beneath the water.

Tank testers.... Today they include the grandsons of those who tested the first Soviet tanks, including at this testing range, and of those who prepared our glorious tanks, including the legendary T-34, for victory in battles against the fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War. Today the tanks are being driven here by the sons of those who handled the postwar models of the combat vehicles, the ones preceeding today's tanks, which have admirable firepower, maneuverability and passability. Pride could be sensed in references to Senior Lieutenant S. Mikhaylov, commander of an outstanding platoon, master of combat qualification Warrant Officer P. Kazak, senior instructor-tester 1st class Warrant Officer V. Popov, driver-mechanics and testers junior sergeants V. Silin and A. Silin and many others who distinguish themselves in all of the tests with selflessness and high quality of assignment fulfillment.

Many of the veterans are still working here as well. To the extent that their strength allows, they continue to labor here at the testing range after being retired into the reserves. Their rich experience, pride in their profession as tank testers and their love for it are accepted from them by the young soldiers as they would a baton in a relay race.

Right before the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant Dem'yankov left for the water testing area, Apollon Andreyevich Federov--the former sergeant-major of this subunit--looked in on the tank crews. He looked in, as he said, in passing. He missed it, it would seem.

There was reason to believe that. After all, he had served in the company for a little less than 30 years. During the war he tested the KV and IS tanks, the T-34 and self-propelled guns. He had the fortune of learning the art from those who had assimilated the first Soviet tanks in the 1920's--the "Champion of the Liberty of Comrade Lenin," "Paris Commune," "Proletariat," "Il'ya Muromets," "Victory" and "Storm." And now of course it was no accident that this person appeared in the company. Apollon Andreyevich knew that the tank crews were conducting lengthy, complicated tests, that the people had grown tired, and that they very much needed the inspiring words of an elder. And the veteran was able to find the appropriate words.

In the same way that athletes suddenly get a second wind during a long, difficult run, following the veteran's story about the heroism of his comrades in arms who had fought fascists for several days from a besieged tank, the morale of the company's soldiers doubled.

The tank crews often get such support from veterans. Colonel (Reserve) N. Kuznetsov, former extended-service Master Sergeant P. Bednyy and many other veterans frequently check in with the subunits in an official capacity.

Former subunit commanders reserve officers S. Kuts and N. Stepanov do a special sort of indoctrination work. They devote almost all of their free time to working with the models of armored equipment present here. There are many brands of tanks, armored transporters, combat vehicles and self-propelled guns with which our army had been armed at different times, and there are foreign models as well. The veterans could spend hours on end talking about these vehicles, about their merits and shortcomings and about how they have changed over time.

The lessons of the veterans.... They leave an indelible impression on the hearts of the soldiers that are just beginning their careers as tank testers. It was quite recently that the brothers Viktor and Aleksey Silin--former engine room mechanics of cargo steamships of the Sukhony River Steamship Line--joined the army, but they have already recommended themselves well as competent driver-mechanics. Both have earned several rewards. And Viktor was granted a short leave for exemplary action in one of the tests. The brothers are working hard on themselves, and they are upgrading their qualifications. They are motivated by the same love of their profession which they are absorbing from the veterans.

This love transforms into an attachment to the army, to the difficult labor of the tester. Such also is the fortunate fate of senior instructor-tester 1st class Warrant Officer V. Popov, and company senior technician Warrant Officer P. Kazak, who became a Master of Combat Qualification. Such also is the fate of dozens of warrant officers and officers that have devoted their lives to the army.

In the troops, the attitude toward the testers is one of respect and interest. This is understandable. After all, much of what is now the immutable rule for combat vehicle crews of the subunits was tested many times here on the testing range and underwent verification by the hard labor of the testers.

It is with the purpose of confirming another such rule that the eighth crossing of the water testing area is being performed today. Once again in response to a command from the officer in charge of testing the tanks descend to the deepest point, and once again they are flooded, after which the tank testers rise successfully to the water surface like divers.

Tank Unit Commander Training Discussed

Moscow KRANSAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col I. Tantsyura, Commander, Guards Tank Chertkovskiy Regiment imeni Marshal of Armored Troops M. Ye. Katukov, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "To Study Independently"]

[Text] A company tactical field firing exercise was underway. At precisely the appointed time, the subordinates of Guards Senior Lieutenant M. Khromov advanced to the start line, coordinating efficiently with attached and supporting subunits, they punched a hole through the "enemy's" defenses, and they continued to advance in the required direction. Had the exercise continued to develop according to the plan of the battalion commander, Guards Captain Yu. Bragin, the company would probably have received a high score, inasmuch as the further course of the battle was known to the officers from their experience in previous exercises.

But this time the plan was changed, and the subordinates of Guards Senior Lieutenant Khromov did not receive a high score. The regimental staff was at fault. After the company completed its immediate task, Guards Senior Lieutenant Khromov was given a scenario input in accordance with which the subunit had to enter into combat with an "enemy" tactical airborne force.

The practice targets were set up appropriately in accordance with this input.

Naturally the company commander and the other officers had to know how to act in a swiftly changing situation. And not just on paper, as we often find is true with responses to scenario inputs, but in fact, with real use of all of the fire weapons available to the company. Guards Senior Lieutenant Khromov found this task to be beyond his capabilities. In the course of the combat with the assault force he made a number of tactical errors. In particular his maneuver of fire was not effective enough.

It should be noted that the regimental staff did not plan this input without purpose. We used it as a means to determine how deeply the company commander had assimilated the problems concerned with organizing combat with an airborne force. The fact is that not long before the exercise, the regimental staff recommended that the subunit commanders study this subject independently. Now it was clear that Guards Senior Lieutenant Khromov did not address the assignment with adequate diligence. It was revealed later on that some other subunit commanders had not worked on their own as they should have.

Independent study.... It has long been proven by practice that it is one of the principal forms of improving the professional skills of officers. No matter how many rallies, seminars, group exercises, tactical exercise sessions and other planned measures are conducted within the commander training system, the officer must constantly work to improve his knowledge and habits independently.

Of course much depends here on the regiment commander, the staff and the party organization. Much depends on the sort of conditions they create for the independent study of officers and on how well they monitor and guide their work. But most of all, success depends primarily on the officer himself. Were he to utilize every possibility to assimilate a new training procedure, to practice behind the levers of a tank and the gun sight, and were his independent work to be distinguished by purposefulness and regularity, the results would not be long in coming.

For example it was not that long ago that Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Zaporozhchenko assumed command of his company. Frankly speaking the company was far from the best in the regiment in terms of many indicators. But test exercises conducted in the final phase of the training year showed that the subunit had improved noticeably. And Guards Senior Lieutenant Zaporozhchenko proved himself to be a competent commander. I think that it would not be an exaggeration to say that the achievements were to a great extent the product of the officer's meticulous work to improve his own occupational qualities. When an article was published in a military journal describing a progressive method for training driver-mechanics, Zaporozhchenko introduced the innovation in his own subunit. One of the officers of the company learned to strike the target with the first shot in quick time, and he immediately capitalized on his experience to teach all of the subordinates. Having assimilated the responsibilities of every specialist in the subunit to perfection, Zaporozhchenko is now independently mastering the habits of working at a position one step above his own.

Such persistence in occupational self-education of course deserves praise. And many officers proceed in the same manner. But invariably we still occasionally hear the complaint that very little time is allocated for independent study. In such cases I always bring up Guards Senior Lieutenant Zaprozhchenko as an example.

Where and when is this officer able to improve his knowledge and habits? The answer: everywhere and at all times --at the practice range, in the motor pool, at the gunnery range. And he does all of this in the course of exercises and training sessions together with the personnel. The lights remain on in the windows of his apartment late into the night: The commander works with his textbooks and periodicals.

I would not be wrong in saying that most of the officers in the regiment work independently to raise their professional knowledge and habits just as diligently. But unfortunately not all. I had already mentioned Guards Senior Lieutenant Khromov. The same can also be said about Guards Captain B. Bersanov and some other officers. When one begins to analyze the reasons for the shortcomings in their independent study, one is persuaded again and again that so much depends on work style and on the ability to make sensible use of time.

During the week the officers of the regimental headquarters conducted a time and motion study on the work day of several subunit commanders, and they reported the results at an official meeting. All were persuaded that every officers has not less than 2 hours a day for independent study.

Of course it would be incorrect to assume that the independent study of officers and the search for the time for such study is their concern alone. It is also an important concern of commanders and chiefs. Without their influence upon the independent study of officers, there can be no discussion of success. We have been persuaded many times by experience that the more active this influence is and the greater initiative and creativity is displayed by commanders and chiefs in questions of organizing the independent study of officers, the more successfully the latter develop.

As far as our regiment is concerned specifically, as an example when we search for new, more effective forms of work in this area, we concurrently try to utilize all of the known and well-proven forms of study in application to new conditions and tasks. Take as an example individual assignments. Such assignments include drawing up lesson summaries and plans, writing lectures, reports and abstracts. For example recently the chief of the unit's chemical service, Guards Major A. Medvedev, was instructed to prepare a report on problems associated with improving a tank subunit's protection against mass destruction weapons. The report was then utilized in the organization and conduct of a demonstration lesson for officers. Reports on various topics have also been prepared by other chiefs of the regiment's arms and services.

The quality with which officers complete each individual assignment is monitored and examined by the unit's methodological council, which is headed

by regiment deputy commander Guards Major I. Kal'nitskiy. The appropriate commanders deal with these issues in the battalions. As experience shows, such control is necessary. It helps to promptly reveal omissions in the independent training of officers, to determine their individual features better and, with a consideration for this, to give them assignments for improving their occupational proficiency.

However, we also have some problems which depend upon higher authorities for their solution.

Take as an example upgrading the class qualifications of the officers. I cannot say that things are going badly in this regard in our unit. Especially much was done during the present training year. Platoon, company and battalion commanders and all regiment deputy commanders are capable of driving combat vehicles and performing gunnery exercises with at least a good score. This achievement is in many ways the result of the fact that it has become a rule in our unit for every task at the practice range to be performed first by the seniormost officer. The latter in a sense sets the tone for the lesson, and concurrently he hones his own proficiency. In particular this plays a major role in the fact that almost all of the commanders of the companies and battalions and the regiment's staff officers are 1st class specialists. But there are no masters in the regiment.

What is the problem? As we know, not all chiefs are granted the right to create a qualification commission that can give master's examinations. Despite the fact that we have about 15 officers ready for such examinations, things are not moving along. It has now been several years that we have been waiting for a competent commission from higher headquarters. But still there is no word of its arrival.

The following truth is persuasively confirming itself in the present training year, in which we are at its final phase: Raising a unit's combat readiness depends to a decisive degree on how well independent study of officers is organized. Imparting a more regular, systematic nature to this important form of commander training, raising the interest of officers in improving their occupational proficiency and achieving even more effective control of assimilation of studied material are, we believe, the dependable ways of reaching success in fulfilling training plans and satisfying socialist pledges.

Tank Unit's Year's Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col S. Kiselev: "It Begins With the Officers"]

[Text] The inspection was coming to an end. The pledges had been satisfied. No matter what aspect of the regiment's life was looked into, it could be felt from everything that the competition was continuing. Its impact could be felt in the motor pool, where tank crews placed their equipment in order, in the field, where the materiel is now being prepared for the new training year, and in the barracks.

Here is a typical incident. Once in the evening following final lessons I visited one of the companies together with the regiment deputy commander for political affairs, Guards Major A. Markhay. We went into the bathroom. There, two soldiers in parade dress were grooming themselves before the mirror--they were preparing for a short leave which they had earned in the inspection. They were so engrossed in their toilet and they checked the fit of each other's uniforms so carefully that the deputy commander mentioned with a smile:

"In my opinion what we see here is a spark of rivalry."

The deputy commander was a man with a sense of humor. But it is said that there is a share of truth in every joke.

And so the regiment achieved its goals. But the sense of responsibility that led us to our high objective and helped us surmount all the difficulties did not dull. It only became filled with new content and began sparkling with new facets. Concern for fulfilling the training plans and pledges which we experienced yesterday has now been replaced by concern for retaining the positions won in the competition and for utilizing the accumulated experience, so that we could go farther and achieve more in the new training year.

We are all pleased by how much the people matured in the competition and by how greatly they value the honor of their collective.

Not long before the end of the training year Guards Private A. Kryukov, a gunner of 1st Tank Company, was injured. For health reasons he could not take part in the inspection. But when Komsomol member Kryukov learned that his company needed just a few points to achieve an outstanding score in fire training, he worked things out so that he would be permitted to participate in the gunnery exercise. Ignoring his pain, the soldier sat down at the tank sight. He brought the company another outstanding score, thus insuring its first place not only in the regiment but also in the division.

One had to see with how much pride the eyes of Guards Private Kryukov's friends shined when Lieutenant General V. Lobov, first deputy troop commander of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, presented a valuable gift to him for his outstanding gunnery. One out of every two tankmen in the company fired with an outstanding score that day.

The personnel of this subunit also attained high indicators in other training subjects. And what played a major role in this was the enthusiasm of the soldiers and their preparedness for self-sacrificing acts in behalf of the common cause--qualities which were doubtlessly nurtured by competition, which required the people to exert strongly both their physical and their moral strengths, and by party-political work.

But of course, it was not only enthusiasm and a fighting spirit that led us to success. The inspection showed that the achievements of the 1st Tank Company and of other subunits that won top positions in the competition are based primarily on the high occupation proficiency of the officers.

The beginning of the training year was not successful for us. Not everyone achieved the planned goals of the competition in the winter training period. Many who promised to become outstanding soldiers failed to do so. One of the main points of the pledges of the regiment's officers remained unfulfilled. Before the beginning of the training year the officers promised: "...to constantly display initiative and creativity in work and to improve our occupational training." But when the results of winter training were summarized, it became clear that not all were working with initiative, creatively, with a knowledge of their affairs. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA validly noted at that time, this was precisely the reason for many of our failures. Naturally when we planned our further work, we recognized that the goals we planned for the summer training period could remain unreached if we did not tackle officer occupational training aggressively.

I cannot say that the regimental staff and the party committee ignored these issues in the winter training period. However, the quality of the lessons and training sessions provided for subunit commanders, especially at the platoon and company levels, rarely satisfied the high requirements.

The situation was also aggravated by the fact that in addition to completing the planned assignments of the summer training period, we also had to make up for ground lost in the winter. This necessitated a more-persistent search for ways to raise the intensity of the lessons.

Quite understandably, we could count on success only with the active participation of all officers of the regimental administration in this work. It is precisely from them, the experienced specialists, that the young platoon and company commanders could expect effective assistance in their professional development. Officers of the administration of the office of the headquarters party organization and the regiment's party committee were directed into this channel. And I must say that they did make a substantial contribution to intensifying the training process and to improving the personal training of officers at the platoon and company levels. Especially fruitful work was done in this area by the regiment's deputy commander Guards Major A. Grigorash, the chief of the rocket and artillery service Guards Major G. Nikitin, the chief of the armored service Guards Captain V. Kravchenko and the air defense chief Guards Captain G. Musatov. Instructor training and demonstration lessons and other measures conducted by them in the commander training system helped us to improve the skills of the officers and the specialist training techniques relatively quickly.

Special attention was devoted to raising the effectiveness of tank gunnery exercises. In the past, they were often conducted without regard to the concrete missions of the subunits. Sometimes the proper sequence of studying training issues was violated. All of this was the product of the inadequate instructor training afforded to a number of officers, and inadequacies in their tactical gunnery skills.

How were we able to correct the situation?

Extra meetings were held with commanders of all ranks and their deputies during preparations for the summer training period. The officers once again studied the

guidelines on combat training and the teaching instructions. Moreover they took tests on equipment and armament. Each platoon and company commander was given the appropriate recommendations on improving his knowledge and instructor skills with a consideration for the shortcomings that became known in the course of winter training. Placing emphasis on independent work, we also took pains to see that every officer would have a concrete individual assignment in relation to a particular question of tactical gunnery training. In this case an officer that prepared a program of instruction for a particular subject had the possibility for "defending" it against the opinions of fellow servicemen, and supplementing and improving his work if necessary.

I must say that this form of officer training turned out to be extremely effective. Take as an example the following fact. The regiment staff, which is headed by Guards Major S. Lazovskiy, developed an efficient tank gunnery training schedule on the basis of recommendations from the district's combat training directorate and institutions of higher education. The schedule was intended primarily to insure the greatest possible intensity of training. This was something that had to be done. But it was revealed in the first training exercises that far from all of the officers were ready for the new system in terms of their proficiency as instructors. The most experienced instructor, company commander Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Veretenik was given the assignment of preparing a guideline on organizing training sessions in the company with a consideration for local conditions and the unique features of our equipment.

Such a guideline was prepared. It was tested out in practice. Not only officers of the regiment but also specialists of the district's combat training directorate and institutions of higher education took part in the experiment. When it became clear that the proposed procedure could be beneficial, several demonstration lessons were conducted in all of the battalions. And then things began to move. All that we had left to do was to place fulfillment of the training schedule and compliance with the teaching recommendations by all officers under strict control. And that is what we did.

I am convinced that strict compliance with the written training schedule, the regularity of the training sessions and their high quality were among the decisive prerequisites leading to the high tactical gunnery skills of the tank crews. In any case this helped us to improve the fire training deficiencies of many of the subunits during this summer period. The officers themselves developed as well. It would be sufficient to point that in the final lessons and exercises their overwhelming majority demonstrated outstanding fire skills and the ability to control fire and maneuver of their subunits in the complex conditions of modern combat.

Yes, I can cite many examples attesting the the greater command skills of the officers. This is an indication that we did the right thing by emphasizing improvement of officer training in the summer period. But at the same time the achievements do not at all mean that we have done everything we can in this direction. The regiment still has officers who must do much work on themselves before they can reach the level of the best. And this pertains not only to personal training.

Sometimes we also encounter this kind of situation. When the discussion turns to the problems of combat control, subunit commanders speak with the judgement of an expert. One can sense their complete competency and solidity. But once the discussion turns, as an example, to military and moral indoctrination or to questions associated with organizing the company's affairs and providing logistical support to the personnel, one immediately senses that the officer clearly lacks both knowledge and practical habits.

As we know, experience is something that accumulates with time. But time waits for no one. New, even more complex tasks are ahead of us. And we can count on success in completing them only on the condition that every officer is comprehensively prepared in professional respects.

It is on these requirements that we will base our planning of commander training for the new training year. We will lay our emphasis primarily on intensifying its practical orientation and on implementing more persistently the principle of teaching that which is necessary in war.

Tank Unit's Range Performance Drops

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Nov 82 p 1

[Article by Col N. Naydin, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Lessons of One Gunnery Exercise"]

[Text] When the tank company commanded by Captain V. Pakhomov arrived at the gunnery range for its night firing test, perhaps no one doubted that it would complete its task successfully. We the inspectors also surveyed this company optimistically. We visited the subunit the day before. We asked about the pledges taken by the tank crews. They were considerable--striking the targets with the first shots, with the first rounds. The gunnery results in the preceding inspection raised our hopes. At that time, a month ago, the company underwent the same kind of exercise. High scores stood beside the names of most of the gunners on the exercise documents.

Now however, it became clear from the first attempt that the hopes for a high end result were not justified: The gunners were unable to confirm their previous achievements. The picture repeated itself with subsequent runs as well. Could it really be that the people forgot how to shoot in the course of a month?

As it turned out, the problem lay in something else. It was discovered that the tank crews had functioned a month ago in the gunnery practice preceding the inspection just as they were functioning today. The only difference was that the scores they were awarded were not the ones they had earned, being deliberately inflated.

Let me explain by illustrating this with the example of Private S. Klimov. In the opinion of battalion commander Major I. Ivanishev and company commander Captain V. Pakhomov this soldier experienced a drop in the results of his fire training "for incomprehensible reasons." But are these reasons really that

incomprehensible? The inspection revealed that the soldier had simply never learned how to fire a gun at night. He did not even manage to detect the target within his sector, and instead he opened fire on targets reserved for the gunner of the neighboring tank. The crew commander could have corrected the subordinate's mistake. But he was not controlling the actions of his gunner simply because he never learned to do so.

The inspection showed that many other gunners did not have sound habits of working with night sights either, and that some tank commanders were not trained to work with communication resources and did not know how to correct fire. Moreover some officers also had low results. It would be sufficient to point out that the battalion commander himself was generally unable to complete the exercise.

How do the tank crews themselves explain such a state of affairs?

We heard the most diverse explanations. Privates S. Klimov, A. Lebedev and some other soldiers, for example, complained that the training subunit from which they had been transferred to the regiment had not given them an opportunity to perform similar exercises even a single time. Discussing the reasons behind the poor training of the tank crews, Captain A. Grachev, chief of the regiment's armored service, gave the excuse that they had a larger load of details in the summer training period than in winter.

We should perhaps not discount all of these and other explanations. Each case requires deep analysis. But one thing can be said for sure: The personnel of this company, as well as those of the others, could have achieved more, had the subunit commanders utilized all of the possibilities available to them for training the subordinates, and had the lessons been conducted well, in strict compliance with the requirements of the guidelines. But this is exactly what was missing. Many of the lessons and training sessions, according to the testimony of the tank crews themselves, proceeded at a low methodological level, and some officers permitted laxity and simplifications in training.

Were the regiment staff and the division staff aware of this? It turns out that they were, and they had fully resolved to make sure that all of the tank crew training requirements would be unfailingly completed in the new training year. This of course was good. But the following question begs itself: What kept representatives from the higher staffs from sounding the alarm sooner, while there was still time to correct the shortcomings?

The race for high scores turned out to be the culprit. Assuming the objective of achieving high scores in the competition, some officers measured their work not by the gauge of combat but by the number of points, which the inspection revealed to be inflated. Sometimes things went so far that the weapons were even prepared for firing not by the crew but by officers of the regiment's administration, and sometimes even by officers at the division level. Naturally this reduced the enthusiasm of the people and generated an atmosphere of dependence.

The way the desire--primarily of officers--to achieve high scores at any price reflected upon the attitude of some privates and NCOs can be judged from the following incidents that occurred during the inspection.

During a firing exercise the commander of one of the crews, Junior Sergeant Yu. Slezkin, accidentally turned off his radio set. It would not have been any special difficulty for a competent commander to determine the problem and restore communication. But Slezkin did not try to do this. He knew that for the sake of a high score, the officers would do everything necessary. And he was not mistaken: Following intervention by the battalion communication chief Senior Lieutenant S. Fisnovich, the radio set went back into operation.

Here is another incident. Responding to a command, tanks rushed forward to the fire line. But suddenly one of the vehicles stopped--the engine died. No matter how much the gunnery leader tried to determine by radio why the engine would not start, he never could get a sensible answer from the crew. The battalion deputy commander for technical affairs was sent to the aid of driver-mechanic Private V. Dzyube.

Thus the soldiers worked according to the following principle: If you don't know how, we'll do it for you, the main thing being to reach the needed score.

The experience of the best subunits and units and persuades us that one of the important factors promoting success in combat training is competently organized competition. But this company takes a formal approach to organizing its competition. The personnel adopted their pledges, and that was that. Need one be amazed that many of its tankmen with whom I talked did not even know who their rivals in the competition were?

Now, preparing for the new training year, in addition to completing new tasks the company commanded by Captain Pakhomov and other subunits of the regiment are thinking about how to make up where they fell behind. There are also some things to think about for officers of the higher staff and the political organ. For example, they need to think about how to create an atmosphere of high strictness in evaluating achievements and of intolerance of laxity and simplifications in training.

11004

CSO: 1801/075

GROUND FORCES

AIRBORNE TROOPS PARTICIPATE IN EXERCISES

Warsaw Pact Exercise 'Shield-82'

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 82 p 1

[Article Capt A. Oliynik, special correspondent: "Using a Vertical Envelopment"]

[Text] Yesterday the sides of exercise "Shield-82" continued their active duel. Coordination of troops and naval forces was at the center of attention. Actions by airborne and marine assault landing forces were the main events of the day.

The Black Sea spread out before the wings of our "Il'yushin." The airplanes were following the coastline. The aerial caravan was being led by Pilot 1st Class Communist G. Obidin.

A sea of snow-white crests. And on the waves, assault landing ships.

"We will attack shoulder to shoulder with marines, the soldiers of fraternal armies," Guards Major Yu. Kostyuk spoke without tearing his gaze away from the airplane window.

The battalion under his command and reinforcing subunits made up the striking fist of the airborne landing.

Kostyuk's lean face was unperturbed. The officer has been credited with more than 300 parachute jumps. He has jumped from airplanes day and night, at high and low altitudes. Senior commanders have this to say of him: "He does not panic in a complex situation, and he makes decisions quickly and competently."

The other officers, sergeants and enlisted men are equal to the battalion commander. They all have had good paratrooper training.

Soldiers of 15 nationalities serve in the subunit. They live together in harmony. The battalion holds one of the leading places in the competition for an honorable welcome to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. High organization and unity can be felt now as well. Calm confidence can be seen in the gazes of the paratroopers.

By tradition the officers will leave the airplane first--communists O. Pikauskas, A. Repka, V. Kozhushkin, M. Ismailov, V. Masyuta and V. Yur'yev. Many of them have considerable experience behind their backs. The subunits they lead have demonstrated their proficiency and skill in exercises many times.

As with soldiers in other branches of troops of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Guards paratroopers are bound by ties of strong friendship to soldiers in armies of the socialist countries. This friendship came into being and grew strong in the blood of battles against fascism in the Great Patriotic War. As an example a Soviet paratrooper brigade was within the composition of the Czechoslovak I Army Corps. Soviet officer-instructors taught the Czechoslovak paratroopers how to use parachutes. They also took their baptism of fire together: In September 1944 the brigade was landed in an area occupied by partisan detachments in Slovakia.

With red stars painted on their wings and with the airborne force aboard, the "Il'yushins" approached the assigned region on Bulgarian soil. Giving a signal, the navigator of our crew, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Drobyshev, informed us that the lead detachment of airplanes had begun parachute-dropping combat equipment. That meant that our turn was soon to come.

Turning, the airplane assumed its drop course. The "Ready" signal lit up on the panel. The side doors shuddered and spread apart noisily.

"Go!" the stick commander ordered. And the airborne conveyor went into action: The Guards soldiers jumped from the craft one after another.

The first combat position of a paratrooper is right beneath the canopy of his parachute. The lead detachment, commanded by Guards Captain N. Prokhorenko, fought to take the landing site while still descending through the air. The combat equipment had already descended by parachute. Automatic uncoupling units disengaged the canopies of the cargo parachutes, which deflated and collapsed to the side.

Within just a few minutes the surrounding area was covered by a white film of parachutes. It seemed from above that the first snow had fallen upon the land, now decorated in fall colors. And from the sky the canopies continued to float down like daisies. An impressive sight this was, this attack from out of the sky.

The Soviet Army used the vertical envelopment for the first time during maneuvers in 1935. Before astounded foreign observers about 1,200 men carrying weapons and ammunition jumped from heavy TB-3s.

During the Great Patriotic War the tactic of enveloping the enemy from the air enjoyed further development. At the beginning of 1942 the IV Airborne Corps was dropped behind fascist lines at Vyazma. It contained more than 10,000 men. For almost 6 months the paratroopers contained the actions of the fascists in this region. During the war the Soviet Army used airborne assault forces of different compositions and purposes dozens of times.

"In a modern, highly fluid, dynamic battle, the significance of airborne forces is constantly growing," said Colonel General D. Sukhorukov, commander of the airborne troops, commenting on the actions of the assault force. He emphasized that despite complex weather, the "enemy" was enveloped from the air in this exercise.

Bumping along, our armored transporter rushed forward behind the combat vehicles of the assault force. Annihilating small groups of "enemy" soldiers along the way, under the command of Guards Major Kostyuk the battalion pushed forward to link up with the marines.

Qualities of Paratrooper Profiled

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 82 p 6

[Article by special correspondent M. Istomin: "Men of the Airborne"]

[Text] The hurried waters of the river beneath the steep clay cliff upon which the military garrison is perched, concealed by age-old pines and firs, had witnessed many changes in the years following my retirement from the army. The former sun- and rain-bleached tents can no longer be seen on the neat, asphalt-paved post. And our BMD (airborne combat vehicle), which we had once concealed so carefully from casual onlookers and which had fired its allotment of ammunition in field exercises and which had passed in parade over the bricks of Red Square, now stands in full view on a pedestal beside the entry point.

The changes that had occurred were not only on the outside. Our officers left the unit in the natural course of their army career. Our beloved regiment commander now commands an army. Vladimir Yelizarov, the former NCOIC of a neighboring company, now teaches tomorrow's warrant officers. And those who are serving in the airborne today remember their predecessors--both recent and more-distant.

I could sense the heightened interest in combat traditions from my very first minutes at the post. The Room of Glory was shown to me with a feeling of pride. Extensive information on the patriotic and international deeds of soldiers in blue berets is gathered together here. Incidentally it was in this unit that Senior Sergeant Nikolai Chepik was brought up. A young lad from Belorussia with an untrainable forelock, his recent act of heroism has been inscribed in gold letters in the history of the airborne troops. Every person retiring from the ranks of the winged infantry now takes his photograph with him. Young paratrooper trainees pledge faithfulness to the motherland beside the obelisk erected in his memory. Thinking about Chepik, one begins to understand the meaning of the expression that "no one will ever vanquish a country in which the new generation preserves and multiplies the combat traditions of preceding generations."

"We are rightfully proud of our young," said the garrison chief with a barely noticeable Caucasian accent.

The weather was pleasant that morning. We went to the tank driving range. Captain A. Onishchenko's company was working on the combat vehicle driving procedures. The line of driver-mechanics was ready at the start line. In a few minutes they drove their combat vehicles through ditches and passageways, over bridges and humps and through simulated minefields. Private Vladimir Krivtsov, a blue-eyed Siberian, drove his vehicle easily, confidently and we might say boldly.

I do not think it was an accident that Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Major V. Belchenko took me to the tank driving range first. I know from my own experience how much physical and moral exertion is required and what sort of loads the nerves and the body must endure for a combat order to be fulfilled in roadless terrain, in dust, mountains and desert, in heat and bitter cold.

Our old firing range met me with the familiar chatter of automatic rounds, the sighs of grenade throwers and the hissing splashes of guided rocket missiles. The crew in which Private Sergey Malygin serves changed its fire position proficiently, and even dashingly. And once again the accurate salvos.

"It wasn't anything special," he shrugged his shoulders later on. "That's just the way we serve. With a big bang," the young soldier from Kharkov teased me as I clasped my ears with my hands.

The skill of the paratroopers and the romanticism of their service attract young boys crossing the thresholds of the military commissariats. But the road to the blue beret and the paratrooper vest is not a simple one.

Vitaliy Kislyuk was a fitter at an atomic power plant before being called into the army. He longed for the sky, he begged the military commissariat, and in the end he even forced the decision: He moved to his place of future service on his own.

"The desire alone to serve in the airborne troops is not enough," smiled Major V. Vyshinskiy, deputy commander for political affairs of the airborne regiment in which Kislyuk now serves. "The lad managed to prepare himself both physically and morally. There are not many conscripts who have two-pood weights at home. And he didn't just lift them once in a while to keep the dust off. He really worked with them. He knew deep inside that before 'the propellers take us aloft,' there is much to do on the ground to become a paratrooper."

Beauty and bravery--these are the unique calling card of the airborne troops. But that which is beautiful in the airborne is the result of training and persistent work. Today short-spoken Sergeant Kislyuk and the lively quick-to-answer Nikolay Kamenskiy, the latter's twin brother Anatoliy and their Komsomol leader Valentin Kishko, a husky man with miner's blood in his veins, can climb up the vertical wall of the barrack building to the third story, they can break through a pile of tiles or bricks with the side of their hand, and they can make dizzying somersaults. But things are not necessarily all that obvious in the airborne troops. And not only there.

"Once we set off to bring in a young complement," Captain A. Filippov began his story. "As relatives said their farewells to the young lads, I often heard

them say: 'Go, now. They'll make a man out of you.' Of course on one hand it is pleasant to hear such faith in the army. But on the other? Why do some parents lay all their hopes upon the man with the shoulderboards: Can he really make him a man, can he correct his ways?"

Incidentally, scientists have calculated that in the last 10 years, the volume of information that a soldier must know has doubled.

"That is true," agreed Colonel P. Zhinkin. "In a certain sense, 2 years of service in the airborne troops may be equated to 4 years of training at an institution of higher education. But honestly speaking, not everyone is ready to assimilate such a volume of knowledge. Considering even that the people selected for the airborne troops are limited to conscripts with certificates of maturity or with diplomas of a secondary technical education."

"The incoming complement is doubtlessly distinguished by a capacity for thinking," Lieutenant Colonel V. Tyurin, the chief of staff of one of the units, shared his thoughts with me. "They basically know how to acquire information and how to work with it, making sound conclusions having practical value. The lads that come in are not stupid."

I was unable to interview him in greater detail. The lieutenant colonel, who was wearing a neat field uniform, went over to the officers standing beside the battalions that had formed up for inspection. The regiment was preparing for an exercise. In the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation it won the socialist competition, crowding out its traditional rival.

"We have no secrets from our friends and rivals, explained to me Senior Lieutenant F. Klintsevich, acting deputy commander for political affairs of the 1st Battalion. "We have organized individual work with the people well. And during the forthcoming exercise we will try to show that the victory was not accidental."

Following the inspection I went with Klintsevich into one of the barracks. Not having taken the time to remove their mottled jumpsuits and still wearing their weapons, the paratroopers clustered around the company's satirical newspaper STROPOREZ, laughing with glee.

"It is said that the main thing is to have people that laugh on your side. The reason for that," the eyes of my guide sparkled, "is that humor is also a means of suppressing the 'enemy.' And we now have him in our clutches."

"I remember my first short forced march," Private Askhaval Magomedov, a handsome Avar, told me. "The sergeant was in front. We were running. There was nothing to breathe. I was laboring along in the rear. The sergeant dropped back toward me. I raised myself up as best as I could. I'm going to get it now, I thought. But he took my grenade thrower and rested my weight upon himself. Running together, we made it the rest of the way."

"How about now?"

"No," he shook his head, "no one needs to carry me anymore. Now I help others. It can't be any other way. We're paratroopers, after all. I even commanded my little brother to put some good effort into physical training."

"Well, who else helped you and taught you?"

"The battalion commander. He's a man with a sense of justice."

I had heard about the battalion commander, Major V. Vorontsov, long before my arrival. His subunit was part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops providing international assistance to fraternal Afghanistan. The battalion commander said:

"For example each of us had read about the whistle of bullets, and heard the thunder of shell bursts in the movies. But what would it be like in real life? What is it in combat that compels a soldier to attack?"

The major--I know for a fact that he had been awarded the orders of the "Badge of Honor" and the Red Star--fell silent for an instant, and then answered his own question:

"Will! It transforms a thought into a daring act, into an act of heroism. It raises people to the attack. It suppresses the fear of the void beneath the airplane's door. One of our main missions is to nurture will, to make it part of the paratrooper's gear, if you will."

They jumped at dawn. The engines droned relentlessly. Parachute canopies covered the sky. Captain Ye. Yegorov and I had just returned from the landing site. My excitement was still intense. And suddenly I sensed something wrong. A silence fell upon the airfield. The song of an unseen lark penetrated the silence unsettlingly.

"The jumping's been halted, the air's too rough," the officers next to us assessed the situation.

A few minutes later I saw an AN-2 in the sky. The "Annushka" clambered along the bank of unexpected clouds, disappearing into them and once again breaking out of the film.

"The general's in the air. He's checking to see if we can go on," Major A. Zelenko tilted his head upward.

"What do the weathermen have to say?"

"Why ask them? They don't even tell the truth at home," joked the chief of the unit's airborne service.

His disappointment was understandable. One can imagine how much effort went into packing the parachutes. The people were all prepared. And now see what we've got. But luckily the clouds soon went away. The lines of paratroopers, all buttoned up and ready to go, once again made their way to the ramps. And once again "a snowstorm of opened canopies."

It has been noted that during an assault landing, a soldier loses half a kilogram of weight, but on the ground he regains what he had lost almost right away, after his first meal. And the officer who remains on the ground and

watches over them loses more than 2 kilograms, taking at least a couple of days to regain.

Standing with their legs wide apart, the people given the job of training and indoctrinating the winged infantry looked hard into the blue sky dotted by canopies. It has been said that officers of the airborne troops turn gray faster. But that simply means that their subordinates mature sooner.

11004

CSO: 1801/074

AIR DEFENSE FORCES

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SOLVING COMBAT PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col V. Lapshin, officer of the Main Staff, Air Defense Forces: "What Is It, A Research Approach"]

[Text] What should the commander's research approach be in the course of combat training and the working out of methods for the employment of equipment and armaments? When I put this question to commanders of subunits and units some of them shrugged their shoulders: problems in military science, they say, including various studies, are examined in the academies, schools, and other military institutions. Special studies are conducted, as a result of which new methods for the conduct of contemporary battle and improving the work style of the tactical control elements can be checked in practice. And what new things do you disclose under conditions of the subunit or unit where a system of combat training which has been established and has been tested many times exists and, in addition, is strictly regulated by instructions and manuals?

But is this so? Let us turn to those instructions and manuals. They contain the requirement to employ the provisions and recommendations which are set forth creatively, conforming to the situation. And really, practice itself convinces us that without a creative search and a research approach it is impossible to master to perfection difficult methods for the conduct of contemporary battle and ensure the high combat readiness of the subunits and units. Unfortunately, the view which exists among some officers concerning organizational forms and methods of combat training as something unalterable, settled, and rigidly limited within the framework of documents is frequently a psychological barrier which hinders an innovative approach in work and does not permit the active employment of research procedures in it.

In one of the units, we asked for information on how the question of the content and delivery of a unit of fire to the position is solved. "Exactly in conformance with the directions of the instructions," the answer followed. But proceeding from the specific conditions and the specific character of the tasks, what has been done to reduce the time and labor expenditures? With what suggestions for improving the providing of the subunits with a unit of fire did they go to higher headquarters? It turned out that nothing has been done and that they went out with nothing: This, they say, will be in defiance of instructions in effect.

As experience shows, the reluctance of an officer to trouble himself with meditation and searches for the best variants of a solution to training problems is often concealed behind the reference to the authority of directives and instructions.

A research approach is impossible without a critical look at accumulated collective and personal experience. As is known, collective experience is always more interesting and richer than personal experience since it absorbs everything better which was achieved by many people over a long period of time. Therefore, to speak of innovation in work without having mastered this experience in full measure is pointless. One can step farther and rise to a new stage in professional skill only having been enriched by it and having understood all the fine points of the matter. In this sense, personal experience can become the source for the replenishment of collective experience. This, of course, is possible under the condition of a creative approach to the matter where each lesson, drill, and exercise becomes a process in the search for more optimum and effective ways to accomplish training combat missions.

One day, in the course of a tactical exercise an aerial target was not conventionally fired on. Here is how it happened. A target entered the zone of reconnaissance means for the first time with a relatively low speed of flight. One of the batteries detected this target at maximum range, and Major A. Chuchilin, who directed the combat work, immediately assigned the battery the mission for its destruction. Several more kilometers remained to the zone of fire when the target was detected by the other two subunits. After the first battery conducted a conventional launch, blips from two high-speed low-flying targets moving one behind the other with a small interval appeared on the screens of the scopes. The subunits which were not occupied at that moment with training firing were assigned the mission to search for and destroy the new targets. The route, altitude, and flight speed of the "enemy" airplanes relative to the positions of these subunits did not permit the missilemen to perform all operations necessary for the "destruction" of both targets. One of them proved to be "not fired upon."

"A hopeless situation developed," Major Chuchilin thus commented on this occasion.

However, the analysis which was conducted convinces us of the opposite. Of the three subunits participating in the drill, the best prepared for operations under difficult conditions was the battery which tracked the first target. This circumstance was well known to Major Chuchilin. Consequently, the very logic of the development of events prompted: while there is one target in the zone of detection and, in addition, one operating at a considerable distance, the mission for its destruction could have been assigned to a less trained subunit. This provided the opportunity to have better trained subunits in reserve in case of a sudden complication of the situation. Unfortunately, the officer adopted a different decision which was not the best. Thus, a tactical error by the director of the drill was present. And its sources are seen in the fact that during the organization of the drills the special features of combat control in unforeseen situations are not studied here in full measure. Namely that which presumes a research approach it absent here.

Just what presumes a research approach in the organization of combat training in the subunits and units? First of all, it is believed, the collection and deep analysis of the most important indices and characteristics of combat work of the sections, subunits, and command posts under various conditions. Even the simple systematization of these data for the period of training permits the disclosure of much that is interesting. For example, to determine how skillfully one or another commander accomplishes a specific mission and to see the dynamics of a change in the level of training of the specialists and the influence of various factors and circumstances on it. In addition, a research approach presumes the working out of new, unexpected tactical, firing, and other missions on each lesson and drill which follow from the nature of the "enemy's" probable actions and the special features of the situation.

The beginning of any study is the collection and detailed consideration of characteristics and statistical data. The following fact shows the importance of this work. Back in November 1942, at one of the assemblies of representatives of air defense of the fronts the necessity to present reports on the actions of enemy aviation and friendly means and the results and conclusions for each operation was pointed out. Such reports permitted the command to organize the air defense of objectives better and more effectively.

But here, proper attention is not devoted to this work in all units now. In reports on the results of exercises and drills, at times it is difficult to find an analysis of the actions of subunit and unit commanders under those or other conditions. Consideration of the results of exercises with live firing is usually limited to range cards in which only the most general indices are recorded. Neither experience nor the reasons for errors committed can be seen behind them. But the systematization of such data would permit introducing corrections in the training process and eliminating shortcomings which are present.

Not so long ago, a significant nonuniformity in the level of training of the personnel of subunits was disclosed during a check of one of the units. What was the reason here? The deputy unit commander, Major P. Gordiyenko, could not name it. It was necessary to prepare the required graphs and diagrams. Which training problems require elaboration became graphically evident. Now it wasn't difficult to ascertain the reasons why some subunits are lagging and to envision measures to eliminate shortcomings.

Why wasn't this work done earlier in the unit? It turns out that none of the staff officers even thought that such an analysis is possible. And here, it will be appropriate to say that in the military schools and academies, unfortunately, they still do not teach the officer candidates and students sufficiently to use research methods and procedures in a combat situation. And without this, under contemporary conditions it is difficult to structure the training process on a scientific basis and attain high results in combat training and the mastery of equipment.

As experience shows, systematic monitoring and the consideration and analysis of current indices of training and competition permit generalizing everything that is valuable and advanced and eliminating "bottlenecks" and errors in the organization of the training process in time.

The subunit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. Sevast'yanov has been showing good, stable results for a long time. The successes are explained to a great extent by an innovational, creative approach to the accomplishment of training tasks. In particular, here a combined evaluation of the professional state of preparedness of the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers [praporshchik], and officers is conducted periodically in accordance with the procedure which has been worked out. A generalized indicator is determined for each person on the basis of the results of the accomplishment of basic standards, grades for the quality with which operations are performed, and grades for technical and special knowledge using factors. For this purpose, special tables have been worked out which permit converting diverse results to points which characterize the level of the men's professional skill.

The so-called "three-operators method" has been introduced into practice in the subunit. It consists of the fact that in the course of lessons and drills the leader joins in the work of the operators who are searching for and detecting aerial targets. Figuratively speaking, another pair of eyes is added to the eyes of the two operators. And the main thing is that the officer's great experience, which is transferred graphically and practically in the course of joint work, is added. And this is of great value.

Military science is being enriched not only in the offices of scientists, in laboratories, and on the proving grounds. Its living, inexhaustible source is the daily life and training of the troops and their constantly developing experience.

6367

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

NCO TRAINING FAULTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Maj G. Belostotskiy, correspondent of the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU [At the Battle Station], Moscow Air Defense District: "They Finish Learning in the Troops.... What Lowers the Quality of NCO Training in the Training Subunit"]

[Text] In the units, I had the occasion many times to hear complaints about the quality of training of graduates from the training subunit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Makhotin. The officers noted that in general the young sergeants are trained quite well in combined-arms subjects. But they have a shallow knowledge of the combat equipment and do not possess the skills necessary to service it. As a result, the molding of junior commanders in the units proceeds with difficulty and with high costs. It is difficult for them to assert their authority among their subordinates who are stronger than they are in special training.

What is the reason for this situation? The officers speculated: evidently the students are diverted to various work and, therefore, they do not succeed in acquiring the required volume of knowledge and skills.

And here in the training subunit I spoke with Lieutenant Colonel Makhotin, informing him of the opinion which had been formed in some of the officers in the units. He immediately specified:

"Our training plan is accomplished strictly and undeviatingly. We consider each stoppage of the lessons as an extraordinary occurrence...."

This means that the shortcomings are concealed somewhere else. But namely where? I looked for the answer to this question in talks with the commander and other officers of the subunit. I also visited several lessons on special training. I will tell about one of them. It began and ended strictly on schedule. One hundred percent of the personnel attended it. But for some reason, only one fourth of the students were constantly occupied in working out the training standards while the others stood aside and waited until their turn came to load and unload the launchers under the observation of the instructors for practical instruction. Where can one speak here of molding firm skills in the future sergeants if three-fourths of the training time is spent in idling.

"Our duty is to inculcate only the most general skills in the students," explained the battery commander, Captain S. Malkov, after a drill. "Really, there are no conditions to accomplish more difficult tasks."

Lieutenant Colonel M. Kireyev, who is responsible for the planning and organization of the training process, spoke in a similar spirit. Since it is hardly possible to ensure the necessary intensity of the drills due to objective reasons, he noted, it is necessary to reduce the course in special training to the minimum, concentrating efforts on methodological and combined-arms training. And for the remaining questions, he says, the sergeants finish learning with the troops.

However, there are officers in the subunit who are convinced that the difficulties can be surmounted. For example, Captain N. Ivanov who arrived here not so long ago from a line unit. He spoke excitedly and with great concern at a party meeting on indulgences and simplifications in combat training and he criticized Major V. Cherkashin and Captain S. Malkov.

Captain Ivanov and other officers of the subunit are persistently seeking reserves to raise the quality of the students' training. There are many difficulties here.

"It is simpler for the launchermen," the instructor of practical training, Captain V. Kolosovskiy, explained to me. "Four men drill simultaneously at one launcher, and the same number at the other. Now, imagine, a platoon comes to me for a lesson. And in the station van there are only two work sites...."

The officers in the subunit posed a question: but can't a part of a platoon rather than the entire platoon be involved in the lesson in special training--in such a way that none of the students lose time in vain? At this time, the others can be occupied on other subjects. This thought formed the basis of the individual-group method of instruction, in the development of which master of combat qualification Major V. Sharin, Captain V. Kolosovskiy, and others participated.

There is no denying it is a good idea. Only it proved to be not so simple to realize it. For it was required to restructure to a considerable degree the training process which had already been checked out.

Nevertheless, the individual-group method has been firmly put into practice in the radiotechnical battery and permitted raising substantially the level of special training of the operators. But why do they train in the old way in the adjacent battery--the launch battery? They were on the point of trying to employ the innovation here, too, as an experiment. And they received graphic confirmation of the old truth: Leading experience cannot be mechanically introduced without consideration of the specific character of the students' training. There are considerably more work sites in a launch battery and with the new drill procedure there are not enough instructors.

They found a way out: to detail one platoon for drill at the launchers. In this case, the platoon leader and his deputy can participate in the drills as instructors. They can also work out problems in tactical-special training. This method was called the platoon method. As experience showed, the method is quite good. But why hasn't it been put into practice up to now?

"We can only introduce suggestions for a change in methods," Lieutenant Colonel Makhotin spread his hands in distress. "And it depends little on us whether or not they are approved. By the way, we should display more persistence...."

Lieutenant Colonel Makhotin and other officers consider that the introduction of the individual-group and platoon methods only approaches the solution of the problem. These methods permit raising the level of the students' individual training. But this is not enough. The future sergeants should be equipped with the firm foundations of tactical training. The graduates of the subunit should have a clear impression of how a surface-to-air missile battalion operates when repelling a raid by the aerial enemy and should test themselves under conditions which approximate those of combat.

Much has been done in the subunit to accomplish this task. First of all, they were concerned here about raising the level of tactical and methodological training of the lesson leaders. A series of training-methods and demonstration lessons was conducted for them. More effective monitoring of the quality of the drills was established.

But nevertheless, it cannot be said that all reserves have been used. A further improvement of the organization of the training process itself is needed. The distribution of instructors by subjects and not by platoons is hardly justified. First, one instructor conducts lessons for several weeks in all platoons and therefore is loaded to the limit. Then, when studying the next subject, his comrade does not come out of the van. The instructors become fatigued and this cannot but be reflected in the quality of the training. Moreover, with such loading the instructors do not succeed in studying the students well. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to speak of an individual approach under such conditions.

A ponderable reserve of time can be provided by the improvement of the training-material base and its more effective use. For it is more expedient to conduct a portion of the drills in the classroom. A simulator created by Captain A. Ikonnikov, for example, permits five operators to work out the skills of detecting and tracking targets simultaneously in the classroom.

What a pity that there are few such devices. Here is something for the soldier-innovators to work on. Of course, the subunit should do better in providing equipment which has been written off whose units, as is known, serve as the basis for highly effective simulators. For the present, requisitions for equipment which has been written off are not completely satisfied.

The subunit also needs more effective assistance in the accomplishment of such an important task as the conduct of tactical exercises. The necessity for the use of this form of training has been discussed many times. And ultimately, the subunit received a "good." But there were no proper conditions created for the conduct of the first exercise. Captain Kolosovskiy and other officers had to work out its plan and prepare the materiel and personnel hurriedly.

"Although it was the first attempt, it did not turn out badly," Lieutenant Colonel Makhotin joked as he told how the exercise went. "There were rough spots, but they don't count: the main goal was achieved. The students learned what genuine combat work is."

Lieutenant Colonel Makhotin shared his plans. He has the following intention: to plan and conduct an entire cycle of tactical lessons. This will permit raising the tactical training of the future sergeants significantly.

"And one other thing," he said. "We will introduce night lessons. Today is the first one." And smiling, he added: "We are trying to do everything that depends on us so that our graduates do not have to finish learning with the troops."

The task, of course, is not simple, but it is completely realistic. In order to accomplish it successfully, it is necessary to eliminate all shortcomings in the organization of the training process and utilize available reserves more completely.

6367

CSO: 1801/016

NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL INFANTRY: AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT IN EXERCISE 'ZAPAD-81' DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Sep 82 p 4

[Article by special correspondent Capt A. Kondrashov, Twice-Honored Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "Report from the Exercise: An Attack from the Sea"]

[Text] The sea greeted them with a storm. The ship [1-2 words missing] "the infantry made it dirty... [one word missing] for them..."

Gds Sgt Yuriy Bogachkov looked around. Several seamen from the landing ship's crew were swabbing down the deck at the stern.

"Hey, brothers! Let me help..."

Other naval infantrymen also shed their jackets and armed themselves with mops. Soon the deck, which had been soiled with boots and tank treads, again shone.

...Later they sat together in the crew spaces. Someone brought a guitar. They sang different things, but this front melody turned out best of all:

"Our enemies called us a black stormcloud! Friends call us guards of the fleet! But we, more modestly and better, more accurately and simply call ourselves the naval infantry!"

The legendary naval infantry...

"Remove fastenings from equipment! Prepare for landing!"

Work began boiling in the tweendeck, the enormous space between decks resembling a gigantic cave. The rumble of combat vehicles drowned out the heavy breathing of the sea. These were the driver-mechanics of the amphibious tanks Aleksey Astapenkov, Oleg Sysoyev and Dmitriy Demidchik preparing for action.

The crew helped the naval infantrymen.

Then there was more substantial help. Fire support guns crashed. Naval aviation "worked over" the shore. The "enemy" had dug deeply into the earth and thoroughly mined approaches to his positions.

And then there was also the storm.

But the sea is the sea and real training always takes place under conditions approximating those of combat to the maximum.

What is a storm ladder worth? Ask this of the two Viktors, guards junior sergeants Khomchenko and Stankevich. The experienced scouts will tell you how many kilometers they clambered over the swaying rope ladder.

Or take the fire course. If you look at it from the side it is a pretty attraction. Imagine a narrow corridor of fire with fearless daredevils in it negotiating obstacles, making acrobatic jumps and dashing demonstrating unarmed combat and karate moves. But the infantrymen also know the reverse side of this "circus."

The jump from the "courage cliff" also is not for the fainthearted. Even the most desperate daredevils lose several kilograms of weight from the excitement. Is it conceivable? Hooked to a line by a waistbelt, to leap into the sea from a very high cliff! The lads jump.

The sea at times plays such mean tricks that you hold up. That was what happened with their countryman Nikolay Katsuba.

It happened in Exercise "Zapad-81." The assault force was standing in the very same kind of storm. The PT-76 [type of amphibious tank] was approaching shore and conducting fire. Suddenly the combat vehicle began to lose speed. The driver-mechanic smelled the odor of exhaust gas. He had a tickling in his throat and a painful headache.

But Katsuba did not let go of the corrugated control levers.

They had more than just a single minute to float ashore. These were minutes that tested will and endurance.

Gds Sr Smm Katsuba was awarded the frontline medal "For Combat Merit" in peacetime.

...The closer they came to shore, the more furiously the "enemy" snapped at them. He was trying to block off the assault force with a fiery curtain and a wall of bursts and to destroy it on the water. The most critical moment of "combat" was at hand.

The command sounded aboard the ships:

"Assault force, away!"

The flap-type gates crawled apart heavily. The sea struck the enormous opening with salty spray. The tank of Yura Bogachkov was first to dart down the ramp into the storm, followed by that of Nikolay Katsuba. And the assault force poured into the sea.

"Seven feet beneath the keel, infantry!"

While the tanks slid toward shore, butting the waves like porpoises, they were being passed by air cushion vessels. Offspring of the sea and sky, the flying ships rushed toward shore with a jet roar. Forces of the first wave of naval infantry and combat engineer-divers were aboard the multiton "saucers" flying over the sea.

The divers' work is not showy. They don't throw knives or make effective lunges and throws. But it is not easy to make a passage in an underwater minefield or clear the sea of TNT boobytraps. Experience is needed here, such as, for example, that of Gds Sr WO [praporshchik] Ivan Krivenko, a naval infantry veteran and the best combat engineer-diver of the Baltic Fleet. He has worked an overall total of more than five months under the water alone.

A swift dash, and the first wave of the assault force is ashore. Landing personnel who came ashore in the first wave join "battle." Machinegun and submachinegun bursts ring out. Grenades fly into the defenders' trenches. Of course, all this is only simulation in the practice fight, but the hand-to-hand fighting is real. Although the best unarmed combat specialists of the naval infantry use far from all moves (safety measures do not allow it), they win the beachhead confidently.

Meanwhile the main body of the assault force rolls ashore like a storm wave. Soon only the tracks of wheels and scars from treads are left on the yellow sand of the beach. The "fight" already is rumbling in the depths.

...In the evening, when the very edge of the red-hot sun already was disappearing in the cool sea, the ships approached shore. The flap-type gates again spread open hospitably. Like tired horses, the dusty tanks slowly entered the native stall of the tweendeck.

The assault force was returning home.

6904

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NAVAL FORCES

SURFACE VESSELS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Patrol Ships Transit Bosphorus

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Captain 2d Rank A. Shevchenko, commander of "outstanding"-rated patrol ship "Zadornyy": "Operating in Company, A Commander's Thoughts"]

[Text] In summing up performance results for the winter training period, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, referred to the patrol ship "Zadornyy" as one of the best surface vessels in the Red Banner Northern Fleet. We are today publishing an article by the commander of the "Zadornyy" dealing with assimilation of the experience of operating in company.

Our ships were passing through the Bosphorous, straits difficult to navigate because of the density of the traffic and of the necessity of having repeatedly to move from one side to the other. The patrol ship "Gromkiy", which was proceeding a few cable lengths ahead of us, suddenly began to reduce speed and then stopped. The actions the commander of the patrol ship, Captain 2d Rank V. Ryabko, had taken were at first glance difficult to explain. The objective he was to pass clear of on a head-on course was in fact passing at a safe distance; and another ship, coming from the left up ahead, was, according to the rules, supposed to keep out of "Gromkiy's" way. It was precisely the maneuvering of this, the second, ship, however, that prompted Ryabko to reduce his speed. The intentions of the ship crossing ahead were not clear enough to "Gromkiy's" commander, so he decided to avoid complicating the situation any further, particularly what with the fact that it was almost time to change sides again.

From the pilothouse of our ship the situation as it was developing did not appear alarming. Most of all, perhaps, because we were not directly involved. But I nevertheless ordered our ship to stop as well and then suggested that Captain 3d Rank Yu. Bodarev, the officer of the watch, and Captain-Lieutenant A. Vlasov, our navigator, analyze the actions the commander of the "Gromkiy" had taken and then give their opinions of the decision he had made. Why? Because this concrete situation had presented us with the opportunity, which is particularly valuable to mariners, to test our competence, our ability to predict a situation. Both officers expressed themselves in favor of a bolder solution to this problem. At the same time I, too, as the commander was inclined toward more resolute action.

This unclear picture now began to resolve itself, however. The ship which had been crossing in front of the "Gromkiy" continued on its course without yielding to the patrol ship. It was only very late that its captain, having either recognized his error or changed his previous intentions, turned to the left. At this point, the ship approaching head-on was passing close by. So that, had the "Gromkiy" now found itself between them it would have complicated the situation for its commander in the extreme.

It was thus not for nothing that the experienced commander of the patrol ship ahead of us took timely precautionary measures. Subsequent events had provided clear confirmation of this.

So the experience of another commander in our joint operation became a lesson for us as well. For the fact is that even a tiny crumb of this practical experience is of great value for a ship commander. Operating in company is particularly useful because it creates an environment in which he can develop skills faster not only through his own activities, but by borrowing from the experience of the commanders of other ships as well.

Another example from our joint operation with the "Gromkiy."

Soviet ships were concluding an operational call at a foreign port. The squadron commander instructed Captain 2d Rank V. Ryabko and me to prepare the decision for the ships' departure from port. We both presented our proposals to the admiral within the time allotted us. They turned out to be entirely different, but the flag officer approved both of them. Quite frankly, this for me was somewhat unexpected. After I had acquainted myself in the flag officer's room with the decision submitted by the "Gromkiy's" commander, it seemed to me that his conception was a little on the simplistic side and somewhat inelegant to boot. He had the "Gromkiy", the second hull alongside berth, pulling away from the pier, turning 30 degrees and then backing out of the bay. The bay was indeed narrow and inconvenient for maneuvering, but nevertheless.... For my own ship I proposed to pull out and then reverse my main engines so as, having backed into the fairly narrow and rapid river channel, to be able to turn around and head quickly out of the bay. Maneuvering, particularly in the river channel, was a little difficult; on the other hand, it would not only gain time, but make for a disciplined, and at the same time an elegant, maneuver.

So we took in the gangways and let go the mooring ropes. The "Gromkiy" began to execute its plan easily and fairly quickly. Our "Zadornyy" also pulls away from the wall, flying the admiral's flag. The escorts therefore naturally pay our ship particular attention.

During the first stage of our departure I was not in any humor to be observing the "Gromkiy." Our difficult maneuver required quick movements and special efficiency and precision. I had to spend the whole time going from one wing of the bridge to the other. But then when we finally began moving ahead, I saw that the "Gromkiy" was already entirely clear of the bay. That's when I really began to evaluate the picture of our ships' movements in relation to one another. They had been exceptionally well-coordinated and rapid and therefore beautiful, which in foreign ports is of no small importance for the prestige of not only the individual pendants, but of our navy as a whole. Captain 2d Rank Ryabko deliberately avoided the more difficult and efficient movements in favor of the flag officer, that is to say, to the benefit of us all. In so doing he demonstrated his command wisdom, which, of course, the squadron commander appreciated immediately.

It is impossible to operate in company without paying heed to the common interest and without striving to act in this interest vigorously and conscientiously. Accomplishment of the complex missions characteristic of modern-day naval combat requires the participation of many, and frequently diverse, forces. But not simply the participation of these forces, but their maximum coordination, and mutual understanding and support as well. The ability of each commander to think and act within extremely narrow time constraints and under conditions involving enormous moral-psychological and physical stresses is of particular importance in this connection. In his address at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, drew attention to precisely this aspect of operational control.

The level of instruction the school of company operation provides depends to a great extent upon the attitude of the individual ship commander himself. It will be necessary to rely not only upon flawless operational control on the part of the flag officer: you receive his commands, carry them out and you've performed well. Yes, of course the flag officer holds all forces in his own hands, of course he's in control of all combat operations. He does have the big picture. But reliable control in combat will also require that ship commanders be able to develop an accurate and extensive feel for the flag officer's concept, that they occasionally be able to anticipate his decisions and, depending upon the situation, be able to see possibilities for demonstrating their own initiative and then in fact to demonstrate it in a timely manner. This in turn requires that they continually subordinate their own interests and actions to a single combat operational rhythm and to a single objective.

I recall the following incident from my first ASW drill. A neighboring ship in our hunter-killer group was maintaining contact with an "enemy" submarine it had spotted. The senior officer then ordered me to attack it. In attempting to execute my mission as quickly as possible, I sped over the shortest course toward the target and soon found myself between it and my colleague who had been tracking it. The wake of our own ship, which now cut between our neighboring ship and the submarine, consequently made conditions for maintaining contact with the latter substantially worse. Even though the attack was precisely on target, my overall performance received low ratings. In the process of accomplishing my own mission I interfered with another ship. And if a situation had arisen in which we ourselves had not been able to establish contact with the "enemy" submarine, the other ships in the hunter-killer group would have lost the target for some period of time as well.

Actual combat is characterized by intense enemy countermeasures. It would be mistaken, however, to think that operating in company or joint execution of combat training missions will always be possible in accordance with a fixed, preplanned scenario in peacetime. We are not speaking here about unexpected changes in weather or an artificially created tactical background situation. All these things can theoretically be taken into account and predicted. A situation may occasionally be complicated by the appearance of what are referred to as unanticipated targets. These are the variety of transport, fishing and naval vessels belonging to capitalist, and particularly the NATO, countries. All commanders have probably encountered gross violations of the international rules for the prevention of collisions at sea on the part of foreign vessels and ships, even under extremely adverse conditions. There are instances in which a fellow commander has overlooked an important aspect of some situation or incorrectly understood a flag officer's orders. The attitude of a sideline observer cannot be permitted in this kind of situation. To offer suggestions, to come to his assistance,

to do everything which depends upon you--these things constitute both the moral and the operational duty of the ship commander.

On one particular occasion, in the process of carrying out a training mission, we somehow found ourselves at night in an area which had poor visibility. The maneuvering of our targets, which we could make out only by radar, required our utmost attention.

The patrol ship "Rezvyi", commanded by Captain 3d Rank V. Ambartsumyan, was inside the "enemy" formation, our "Zadornyy" outside. It was we who first detected the unexpected "enemy" maneuver: the primary target described a circle and then moved off to the side at top speed. The "enemy" had probably decided to take advantage of a dense bank of fog which had unexpectedly moved in between him and one of our ships. Off to the side we could see this fog bank quite clearly; so the inaction on the part of the "Rezvyi", which had evidently first spotted the target visually, was extremely surprising.

We could have assumed, of course, that Captain 3d Rank V. Ambartsumyan had something planned of his own, and any outside interference with his operations would have been entirely inappropriate. But our first impulse to point out the sudden change in the situation to "Rezvyi" ultimately proved to be correct and timely. Then later, back at the base, Ambartsumyan thanked me for my assistance.

In the course of my five years as a commander I have been put in command of a number of ships. A lot of work and effort was required on the part of all officers and crews to put these ships among the ranks of those earning "outstanding" ratings. According to results out for the winter training period, our patrol ship "Zadornyy" led in organizational competition. I would explain my success as due in large part to the fact that I have tried to pay the closest possible attention to experience gained by other commanders, to borrow from it and then to instruct my own subordinates on the basis of the examples it affords. Their training has its theoretical aspect, too, of course. But there is no, and there can be no, ship commander without practical training in the school of company operation. And the value of this school is measured not only by the number of miles covered, but also by how much has been attempted, what has been seen and how much has been assimilated. Not that of a sideline observer, but rather that of a direct participant in everything that happens to him personally as well as in what he takes in with his own eyes--that, in my view, should be the point of view of the ship commander. And as I have so often had occasion to see with my own eyes, the more experienced the commander, the more undeviatingly he adheres to this rule.

ASW Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 82 p 2

[Article: "In Tactical Duel"; sections by Captain 2d Rank B. Kozhin: "The Good Feeling a Difficult Victory Brings" and Captain 2d Rank V. Tikhonovskiy: "Both Rivals and Comrades-in-Arms"; commentary by Rear Admiral F. Starozhilov, deputy commander of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet for combat training]

[Text] ASW men and submariners.... In the course of an exercise they will frequently have occasion to take the measure of one another's strengths in complex duelling situations. In playing the roles of combatants they naturally carry out dissimilar tasks, and occasionally even tasks which in nature are directly opposed

to one another. But both sides have an equal interest in seeing that every two-sided exercise produce the greatest results possible and that mutual tactical support is at its most effective. In their letters below, an ASW man and a submariner speak about problems still existing in this area.

The Good Feeling a Difficult Victory Brings

The ASW men in our unit (chast') have succeeded in winning the Navy Prize for five years in a row now. These consistent achievements are due to the strenuous efforts our seamen put forth both on base and at sea. Crew participation in two-sided tactical exercises has been particularly important.

How could we not speak a good word here about those whom we frequently refer to as our "enemy", but who are in fact our friendly rivals. A sharp tactical duel with an experienced submariner is the best school of practical experience for an ASW man. Captain 2d Rank A. Chadovich has not been a submarine commander for long. But the lessons he has nevertheless been able to teach our ASW people at sea during the time he has been one are memorable ones. His unique maneuvers have been difficult puzzles to solve. Combat with this "enemy" has been difficult, but interesting.

It has also been interesting to work at sea with submarine commander Captain 2d Rank A. Babenko, who, too, has his own creative style. And when an expert ASW man like Captain-Lieutenant Yu. Neminushchiy finds himself in a duel with a submarine commander like this, you can be sure that both sides will turn up something new.

Unfortunately, however, it's not always that we have such fruitful exercises. On one occasion, for example, the ship commanded by officer V. Magazinov was to locate an "enemy" submarine and then practice maintaining sonar contact with it. The seamen worked continuously. But they still failed to earn an "outstanding" rating. The fact was that they were working along the lines of the cut-and-dried patterns. Magazinov cut his risks to the minimum, continually waiting to see what move the submarine commander was going to make. But the submarine commander, it seemed, was playing the game at just about Magazinov's speed. He would move from one assigned point to the next without even attempting to shake off his pursuers.

There are not many such instances of blatant attempts to avoid taking active counter-measures, but there are nevertheless some. Some people say they occur as a result of the fact that, as they put it, submariners have no interest in putting forth maximum efforts in these exercises when it's the ASW people who are getting the ratings, while they themselves are out there only to support the mission. This is a very strange attitude in my opinion. Any naval exercise, whether it involve a mission one is to execute oneself or whether it be in support of someone else's mission, any naval exercise is a good opportunity for another check of crew skills. This, for example, is precisely how we in our unit look upon missions in support of submariner training exercises. From each commander we require that while he is creating a feature of a tactical background, he at the same time organize effective, well-integrated training for his crew.

I once had occasion to talk to a submarine officer about this. I found one of his statements most amazing: it's you yourselves who are forcing us into passivity, he said, by introducing all these limitations into our tactical missions. Now what do you say to that? Training is training. And it will inevitably involve conditions of

one kind or another. It will on occasion, particularly in instructing new ASW men, be to advantage to structure the training program such that the "enemy" can be spotted with maximum probability; but regardless of the particular ASW mission involved, there must come a point at which the submariners are allowed some freedom of action and an opportunity to display some tactical creativity. It should be said clearly here: we ASW people ourselves have a deep interest in this. Victory in combat training brings pleasure and satisfaction only when it comes as a result of hard work. This is why in working out our training plans we frequently consciously establish difficult conditions. We execute most of our training missions, for example, in regions presenting difficulties from the hydrological point of view.

Speaking from the point of view of planning, however, it should be pointed out that we can still draw upon a great deal of untapped potential to improve our submariner training program. We do not always consider, for example, the extent to which the level of training of one combatant crew corresponds to that of the other, or, again, whether the skills of the commanders involved are commensurate. And then in determining the participants in a particular exercise there is occasionally to be encountered a certain element of randomness. For the fact is that the training duels yielding the greatest results are those in which the two contending sides are equal in strength.

Overall we need to give greater attention to coordinating our plans. It is in fact no secret that we have occasionally to "pry loose", as they say, a supporting submarine. We need to work to see that these as well as others put to sea with a desire both to derive maximum benefit for themselves and at the same time to give the maximum to those on the opposing side.

Both Rivals and Comrades-in-Arms

I had occasion not too long ago to meet one of my old classmates, now an ASW officer. We were chatting away, when it suddenly turned out that we had once both participated in one of the big naval exercises at sea, in the course of which our ships were on opposing sides. Our conversation at once took a practical turn as we began to focus on this, and what my friend had to say I found to be very interesting. During the course of that particular exercise, we submariners were employing three variants on evasive maneuvers, and I was now hearing first hand, so to speak, which of them had created the greatest difficulty for the "enemy." And then I in turn was able to tell him the actions the ASW men had taken which caused us problems and which ones we had been able to absorb painlessly.

Each of us had in due course attended his post-exercise critique. Our unit commander subjected the actions the submarine had taken to thorough analysis, the flag officer at the head of the ASW forces those of the ASW ship. But now after having met under these free and unconstrained conditions, we suddenly realized that in this what would appear to have been thoroughly analyzed duel situation there still remained many nuances, to which only we ourselves, the ones who had been direct participants in the combat training involved here, could open one another's eyes.

The thought then occurred to me: what a pity that this kind of dialogue had not taken place hot on the heels of the events themselves, what a pity that we do not always have an opportunity to get together for joint analysis of our actions in the course of a two-sided exercise. We can't say these opportunities don't exist. Periodically we do meet for a number of purposes. But these occasions are few and far between. We need

to increase our practical contacts. It would not be a bad thing to get to know the "enemy" by sight and to learn a little more about the tactical methods and the special characteristics of the actions each of us takes.

Here, however, is the way things stand at this point. A submarine is to put to sea in support of an ASW exercise. As has become the custom in these instances, the ASW staff outlines our mission for us. When we receive it we are immediately struck by the poor coordination it provides: it doesn't call for any surfacing for communication, it doesn't take all necessary navigational safety measures into account.... ASW people obviously can't know all the fine points submariners deal with. That being the case, why didn't the staff representative planning the exercise think it necessary to come to us ahead of time so we could work out all these "trifles?" We should point out, though, that some ASW officers do do this. Captain 2d Rank B. Kuchin, for example, always consults us. This has yet to become established as a guide to daily practice for everybody, however.

We submariners are occasionally accused of deficiencies in the creativity we display in supporting ASW operations. There is a kernel of truth in this accusation. There will indeed be found the submarine commander who fails to approach this important task with the proper sense of responsibility. On the other hand, there are objective reasons for this as well. We frequently say that each exercise at sea should be preceded by thorough training and preparation at the base. This is always the case when it is a matter of getting things done in preparation of combat training plans for our own crews. But when it comes to preparations in support of ASW operations we occasionally can be found taking a slapdash approach to the job.

Then it's a crew's "own" mission that counts toward fulfillment of the combat training plan, and it will get a specific rating for it. And how many times has a submarine put to sea in a support role, played that role but then seen this role almost totally ignored. Among other things, I would suggest the following: in cases such as this, let the party performing the basic mission evaluate the quality of the tactical support it gets, and then let these evaluations be entered in the records of the crews involved.

It should also be said that some of the overly simplistic aspects of the training program are products of exercise plans. As you acquaint yourself with the conditions associated with the execution of one mission or another you will read: "Maneuver in accordance with mission assignment...." What kind of creativity does this represent? You could understand this kind of approach if you were talking about having ASW people execute really elementary missions. But isn't it actually the case that we occasionally abuse these limitations? I'm not going to make any unqualified statements here. But I would like to pose the following question: in actual combat is the enemy really going to be coming from where we always expect him?

While we have touched upon some controversial points here, I would say that to pose these questions and discuss them is an entirely normal thing to do. We don't need to be afraid of them; but of indifference toward them we should be afraid. People who think and search for solutions must inevitably confront controversial questions.

I, for example, have had on more than one occasion to work with ASW Captain 3d Rank G. Donts. I have always been struck by the energy and assertiveness with which he has implemented his own tactical ideas. What he suggests does not always correspond to our own interests, though. We look for some mutually acceptable solution, and in the process we have our arguments. But each time we are able to achieve our primary goal:

we are able to work out a variant which enables us to conduct a training exercise for both sides with maximum effectiveness.

In combat training, in our naval exercises we are rivals; the essential fact, however, is that we are comrades-in-arms. That we can never forget.

[The editors have asked Rear Admiral F. Starozhilov, deputy commander of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet for combat training, to comment on these letters.]

Captains 2d Rank B. Kozhin and V. Tikhonovskiy have raised a number of timely questions. Not all of their judgements are indisputable. There's no point in categorically declaring, for example, that the most beneficial training duel are those organized between two equal sides. We have to learn how to win out over an enemy who may at the same time be both superior in strength and more advantageously situated. In speaking of the importance of an active exchange of experience between the contending sides we just cannot forget the need for a sense of proportion. Exchanges like this are necessary, but we cannot fail to consider the fact that if one-on-one encounters involve only parties who already know everything about one another, down to and including one another's favorite tactical methods, this, too, will result in oversimplification.

The authors of these letters are entirely correct to insist on the need to achieve the best possible cooperation between commanders and staff personnel in planning, organizing and conducting two-sided exercises and other joint training activities. I would like only to underline the fact that vigorous efforts on the part of both sides are an indispensable condition for the success of these activities. If ASW people wait until the submariners move first in one situation or another, and the submariners do the same, then the activity's not going to move off dead center. The quality of combat training will depend upon each individual force, unit and ship commander, each individual staff officer and the attitude each one of them brings to the task for which he has been made individually responsible as well as his ability to see in this task an effort of significance to the navy as a whole.

In his address to the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, pointed to deficiencies still existing at some points in the organization of our combat training, to yet untapped potential and untried possibilities for improving the quality of it and then emphasized the particular importance of the following historically proven principle: teach troops what they need to know in war. All naval training should be conducted with reference to the nature of modern-day warfare, and that means without winking at slackness or oversimplification.

We still see, however, instances in which people create oversimplified training situations for themselves and others in which some fail to take a conscientious approach to tasks to be performed in support of "other" missions. What is to account for this? In the first place, the narrow view some people take of combat training and their inability to rise above their own narrow bureaucratic interests. We must therefore devote our attention above all to such problems as developing a unified approach on the part of both ASW people and submariners to combat training and training them in the spirit of responsibility to one another for the success of their mission.

Our fleet is accomplishing no little in the way of continually improving practical contact between ASW and submarine people: we are coordinating ship and unit combat training plans, improving criteria by which to evaluate the parties contending in training

duels and hold regular meetings and assemblies for ship commanders as forums for exchanges of experience.

We are doing a lot, but much more remains to be done. The main conclusion I would draw from all this is the following: both our ASW people and our submariners still have new possibilities, new potential to tap. What we need now is a joint search for them in creative collaboration and a common concern to insure that each exercise, each tactical duel serve as a true school of mastery for both ASW and submarine crews and commanders.

Physical Training During Cruise

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Captain 3d Rank V. Morozov, commander, patrol ship "R'yanyy", master of sport, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "The Ocean Tests, Military Specialty and Physical Training"]

[Text] A ship will stand its ocean watch day after day, month after month. Personnel will perform the most varied combat training tasks far from their native shores. At the conclusion of a long cruise they will not infrequently have covered a distance considerably exceeding the circumference of the Earth at its equator. Merciless tropical sun and fierce storms will have exhausted the sailors. The fast pace of their combat training exercises has occasionally demanded of them performance pushing the limits of their physical capabilities and rigorously tested each member of the crew. Strong, steadfast and well-trained, they have emerged from the most difficult situations repeatedly in an honorable fashion. And so it was over the course of our last long cruise, when all seamen distinguished themselves with high ratings in both combat and political training. It was also gratifying to learn that according to the results of socialist competition for the preceding year our ship had taken first place in the force [soyedineniye].

When we returned to base we were not to have time for either rest or preventive maintenance--we had to put to sea again for a missile firing exercise. The crew performed this important task with confidence as well. A guarantee of success was the fact that the long cruise had seen personnel develop a high level of skill. We returned from sea a harmonious, solidly knit military collective. These qualities were demonstrated again in full measure during the missile firing exercise, which required high levels of professional skill, physical conditioning and naval know-how.

I recall a number of incidents from this cruise. A group of sailors assembled during a dinner break in the torpedo area. There under the mercilessly scorching sun we did a few warm-up exercises and then headed out on a cross-country-style race around the deck. With all its sharp turns, the course was no simple one, but everybody was well acquainted with it; the sailors had covered these meters many times before in response to alarm signals.

Considering the weather that day we didn't set too fast a pace, but after an hour's run we had covered six or eight kilometers. Fatigue? You felt it during the run, of course, but everybody ultimately felt a surge of new strength. As a rule, the "cross-country men" looked healthier than their friends who had not participated in this hour of physical exercise, preferring instead to relax in their rooms or compartments.

This group of runners was made up entirely of volunteers. Regularly to be seen out on the course were Senior Lieutenants A. Kirpichnikov, A. Krivosheyev and V. Timofeyev, Warrant Officers V. Khitrin and A. Vinogradov, Senior Seamen S. Kushnir and A. Shul'ga, Seaman A. Pustovoyt and others. I think the fact that a lot of officers came out for the event played its role.

While troops participated voluntarily in this cross-country race, all seamen free of watch duties were required to take part in physical training exercises. At a certain time on the upper deck were to be heard the vigorous commands of Captain Lieutenant V. Makarenko, the ship's executive officer. Rhythmic music, which not only helped the men do the exercises at the proper speed, but also generated enthusiasm, had been selected for each exercise and tape-recorded. Four series of general physical exercises had been worked out before the cruise along with some additional exercises for each series.

The sports training available to the men during the cruise was notable for its variety. Boxing, for example, which was organized by Warrant Officer P. Rebrov, a top-ranked boxer himself, was a regular activity. Senior Lieutenant I. Pavalyayev, Senior Medical Services Lieutenant N. Kornilov and many other seamen got involved in weightlifting. The large number of men wanting to pit themselves against one another was always to be found gathered around the weights, which skilled shipboard craftsmen had made themselves. The organization of these training programs showed evidence of real resourcefulness and imagination. An angle-bar ladder had entirely taken the place of a wall-bar wall, for example, and jumping ropes had been made of rope written off the inventory.

The ship has only one authorized boat, but the men have nevertheless been able to organize rowing competitions, and these have become particularly popular. Races have been organized on days when the ship is lying to or at anchor. The officers, warrant officers and various departments of the ship have all entered teams. The course ran around the ship, and the "fans," stopwatches in hand and knowing what times one team or another was going to make, would enthusiastically support "their own." There would be prizes for the winners, of course--pies and cakes our cooks had baked. These boat races have provided a really splendid source of emotional release for both participants and on-lookers.

The traditional Neptune festivities have included a large program of sports events. The military relays have been particular favorites of everyone. The various stages of the races were planned by a group of activists headed by Captain Lieutenant V. Nosikov, the ship's executive officer for political affairs. All shipboard organizations [podrazdeleniye] enter teams in these races, which provide tests of knowledge and skill in assembling and disassembling automatic weapons, donning chemical gear, firefighting and in giving first aid to a victim and then transporting him. The inclined rope, horizontal bars, the two-pood weights and other apparatus awaited the seamen as well. They also competed for accuracy in firing at a floating object. This kind of relay race "worked" outstandingly for combat and physical training, and, what is also of no little importance, it has been an excellent form of active relaxation for personnel.

The attention senior ship officers, department heads and party and Komsomol organization leaders have given to the physical training of their seamen has contributed to the successful accomplishment of combat training tasks at sea and to the maintenance of a favorable psychological climate. As everyone knows, modern-day naval vessels have been liberally provided with automated equipment which reduces the heavy physical loads. But

reductions in motor activity can impair a number of body functions and hypodynamia, while sports activities can help seamen deal with this threat.

I would at the same time say we need to intensify our concern for the physical conditioning of naval personnel. Ships are occasionally to be found poorly supplied with sports equipment. It is probably now time to provide ships putting to sea on long cruises with such pieces of useful and compact equipment as a veloergometer, a "treadmill" and other apparatus. Continuous expert assistance on the part of sports specialists to shipboard sports organizers would be a desirable thing. Higher headquarters should think more frequently of the need for efficient organization of shipboard and unit sports activities, the importance of which has been emphasized in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers "Increase Mass Involvement in Physical Training and Sports."

There used to be a basketball court on our unit grounds, for example. It's now been turned into a grassy lawn. A big sign on the fence warns: "No Football Allowed." Your home port should of course be comfortable and attractive, but concern must also be shown for creating the proper conditions for sports activities. Planned physical training activities have become law for long cruises, but there are occasional departures from these plans in port. It not infrequently happens that the days for which physical training is scheduled are also days on which shipments arrive at the depots. Seamen are then unable to get back to their ship in time for the beginning of physical training. You will see instances of over hasty instructions saying, for example: "Remove all horizontal bars," as we saw on one of our ships. We had to carry them out. The lack of any justification for orders like this fortunately soon became apparent, and they were shortly rescinded.

There are, in a word, problems. Some of them are going to require intervention on the part of higher headquarters. A lot, though, will depend upon our activists and their stick-to-itiveness and initiative. Our squadron recently concluded its competition. Seamen from the "R'yanyy" upheld the ship's athletic honor in worthy fashion. The volleyball players took a championship, the track and field people had success and athletes in a number of other events took prizes as well. Characteristically, all the champions and the other prizewinners had also run in the deck cross-country race during the ocean cruise. The crew overfulfilled its socialist obligations in satisfying military sports program norms and increased the number of its ranked athletes.

All this is a good addition to the primary results of our military duty performance and helps us continually improve our naval skills.

Missile Training on the ASW Cruiser 'Minsk'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jul 82 p 1

[Article by Captain 2d Rank L. Melent'yev, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "Missile Thunder"]

[Text] The gusts of wind are becoming stronger now, the crests of the waves rising higher and higher. But from the high bridge of the ASW cruiser "Minsk" they still seem quite small. This powerful ship easily continues to make its way ahead, leaving a broad wake behind.

The emergency drill signal has just sounded on the ship. The seamen dash to their battle stations. To be able to take up their battle stations quickly when the alarm sounds requires of the men serving aboard the "Minsk", in addition to coordinated actions, dexterity and skill, an unusually good sprinting ability. For the fact is that the overall length of the alleyways on this multidecked ship is measured in kilometers.

Nevertheless, within only a few seconds reports on the readiness of the various departments and services for this training duel begin coming in to the primary control station to the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank V. Samozhenov.

The "Minsk" is one of our navy's most modern ships. It has been provided with the greatest variety of equipment and is capable of accomplishing many different missions. So the sonarmen are now ready to begin their search for submarines, the aviators await orders to send up their aircraft and helicopters from the ship's hangars, the gunners have pointed their guns to the sky.... Today, however, it has not been given them to play the main role. Today the cruiser "Minsk" is going to be firing missiles at naval targets.

The "Minsk's" missilemen have been preparing for this important test more than any one day or week. Even before leaving port they thoroughly checked out their equipment and polished up their practical skills. Personnel worked through dozens of electronic, or as they also say "dummy" launches, in the course of which they played through the missile firing and practiced performing under conditions which suddenly become difficult.

The cruiser's radar operators are still only searching for the target. In the meantime, however, the activity all over the gunnery department (BCh-2) is now already fast and furious. Seamen in the division commanded by Captain 3d Rank V. Glushakov have begun their prelaunch missile preparations. This is something that can't be rushed. It is important that all technical standards be observed carefully, each operation performed well and that each parameter be checked closely. Although Glushakov's men always have these things in mind, they at the same time do not lose sight of the need to save time. Because of the well-planned organization of their activities and their practiced coordination, they are able to knock a few seconds off the established rigorous time norm.

The "enemy" has now been sighted. "Bearing.... Range...." These terse reports from the radar men are points of reference of sorts. The combat information center now begins to play its role in the action. The navigator and head of BCh-2 prepare suggestions and recommendations for the ship commander. Primary control station personnel are working at full capacity.... A ship like the "Minsk" is essentially a complex of modern laboratories provided with the last word in equipment. On the basis of the least scrap of information and details which would elude the uninitiated it becomes possible to sketch out the full picture: the class of the ship opposing the "Minsk" and its armament are now established. The "enemy" is maneuvering actively in an attempt to avoid any attack from the cruiser.

But the "Minsk's" crew did not relinquish its initiative. Captain 1st Rank Samozhenov orders the head of BCh-2, Captain-Lieutenant V. Mal'tsev, to attack the target. Warrant Officer A. Vakhromeyev, Senior Seaman V. Mitroshkin and the other operators are striving to give the utmost care and attention to their work. The target tracking is reliable.

Fire! It is as if a blacksmithing warrior has just pulled a dagger with a red-hot blade from a giant furnace. The missile streaks toward the horizon. The thundering roar it makes resounds long and loud out over the ocean. A little bit later Captain 1st Rank Samozhenov receives a report stating that the firing has been accurate. The exercise wins an "outstanding" rating. This is by no means the first military victory the crew of the "Minsk" has won during the current training year. Striving to be able to render a worthy salute to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, these seamen have successfully accomplished dozens of different difficult and important missions. And they are greeting their day, Navy Day, in a most appropriate manner as well--by moving into the ranks of the leaders.

...As the ASW cruiser "Minsk" was returning to its home port, the fiercest storm was already raging at sea. But just as on the cruise out, the ship pressed confidently ahead as if unaware of the roaring waves dashing against her.

Ship Staff Officer Duties Outlined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Captain 2d Rank A. Bobrakov, chief of staff, Unit X: "The Shipboard Staff Officer, Efficiency and the Creative Approach"]

[Text] The first thing staff officer Captain 3d Rank Ye. Okolokulak did upon coming aboard the ship alongside berth was to report to the commander, Captain 3d Rank V. Ol'shanskiy, and announce that he intended to check the engineering department's (BCh-5) readiness to put to sea.

"The engineer officer just reported to me that all machinery was in good order and that personnel are ready for the cruise," Captain 3d Rank Ol'shanskiy said to him. "But it wouldn't be a bad idea to check, of course."

This check proved to be most timely indeed. As it turned out, the head of BCh-5, Senior Lieutenant-Engineer V. Belinskiy, had misled the ship commander concerning the true state of affairs in the subunit (podrazdeleniye). There were actually no few serious deficiencies to be noted here. There had, for example, been errors and oversights in maintaining equipment and organizing drills. The seamen had not measured some machine operating parameters for a long period of time, and the data they had entered in the logs they had manufactured, as people say, out of thin air. Captain 3d Rank Okolokulak informed the ship commander of the deficiencies he had noted, and right then and there helped him put together a set of quick and effective measures to eliminate these deficiencies and saw to it that both men and equipment were henceforth in fact maintained in continuous readiness to put to sea.

But the staff officer did not consider this the end of his mission. When the ship returned from its cruise he met with Captain 3d Rank Ol'shanskiy once again. They were both concerned on this occasion with how to insure that a state of affairs such as that which had developed in BCh-5 did not recur and how to create within this collective an atmosphere of adherence to principle and intolerance of the formalistic approach and strivings for merely good surface appearance. The two officers together worked out a program of specific measures, and together they set about carrying them out. Both of them, each in his own capacity, began to be more demanding of the young engineer officer and to exercise closer supervision over the pattern of his professional development.

They devoted a great deal of attention to mobilizing the communists and Komsomol members in BCh-5 for a drive to attain high levels of military duty performance. In time, things here did in fact begin to progress satisfactorily.

This is a typical example of the way Captain 3d Rank-Engineer Okolokulak goes about his work. By remaining continuously aboard ship he is able to study the situation in all engineer subunits thoroughly and comprehensively. The staff officer is always interested not only in problems directly related to his own specialty. He also concerns himself with the state of discipline within the various departments, the level of political indoctrination and the organization of socialist competition. I myself have had occasion to witness how actively he participates in the organization of mass shipboard cultural and sports activities.

Now the following question arises: isn't this staff officer spreading himself a little too thin? He is, after all, first and foremost a specialist. But no, I don't think he's spreading himself too thin. A staff officer, a flag specialist, cannot withdraw inside a circle of purely technical problems alone. Tending the most complex machines and equipment and manning guns and missiles are human beings. Upon their conscientiousness, discipline and morale will depend the reliable functioning of equipment and the effective employment of weapons.

But unfortunately, not everyone fully understands this. I recall the following incident. Alarming signs began to appear within the gunnery department of one of our ships--one of the seamen had taken to deviating from the daily routine and ignoring the uniform regulations, and service organization began to deteriorate. Staff officer Senior Lieutenant P. Ponomarenko had visited the department on a number of occasions but had attached no particular importance to these deficiencies; he made no attempt to investigate what was responsible for them, taking the view that if the equipment was working properly there was little else he personally was responsible for. But the fact is that when proper procedures are not adhered to there will inevitably be equipment failures as well. And so it was: ship's specialists proved guilty of neglecting something in the course of an important fire mission. At precisely this point Ponomarenko's responsibility became clear.

The mistakes like this we see in the performance of a number of staff officers have their roots above all in attempts to concentrate upon only a narrow range of special interests. When you call one flag specialist or another to account for giving insufficient attention to troop indoctrination, not insuring adherence to regulation procedures or for not involving himself with competition, you will get the following reply: ships have commanders, executive officers and political personnel, they'll say, let them be responsible for all those things....

We all, of course, have our own area of responsibility defined by the regulations. At the same time, however, we all have many responsibilities in common. A truly responsible ship commander will not simply rest content in the knowledge that a flag specialist will come and solve all the problems in one ship subunit or another. And if he is really concerned about the special service with which he has been entrusted, the staff officer will in turn be unable to stand aside from any of the daily concerns the men within it have to live with. In the final analysis we all are pursuing one single objective, one primary aim--to increase combat readiness, in which, as Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, pointed out in his address to the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries,

is to be seen accumulated the results of the many-sided activities of commanders and political personnel, staff officers, political organs and party organizations and all personnel.

Agreement of opinion in approaching one problem or another is indispensable in this instance, of course. Otherwise you'll have the following situation on your hands. In one particular instance a ship commander will pursue one course while the flag specialist takes another; the sets of instructions each gives will not be in harmony with one another, and they will ultimately find themselves working at cross purposes. The result will be confusion and nervousness that nobody needs.

Many of our staff officers have made it a point to conduct periodic checks of subordinate departments together with our ship commanders. This makes it possible to develop common criteria in evaluating a subunit and a single approach to the instruction and indoctrination of personnel and to the establishment of strict adherence to regulation procedures and the requirements of military discipline. Seamen will then see that their superiors are striving for a single goal and that they are united in both the demands they impose and in their responsibility.

We saw a capable lieutenant come to one particular ship, the head of its torpedo department. He quickly familiarized himself with the responsibilities of officer of the day and officer of the deck. The ship's commander repeatedly praised the lieutenant for this and held him up as an example to others. Escaping his notice, however, was the fact that, having set himself the objective of making his way up the command ladder, the lieutenant would occasionally disregard his specialty training and study of his equipment. This could have rendered him a poor service. At this point, however, the flag torpedo officer intervened in a most timely manner. He helped the ship commander monitor and evaluate his subordinate more thoroughly and comprehensively. By coordinating their efforts, these senior officers were quickly able to remedy the deficiencies in the lieutenant's training program. His career then began to progress more harmoniously.

The staff officer expresses the will of the flag officer; he represents the principle of planning; he is a man called upon to uphold aboard ship all that is best, all that is most advanced and innovative. He will hardly be able to discharge this important mission, however, if he comes to a ship, as people say, not so much to teach as to preach, not so much to educate as to advertise his own role in the educational process.

This was at one time a shortcoming of Captain 3d Rank I. Zanimonskiy's. As I recall, he would keep a meticulous record in a special notebook of how many times he had spoken in departmental meetings, how many reports he had given.... But then there was the job that wasn't getting done--things within the officer's subunits were not going well. There was but a single reason for this--he was not concerning himself on a daily personal basis with the people themselves; he didn't even know the ship's officers very well, not to mention its warrant officers, petty officers and seamen. We tried as hard as we could to help this staff officer develop the proper style, to get him to pay attention to people. When we ultimately succeeded, Zanimonskiy's efforts immediately became noticeably more effective. He has now been transferred to a new position, and judging by everything we hear he has remembered the lessons he learned and is taking an effective, purposeful approach to his work with subordinates.

His service duties require him to deal with different crews and work with seamen of the most varied characters, temperaments and personal and military backgrounds. How would he be able to get along in these instances without improving his pedagogical skills? Ships' officers are not identical in character either, incidentally. And when you attempt to establish some kind of mutual understanding with each one of them as individuals, you can't leave this out of account either.

I would like especially to stress the following. A staff officer has a lot to give all ship's officers, including ship commanders, when it comes to his specialty. But it should never be forgotten that it will never hurt for a flag specialist to learn something from them. How to analyze a situation taking in a ship as a whole, for example. For the fact is that you won't be able to undertake any thorough analysis of the specialized training and preparation under way in any given department, for example, if you aren't aware of how things are going for the crew as a whole.

The problems involved in improving a staff officer's personal operating style are many and varied. But we have always to approach their solution in an integrated, creative manner and on the basis of what is required from the combat-readiness point of view. We must understand clearly that our staff officers constitute an important link in the navy's system of control and that this link has to be securely and dependably connected with other links and must help coordinate the whole complex navy organism.

Training Activities on the 'Tashkent'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Captain Lieutenant A. Tkachev, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "The 'Tashkent' Put to Sea"]

[Text] There are letters making their way from out of Central Asia to the Far East which include some from Tashkent which end up on the "Tashkent"--from the capital of Soviet Uzbekistan to a large ASW ship with the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet.

The ship's deputy commander for political affairs, Captain Lieutenant Yuriy Vladimirovich Yakovlev, opened one of these letters in my presence. As it turns out, he's been slow in getting out his regular release on crew life, and the editors of the republic newspaper are properly reminding him of their readers' interest in them.

"We've been at anchor; what was there to write about? But we'll be coming back from an exercise..." he said to me, as if attempting to justify himself.

The next day the "Tashkent" put to sea.

The seagulls from the coast, now left behind, have turned back. Now circling over the cruise formation in their place is an American Navy "Neptune" reconnaissance aircraft. Its motors crackling tiresomely, it moves at low altitude from one ship to another. The pilot can be seen in the transparent cockpit. His neighbor is shooting pictures of the Soviet ships with still and motion picture cameras. There

is no doubting that such feverish activity would also be seen in the aircraft's instrument compartment, where is located its equipment for searching for submarines and listening to radio conversations.

After observing the "Neptune" through his binoculars for a while, the "Tashkent's" commander, Captain 2d Rank Yelovskiy, makes his way to the navigator's compartment and asks the watch navigator to estimate how long it will be before the "Neptune" goes back where it came from.

"How should I know?" the young officer replies with a shrug. "It'll leave when it feels like it."

"Well, think a little and then come report to me in 10 minutes or so."

Vladimir Fedorovich Yelovskiy didn't get any sleep last night, but he's still fresh. He's well-built, tall, broad-shouldered.... In a good moment he will clap his hands, click his heels together and break into something of a chechetka-style tap dance. But then he'll remember he's on the flying bridge, cough and finish his dance in a military step....

Yelovskiy is a native of the Far East. After completing advanced naval schooling with distinction, he decided he'd like to have a look at the "exotic" West, so he got himself assigned to the Baltic, where within two years he was the first in his class already to be commanding a ship.... Then came more training and the academy; upon graduation he got into something of a tiff with the personnel people: they were holding a position open for Yelovskiy as a squadron chief of staff in the Baltic, but the officer persisted, ultimately landing an assignment to the Pacific Ocean Fleet. No matter it's not as chief of staff, let it be another assignment as ship commander--none of this is of the least concern to him. Yelovskiy is one of those people who love an active job and want to be in the flow of events, somebody who can't be torn off a ship and put on shore. But for him, life without the Far East and the Pacific Ocean would simply be unbearable.

"Comrade Commander!"

The watch navigator hands him a sheet of paper with columns of figures, and Yelovskiy, running through the columns in a glance, nods with satisfaction:

"That's nice! And you said he'd leave when he felt like it.... But he's not going to be around here an hour from now!"

Sure enough, in precisely 40 minutes the "Neptune" banked boldly directly along the "Tashkent's" course and moved off toward the horizon. Since he knew the tactical-technical characteristics of the aircraft it wasn't hard, of course, for the navigator to compute approximately how long the "Neptune" could spend conducting its reconnaissance in our sector.

This incident shows Yelovskiy entirely in character. By posing a nonroutine question he stirs the specialist's pride and interest, gives him a little freedom to act on his own.... Then if nothing had come of it his suggestion would have caused no offense either.

The main events of the exercise had not yet gotten under way, and while there was still time the commander was adjusting and tuning the highly complex organism that was this ship. Hence his sleepless night: there had been several signals for practice drills. And hence the anxious day as well: briefings and critiques have been conducted on the flying bridge. So how do problems arise? From situations which nobody has given thought to ahead of time, says Yelovskiy. But of course not even a ship commander can anticipate everything.

Here's an example to illustrate what a commander has to worry about. There's a practice drill at night. You'd think there'd be nothing simpler: each member of the crew knows his battle station. You run, report your readiness.... But confusion develops in some quarters through the fault of new seamen who have just arrived in a recent bunch of replacements. They have attempted to get dressed right in their quarters, while everybody else has grabbed up their uniform in a bundle and is heading for the exits. People running, of course, collide with the people standing

But this is what they require in shore-based training subunits (podrazdeleniye): you jump out of your bunks and...get dressed! You've got 45 seconds to do it. Then when they come on board ship you've got to reteach these new seamen: you jump out of your bunk and...run! You get dress at your battle station while you switch on your equipment. You gain another 45 seconds to perform your military mission this way--and that's a lot of time measured against the pace of events in modern-day warfare!

With all the problems of precruise preparation behind them, subunit commanders will tend to forget about their replacements--but when they get out to sea, they'll immediately be reminded. Everybody knows, and a ship's commander better than anybody, that these youngsters can be retaught in a matter of a few days. But the ship is now at sea already; it's in the heat of an exercise, and the crew is expected to perform as if it were in actual combat.... It is this that accounts for Yelovskiy's vehemence and the remarks he makes to his officers, sharp ones on occasion....

I asked Captain Lieutenant Yakovlev, who in his capacity as political officer is the first to get acquainted with a group of replacements, where all the new recruits are coming from. Well, there were Ukrainians, Russians, Central Asians.... Yuriy Vladimirovich and I counted: seamen of 24 nationalities and national groups comprised the crew of the "Tashkent" on this cruise. For the sake of presenting a full picture I'll name them: Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Kazakhs, Armenians, Georgians, Latvians, Azerbaijanis, Kirghiz, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Mordvinians, Lithuanians, Chuvash, Estonians, Buryats, Abazins, Komi, Moldavians, Lezghins, Tadzhiks and one Gaugaz. It's no wonder the officers' wardroom is decorated with a garland of the coats of the 15 union republics: they're all represented by their emissaries here on board the "Tashkent."

Does this multitude of nationalities figure as a factor affecting the life of the crew? Most assuredly. Not all of these first-term seamen have a confident grip on the Russian language. Life demonstrates, however, that there is a good side to this coin as well. As a rule, when through the combined efforts of all concerned the language problem is solved, both instructor and trainees are bound by ties of friendship before the latter come to the end of their period of service. Such has been the case, for example, with the Georgian seamen Valeriy Mikaya and Emzari Gogoberidze and their instructors, Petty Officer 1st Class Farid Mustafin, a Tatar, and Senior Seaman Oskar Latsis, a Latvian. Of these it can truly be said that they found a common language.

People from the same part of the country find a common language quickest of all, of course. And this circumstance is not ignored aboard the "Tashkent" either. Every effort is made to assign new personnel to a subunit with seamen from the same oblast or republic. We can look at one particular group from Uzbekistan. There were 12 of them on the ship, assigned for the most part to the engineering department and the boatswain's crew.... How great the force of our expectations! How many times have you seen aboard our ships, including our atomic-powered submarines, these swarthy people with their broad faces and high cheekbones who have absorbed the heat of the sun and the color of the Asian desert even before they are born, but your first reaction is nevertheless always one of surprise: dzhgits...in the navy! "How do you like it in the navy?" "Oh, just fine!" And Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Tadzhiks are weathering conditions in the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic and beyond the Arctic Circle no worse than anybody else. And then in the tropics, when they're sweating away by the hour in the engine compartment, there are no watches more reliable than those made of personnel accustomed to scorching heat. Any division of nations and nationalities or regions and republics into "sea-going" and "land" or "naval" and "nonnaval" has disappeared into the past.

Here on board the "Tashkent", just as is the case on every other ship in our navy, the fraternal union of our Soviet republics and the unity of the Soviet nations and nationalities finds embodiment, if it can be so expressed, in the people and in what they actually do as they go about their daily routine. Thousands of families have raised outstanding sons, for whom the "Tashkent" has become a second home, the place and symbol of their own personal coming of age militarily. The press of day-to-day duty performance and the alternation of watch and study aboard the "Tashkent" witnesses a transformation of disparate elements, a conversion, that is, of unlike natures, customs and national characteristics into an alloy unknown to metallurgy but essential to the navy and the country. And the name of this alloy is crew combat readiness.

Night finds the commanding officer on his feet. Illuminating the sea with its radar, the "Tashkent" rams ahead into the darkness. On the watch are Seaman Nikolay Ardashev, signalman, an Udmurt; Senior Seaman Marif Iskhakov, electrician's mate, an Uzbek; Petty Officer 2d Class Andrey Gologuzov, radar operator, a Russian; Warrant Officer Galliola Suleymenov, gun crew leader, a Kazakh; Lieutenant Vyacheslav Dabagnyants, chief of the chemical service, an Armenian; Lieutenant Mikhail Stasyuk, a missile control group leader, a Ukrainian.... The crew is standing watch in accordance with the battle bill.

What's ahead for us? A head-on engagement.

A head-on engagement is like a duel, but a duel in which the opposing sides do not see one another from their starting lines; the one most alert and sharp-sighted fires first. So now, with the night's activities in full swing, somewhere out there, a hundred miles or more away, powerful engines are bringing a squadron of practice enemy warships toward the "Tashkent." Their radar is in no way inferior to ours, neither are their missiles. So whoever is first to spot his targets, classify them and then fire off a volley of missiles will be the victor.

The targets are illuminated on the radar screens and immediately subjected to careful study: what's their speed? course? are they maneuvering? Captain 2d Rank Yelovskiy continuously asks their classification from the combat information center, where the radar "picture" is displayed in its component sections and analyzed. Targets of no

interest are no longer tracked; suspicious targets, and there are plenty of those, are observed more closely.

I recalled the commander during those minutes. His eyes with their phosphorescent reflections, his rapid, noiseless movements, his voice a quarter of its normal level (the stillness on the bridge!), but nevertheless so intense that even I, an outside observer, was electrified and found myself striving to put on my best military appearance. But what is there to say about the watch! These are moments of the highest degree of unity of commander and crew and of men and their machines. And these moments will if necessary be measured in hours, days if necessary... until the command:

"Fire!"

At this command the watch officer immediately records the exact time of launch in the deck log, while the navigator reads the coordinates of the launch point from his chart. The missiles, raised on their launcher rails, are now removed and returned to their magazines. This has been a simulated launch, because the enemy has been simulated as well.

A few minutes later the radar screen showed very clearly how the targets the "Tashkent" had fired upon had disappeared in a small galaxy of blips: from this it was clear that the "enemy" had "fired" on our ship as well and was employing his own countermeasures. Comparison of the documentation at headquarters will show which side won.

What lies ahead now? Live missile launches against range targets. Artillery fire. Repulsion of air attacks. Engagements with missile boats. Engagements with torpedo boats. Antisubmarine searches....

I stopped by to see Captain Lieutenant Yakovlev before I left the "Tashkent", but I couldn't catch him in his room. On his desk lay the familiar envelope from the editors, next to it a stack of paper. The first page carried the title "Our Training Day."

Murmansk Commander Profiled

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 82 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 2d Rank S. Bystrov: "The Commander of the Cruiser 'Murmansk'"]

[Text] The intense engagement continued for several hours. The cruiser "Murmansk" was playing the role of primary target for a squadron of warships, while "enemy" submarines stalked it boldly from behind. Aboard was the senior officer. From his flag command post (FKP), directly above the command bridge, he was following the submariners' attacks and the actions taken by the cruiser's commander. Captain 2d Rank P. Svyatashov had to accomplish a number of diverse tasks simultaneously. While actively engaging the submariners, the cruiser was at the same time watching to maintain maneuver safety, maintaining contact with the submarines at specified intervals and supporting the search for torpedoes fired.

In Captain 2d Rank Svyatashov's experience there had in fact been an incident in which during a similar exercise a submarine had unexpectedly surfaced in the immediate vicinity of his ship. It was only the commander's instant skillful action that made it possible to avoid a worse situation. So even though it may have looked like Svyatashov was under less stress than the submarine commanders, the fact was that the precise and effective performance of the cruiser hadn't come easily. When the exercise was over the commander heaved a sigh of relief. Then at that point the senior officer called him from the FKP:

"Commander, what's the maximum speed this ship can make?"

"What the tactical-technical data specify, Comrade Admiral," Svyatashov replied.

"In that case I'm directing you to secure to buoy at your base by 2100."

This order was so unexpected (he still had other missions to accomplish, for one thing) that Svyatashov immediately hurried directly to the navigation room. Captain Lieutenant V. Smolkin, the experienced, reliable head of the navigation department, had already been able to perform the necessary calculations.

The deck's wood planking shuddered slightly every now and then. Astern the sea would disappear and then suddenly heave a wave up threateningly over the poop. The ship was going to have to keep up its forced pace for a long time. The engineering department could conceivably have difficulties. But not once did engineer officer Captain 3d Rank-Engineer N. Kulikov trouble the ship commander with an emergency report. The cruiser secured to buoy precisely at the specified hour.

Yes, it may have appeared that the cruiser had accomplished nothing out of the ordinary on this cruise. But in the efficiency and precision of the crew's performance was once again to be seen the reliability and stability characteristic of the "Murmansk." The "Murmansk" has earned the "outstanding" designation now for the eighth year.

The communist Petr Grigor'yevich Svyatashov has been serving aboard the cruiser for almost that long. He came to the "Murmansk" upon completion of his command training course, to which he had been sent from a position as executive officer 2d rank. He did not look upon a return to executive officer duties as a step backwards. Sailors have always held the cruiser in great esteem. To be able to serve aboard one is considered a compliment, to serve well--an honor. Within four months Captain 3d Rank Svyatashov was allowed to assume independent control of a ship. In three years he received his first cruiser command.

Last year the cruiser won the Navy Prize in artillery competition. P. Svyatashov learned about this at the naval academy, where he is taking correspondence courses, in the fall. This was a year during which the guns were roaring in his ears continuously. During the summer he fired in the presence of the commander-in-chief. Captain 2d Rank Svyatashov's skill was recognized with the presentation of a valuable gift--a pair of navy binoculars. Then came a long cruise, an exercise, firing with all calibres, once again all successful efforts. He returned to base and immediately found himself in competitive combat exercises. The one who wins in combat is the one whose shells hit the target. Competitions work the same way. The 13 primary-calibre

projectiles the "Murmansk" put into a single target proved more than sufficient to confirm its reputation as the navy's best artillery ship.

It's nice to recall past victories. Commanders, however, have to concern themselves with what lies ahead, with achieving new victories in the future. The commanding officer of the "Murmansk" is now living with these concerns. To win a prize last year was one step, but to win it again this year is another, higher step. But Captain 2d Rank P. Svyatashov has the ability to proceed in precisely this manner, up the steps, up to new successes in competition to render a worthy salute to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. His decorations symbolize this. He was awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3d Class as an executive officer, the same order 2d class as a commander.

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL TRAINING DESCRIBED

Training on the Cruiser 'October Revolution'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Capt 2d Rank V. Kuznetsov: "Party Members in Combat Formation: A Hot Wave"]

[Text] "Svitich, Aleksey Maksimovich," said the thickset, sturdily built captain second rank, extending his hand.

Looking into his affable face, which was made slightly severe by thick eyebrows and light brown moustache, I had the thought that I already had met Svitich. Somewhat later after we began talking I recalled both the late autumn evening and my worry whether or not the message from aboard the cruiser "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya" would reach the editors by morning. Svitich, then the communications department head, assured me that it would get there without fail.

That was the entire acquaintanceship.

Both before and after that meeting I heard many good words about Svitich, but I had occasion to come to know him closer only now, when he became one of the best control department (BCh-7) heads in the fleet.

He took over this subunit with a dual feeling. The awareness that he specifically had been entrusted with such a responsible job gave a pleasant chill to the heart. At the same time, he realized quite clearly how difficult his development would be. Of course he very much wanted for everyone to see soon, not in a year or two, but right away, that the cruiser's BCh-7 commander was in his place. It was this passionate desire to prove himself suddenly, at his awakening, that really let him down.

...The predawn sea was silvery and the gentle, measured waves disposed one to emotional calm when it seems everything is clear in advance, but practice action was ahead and for now there was no complete clarity here.

Svitich again and again checked in his mind whether or not he had done everything so that the captain first rank, the detachment commander, could control the ships continuously and precisely as they swiftly closed with the "enemy" on the threshold of a missile-gunnery duel. He attentively watched the flag officer bent over the chart. Svitch realized from the rare remarks which he exchanged with the deployment staff officers that in evaluating the rapidly changing situation the flag officer was in some difficulty here. For it happens where there is a great deal of information, but the necessary information is lacking. "The flag officer should be connected to another station," thought Svitch. "Communications with the ship commanding officers will be more reliable."

It seemed that little time was spent carrying out what had been planned. And it had to be that at that very moment the flag officer had to issue instructions to the attacking ships which changed the initial stages of the practice action sharply. But inasmuch as the communicators blundered, he had to make corrections on the move to the decision which had just been made.

In the final account their ship group did not let the initiative slip and achieved [one word missing] success. But Svitch experienced many unpleasant minutes.

Now he would not allow anything of the sort. Examining that breakdown of his critically more than once, Svitch concluded each time that in showing concern for reliability of control one must constantly reinforce the apparent expediency with deliberate prudence, and boldness of action with sober calculation.

He stepped onto the deck of the cruiser "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya" for the first time immediately after completing school. This was almost 13 years ago. And from the very first days the lieutenant had a strong liking for the strenuous, strong-pulsed rhythm of shipboard life and the special spirited mood which the crew had inherited from the red eagles of the "Gangut" and heroes of the "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya" (that is what the battleship which was the predecessor of the cruiser of postwar construction was called at various times).

The ship was revealed to him above all by the people--always ready to support, to safeguard from error and to offer sensible advice.

"Look here, Comrade Lieutenant," said the cruiser commanding officer, Capt 1st Rank Yu. Mozharov, to him once. "Take up the adjustment of station bills. The executive officer will be your chief in this work. Believe me, you'll learn much that is new and useful."

What trouble there was with these bills! Svitch was grieved most of all by what he considered red tape. But the essence of the commander's idea nevertheless reached him. It reached him when he learned to see behind the abstruse diagrams and monotonous-appearing words of functional duties to the complex but precise interconnection of command posts and battle stations and beyond them the specific people: officers, warrant officers [michman], petty officers and seamen. At the end of the work on the bills he already could

give the last names of many seamen aboard the cruiser. The ship became for him both a rational combat system and a close, understandable living being.

Where is Yuriy Ivanovich Mozharov, his first commanding officer, now? He heard that he was serving in another fleet and had become a rear admiral. Svitich wished that he knew how his lessons were helping Svitich out to this day.

He recently had written a performance appraisal on Lt Aleksey Shutkin with the following conclusion: Worthy of advancement to the position of communications division officer. A good turning point had occurred in the young officer's service, which largely had begun unevenly.

There was no denying that Shutkin was anxious over the job. But the more anxiety he showed, as paradoxical as it may seem, the more noticeable were the glitches in the work of the group he headed. After taking a closer look, Svitich realized why that was happening. The young officer was taking up everything himself and not bringing anything to a conclusion. The person seemingly was trying but the end result was not apparent. Let's say that in his hustle-bustle he would forget to check the watch once or twice and then there would be a glitch. Then the lieutenant would become excited, make noise and scold everyone.

That is how, in the heat of anger, Svitich once saw Shutkin, having looked in on him in his cabin on hearing his voice. After dismissing the seaman with whom the lieutenant had just been talking "noisily," the department head himself blew up unexpectedly for himself, let alone for Shutkin. Later he checked himself after saying no more than a couple of words.

"I'm surprised, looking at you, Aleksey Nikolayevich," he said bitterly. "You can in no way tune away from the interference in the work with people. To continue in the language of communicators, it is high time to move to the necessary frequency in contact with people and in cohesiveness of the collective."

Here Svitich realized that he was speaking with the lieutenant if not in the words, then in the intonations of his first commanding officer. There was something similar in the long deployment in the Mediterranean back in the time when Svitich was a senior lieutenant.

The weather was excellent, but still our seamen considered the sea gloomy--many foreign ships had appeared nearby.

The communicators had enough to do. Drills were going on under a rigid timetable and, most important, it was necessary to provide reliable communications both with the distant native shore and with other ships. In short, the tension was maximum. And then the antenna-feeder arrangements began to function poorly in addition.

Sr Lt Svitich, commander of the radiotelegraph group, was summoned to the flying bridge by the cruiser commander himself. He asked without concealing his annoyance:

"Tell me as a party member to a party member, how much time do you need to impose truly naval order in your area?"

Svitich responded. He already had weighed everything while ascending to the bridge although of course he realized that the work which had to be done with his own resources usually was done by yard specialists. Guessing what Svitch was thinking, Capt 1st Rank Mozharov still did not soften.

"Fine," he said as if he was chopping something off. "I'll give you additional time. Two days. But this is the limit. Talk with the people, choose the best ones for the work and tune them to the necessary frequency."

They kept within the time period set by him, by Svitch.

And now, seeing how the face of the thoughtful Akeksey Shutkin was blazing up, Svitch, to himself, wished the lieutenant success.

In understanding the essence of the work of the BCh-7 commander, Capt 2d Rank Svitch arrived at the conviction that the key element in adjusting the control system was work with the people. Only the people with their ability and attitude toward the job give control that without which it would lose all meaning in modern combat--efficiency and flexibility, precision and reliability. If the seamen of the control department followed these demands, the entire crew and entire ship would be spread before the commander's eyes and all subordinate forces and means also would be spread before the flag officer. Information about the degree of readiness of weapons and technical means for combat and about the surrounding situation then is complete. This is what gives the commander's tactical thinking inspiration--the swallow of victory in combat.

In studying materials of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, Svitch paid particular attention to that part of the report by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov which talks of the development and application of progressive control methods. No matter how sophisticated technical means might be, the decisive role here belongs to the commander and chief, his knowledge, organizing abilities and will. Capt 2d Rank Svitch thought about this for a long while in preparing for a meeting of the department's party members. His speech was thorough and sharp. The thoughts he expressed touched each person in the party collective.

The BCh-7 party members clarified the ways for a comprehensive accomplishment of the task to improve the effectiveness of control. The focus of their concerns was the indoctrination in people of vigilance, discipline and a feeling of heightened responsibility for mastery of equipment and for keeping it in constant combat readiness.

...Cutting into the resilient sea swells with a sharp stem, the "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya" heads into a gunnery attack. No matter how complicated the situation may be, Svitch is not beyond finding out the communicators' mood. On meeting Lt Shutkin he is pleased by his cheerful, dashing appearance:

"How is it on the air waves?"

"Hot!" says Shutkin, explaining everything in one word.

Already concerned with other no less important matters, Svitich catches himself thinking: "How great it is, nevertheless, when the heart is lashed with a hot wave born of the awareness of one's usefulness to the cause you serve."

Defense Against Low-Flying Target

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 82 p 1

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Kaplunov, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Against a Low-Flying Target"]

[Text] Lt S. Zaytsev, head of the missile-gunnery department of patrol ship "X," could not conceal his excitement on the eve of the next sortie. Together with his subordinates, he was to take a responsible test: Perform missile firing against a high-speed, low-flying target. This mission in itself is no simple one, but the tactical background here also proved to be very difficult. The ship was part of escort forces for an amphibious landing. This meant that the firing would be performed near shore and that the operators would have to function under conditions of heavy interference and with an abundance of the most varied targets.

In performing an operational training mission in a similar situation exactly a year ago the missilemen of the patrol ship did not perform in the best manner. They detected and picked up ordinary air targets for tracking with sufficient confidence, but when the low-flying targets against which it was necessary to fire appeared, the teamwork in their actions was disrupted and some began to make mistakes. For example, the commander of one of the batteries gave Zaytsev incorrect information on the target and by virtue of his inexperience he also was not able to orient himself quickly and make the correct decision. As a result the grade the missilemen received for that firing proved to be not as high as they would have liked.

The young department head took the failure to heart. He drew the following conclusion for himself: Combat against low-flying "enemy" targets demands special training. Now operator drills in the missile-gunnery subunit began to be conducted in a new way, under more difficult conditions. The lieutenant began to devote more attention to the work of improving his own tactical knowledge as well. He was given substantial assistance in this by unit staff officer Capt-Lt I. Morozov.

Then almost a year of strenuous work was behind them. Now the time had come to prove in action, by accurate missile launches, that this time had not been spent in vain for the missilemen.

The ship made tack after tack in the designated area. Operators watched the radar scopes without tearing themselves away. The minutes of waiting stretched on painfully...

The report of Petty Officer 2d Class S. Melent'yev came on detection of the target. Now it was a matter of seconds. Instantaneously evaluating all information on the "enemy" coming to him, Zaytsev concluded that this was the very target which they had to attack and made the decision of which weapon should be employed against it to make the attack most effective. The ship's commanding officer approved the lieutenant's decision and then came the confident command:

"Receive target designations!"

The culmination of missile firing had arrived. Flying at low altitude, the target closed swiftly. Everything now depended on the cohesive work of operators WO [michman] A. Kostyukov and Sr Smm I. Os'kin, and they did not fail. They picked up the "enemy" with a bettering of the norm. There was nothing surprising in the fact that Kostyukov was capable of this: He is a real master of his work and has participation in dozens of responsible firings to his credit. But the confident actions of his young teammate is no small success. It is success both for Os'kin himself and for Kostyukov. The fact is that at the beginning of this training year the warrant officer wrote in his pledges along with other points the following: "Help Sr Smm Os'kin prepare for work under first class norms during the training year." As the firing showed, Kostyukov was keeping his word, just as, generally, was his comrade WO V. Kropotukhin, who had prepared Sr Smm V. Pupyrev for taking tests for the 1st Class, and many other missilemen.

..."Launch!" commanded Lt Zaytsev and the missiles left the rails one after the other and headed for the target. Soon in a blue patch of sky in the distance there swelled a dark cloud from a burst. The missilemen hit the target accurately. With these sniperlike launches they laid a good claim to successful completion of the training year and made a substantial contribution toward fulfilling socialist pledges made in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation.

Training on Small Missile Ship 'Musson'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 82 p 3

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Slobozhanyuk, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "From Final Problems: The 'Musson' Attacks"]

[Text] Days, weeks and months of training were pressed into these seconds of combat. It had been difficult training, to the point of fatigue; to that stern line when it seems that this is it, there is no more strength. But the crew of the small guided missile ship "Musson" continued to work, having set for itself the goal of being best in the division, in the unit and in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.

All missile firings of the present training year had been performed with a grade of outstanding. All basic goals essentially already had been achieved in competition, but the most important goal still lay ahead. In the concluding phase of the training year the crew had to perform a combat exercise. Representatives of higher headquarters were giving the test for military maturity.

The "Musson" was on its own course when a report was received: An attack by "enemy" guided missile cutters was expected.

"Exercise at general quarters! Air defense weapons: Readiness number one!" commanded Capt-Lt S. Kashuba, commander of the "Musson."

He soon heard Lt N. Chernenko's report about readiness for action of the air defense personnel. Lt Chernenko, who had just recently begun the second year of his officer service, already had been appointed head of the ship's missile-gunnery department. But in this drill he was still functioning also in the position of battery commander.

Ship's navigator Sr Lt V. Chichin was concentrated and attentive. The young officer has an honorary title: best unit navigator. Chichin showed in the last deployment that he bore this title rightfully.

Reliability and thoroughness are the basic categories which determine the service of Engr-Sr Lt A. Anoshko, head of the engineering department (BCh-5). During the year there was not a single criticism of the operation of engines and machinery serviced by personnel of this subunit, although the ship covered more than just a single thousand nautical miles. These rarely were calm miles, but the ship has a good tradition: Every nautical mile of deployment for combat training and combat intensity for every nautical mile of operation. The BCh-5 personnel always follow this tradition. This subunit is small in size, but representatives of seven nationalities serve in it. They serve well and they are strong friends.

Then finally came Lt Chernenko's report:

"I have a target! Bearing... Range..."

It was a gray, gloomy morning. The target was low, almost touching the brisk waves. A keen command sense suggested to Capt-Lt Koshuba that the entire crew now was functioning as one person.

Later it was learned that this action had lasted less than a minute, and the entire crew would learn that young operator Smn N. Yermkin managed to detect the target at maximum range, that Petty Officer 2d Class I. Shaydulin, leader of the machinists' team, had functioned faultlessly in his area of responsibility, and the other seamen had demonstrated high proficiency.

By hitting the target accurately the crew of the "Musson" passed a difficult test at the finale of the training year.

Year's Training Results Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Nov 82 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Lyashenko, commander of unit "X": "Reflecting on the Training Year's Results: Beyond the Limit of What is Usual"]

[Text] Our unit combat glory room has photographs which evoke a lively interest both in the experienced frontlinesman and in the young person serving aboard a small combatant. These photographs show results of combat work at sea in drills. You gaze at a picture of a panel shattered by rounds or a half-sunken ship which served as targets during a practice action and you experience a sense of pride in the modern weapons, but above all in the people who handle these weapons expertly.

For no matter how high the level of technical outfitting may be, the last word in combat always rests with the people. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, who gave a briefing at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, stressed that weapons and combat equipment can produce the proper effect only if they are in capable and reliable hands and if their study and the mastery of combat employment methods are combined with a further improvement of field, air and naval schooling of personnel, with the development of tactics and operational art, and with the tactical teamwork training of subunits, units and ships.

The following episode is typical. In one practice a division of guided missile cutters commanded by Capt 3d Rank D. Ukrainets was ordered to attack a group of "enemy" landing ships. The tactical situation was very difficult. The cutter personnel had to choose the main targets out of a multitude of targets and deliver a missile attack against them.

The assigned mission was accomplished boldly and with originality. Capt 3d Rank Ukrainets successfully applied frontline experience, combining it with today's tactical achievements. The "enemy" was attacked from ambush at top speed. The combat equipment of the guided missile cutters was employed at the limits of its rated data.

Later we repeatedly returned to this attack, breaking it down into component elements again and again and analyzing in detail the actions of commanders and the crews they headed. Each time we concluded that our entrusted weapons represent a formidable force, if of course they are employed innovatively.

Without question, many difficulties are encountered along this path, for everything that is truly innovative does not arrive of itself. We have to give up old impressions, overcome the inertia of thinking and carry on a steadfast search for new things. It is not everyone who succeeds in striding immediately beyond the limit of what is usual and deciding on a daring maneuver or a nonstereotyped technique. Some at first are wary of getting everything from the equipment which it can give, and they gradually become accustomed to take the well-trodden path.

I recall once, in performing an operational training mission at sea, a decision had to be imposed directly on one of the commanders to use a missile at the limit of capabilities contained in it. The plan was to attack a target at maximum range. It was necessary to provoke the "enemy" into turning on radars in the search mode, then determine the target motion and employ the weapon in the shortest possible time. There was great risk, with the slightest mistake possibly leading to failure. The cutter's commander, being outside the sphere of the customary, as he later himself said, had doubt as to the success of the attack. Nevertheless all calculations were performed exceptionally quickly, then came the command for the missile launch. It hit the target in the bullseye, as they say.

During the last training year the officer mentioned above proved himself to be one of our best commanders. That memorable missile firing gave him wings, helped him overcome a psychological barrier and the fear of new things, and prompted him to improve himself even more persistently in a search for tactics and to inspire subordinates with this.

In modern combat, distinguished by its transient nature and dynamism, a commander often simply will not have time for reflection or to check and recheck his doubts and fears. Victory will come to one who, being first to attack daringly and calculatingly, uses all means to ensure getting a telling strike. But for this one must work hard and think in detail long before the action: work and think, showing initiative and a readiness to try an experiment or take a risk. I recall how HSU Capt 1st Rank (Ret) B. Ushchev, a famed small combatant officer, emphasized in one of the meetings with seamen:

"Our crew knew no defeats because each one knew the weapons and equipment to perfection and each one showed both boldness and gumption."

The foundations of tactical and technical schooling are laid down in the command training system, but much also depends on self-starting forms of training. Such a form took root in our unit in the last training year: accounts by officers and warrant officers about the knowledge gained in the process of independent training. Each of them receives specific assignments with clearly posed problems. The range of these problems is such that it prompts a person to improve competency during independent training both in his own specialty and in a related one. One learns during the accounts who succeeded here, who should work on something, who needs help, or who needs a strict reprimand for inertness.

Themes of scientific-technical conferences and for a rationalization search also originate here. That is how the research work by officers A. Golovachev, N. Paleyev and others began, which allowed a significant increase in the tactical capabilities of our weapons.

It is impossible to count on success of any matter without the people's lively interest in the high end results and without their initiative, which must be recognized and supported promptly. Therefore we make comprehensive use of the factor of competitiveness in classes and practices both at sea and in base. We try to make everything foremost born of inquisitive thought the property of every military collective as quickly as possible.

During the last training year the organization of so-called dry firings was improved aboard the guided missile patrol boat commanded by Capt 3d Rank G. Plyusnin. This helped the commander learn to feel the pulse of combat work of each station more accurately during an attack and to gain a clearer picture of the time expenditure for executing various commands. Now this experience is being used in other crews, and it is valuable above all for the fact that it provides an opportunity to think out in advance different variants for the tactical employment of weapons and combat equipment. These variants are practiced at sea with consideration of the nature of modern combat.

We already have cited an episode in which Capt 3d Rank Ukrainets distinguished himself. But here is another example when this officer took advantage of one of those models of combat which had been polished during practice in a duel situation. Both sides detected each other simultaneously but Capt 3d Rank Ukrainets was more decisive. Imposing his own will on the "enemy," he closed with him quickly and attacked boldly.

It is apropos to note that the side which lost in that practice action had a clear advantage. It could employ weapons from an enormously greater distance than the patrol boat which Capt 3d Rank Ukrainets took into the attack, but a tactical miscalculation constrained its actions. All elements of this instructive duel were analyzed in detail during the critique and the ship commanders drew necessary conclusions for themselves. It became clear to all how important it is to hone the ability to think and act under conditions of a restricted time limit, getting the maximum possible out of the weapons and equipment.

This requirement is dictated by modern combat, in which all-arms forces and means often take part. That means it is necessary to consider this circumstance in mastering equipment and tactics.

We studied a new tactic in detail in one of the short tactical training problems. It was decided to test it in practice. Capt 3d Rank V. Shevchenko was one of the first to use this technique, but this was not a simple repetition, which in itself would have been evidence of stereotyped command thinking. Shevchenko went further in using the capabilities of the combat equipment. He delivered a missile attack against the "enemy" from maximum range after ensuring absolute secrecy of his maneuver. This tactic today is considered innovative, but we hope to find a higher-quality replacement even for it. That is the demand of the times. Concern for improving combat readiness cannot bear a temporary, seasonal character or be frozen at some level. Combat readiness has to be raised and improved constantly.

The training year has ended and the new one is not far off. In preparing for it, we are interpreting the experience gained and seeking unused reserves. We have no right to rest on our laurels. In order to achieve new goals of combat readiness we have to stride even more resolutely beyond the limit of what is customary in the next training year and conduct an even more active creative search in the struggle for maximum use of the tactical capabilities of weapons and equipment.

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NAVAL FORCES

SUBMARINE TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Submarines: Torpedo Attack Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 82 p 1

[Article by Capt Lt I. Anfert'yev, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "Lessons of a Torpedo Attack"]

[Text] The submarine descends strenuously. A minute ago a group of surface vessels has been detected. The task is to disrupt the deployment of escort vessels and conduct a torpedo attack against the main target. The submarine commander Capt 3d Rank V. Ryazantsev prepares for the encounter with the "foe." The evening before he had reconnoitered the area, studied the pattern of the probable interaction of the surface vessels and their techniques of using anti-submarine weapons. He had conducted a tactical briefing on these questions with the officers and was satisfied with their reactions. He recommended that they display independence and initiative in action. He advised them to utilize the experience of the veterans. And he was the first to provide example to the others during the training conducted by the unit commander. During that training Capt 3d Rank Ryazantsev acted confidently and astutely. He strived to anticipate the course of events and seize the initiative. The KBR [ship combat mission team] earned a high rating.

The sea introduced some corrections in the work of the submarine commander. The point is that the officer had as yet little experience in independent command at sea. He was assigned a ship of his own only recently.

The "foe's" ships changed tack and jammed communications. They hunted for submarines with the aid of aircraft. The hydroacoustic gear operators were not able to detect the main target immediately. Then Capt 3d Rank Ryazantsev decided to utilize indirect data. The chief of radiotechnical service Sr Lt G. Grinchenko computed the probable courses of the ships and determined the order of redeployment.... One of the ships maneuvered less than the others. Its sonar was not working according to the report of Michman Zimin, hydroacoustic gear operator. Does this mean that that ship is the main target? The submarine commander decided to attack it.

The senior commander present on board, Capt 2d Rank Ye. Nevyarovich, monitored the situation from the command post ever since the submarine began to submerge. His experienced eye did not omit noticing the readiness with which the KBR members accepted the submarine commander's decision. On the whole, Ryazantsev's logic appealed

to him, too. But what if the "foe," sensing an attack, was trying to mislead the submariners and using an escort vessel to simulate the main target? This could be a weighty consideration. Nevyarovich counseled the submarine commander to think over his decision. Then the hydroacoustic gear operator submitted another report: the main target was identified. The senior commander proved to be right. Now it was time for the torpedo attack.

In such situations the aid of a more experienced officer to the ship commander is invaluable. Astute advice and the right word uttered at the right time help reconsider a situation that only seemed to be clear. And the greater the effect produced by the presence of a senior commander on board, the more deliberately and with the greater finesse he approaches training the ship commander.

But let us return to the attack that commenced. The shipboard combat mission team prepare the input data for firing. Every second counts. But the commander is slow in feeding the data to the torpedo. An escort vessel is crossing the path toward the main target. New difficulties to the commander. Ryazantsev looks at the senior commander. Then he calls out several figures with the evident hope that Capt 2d Rank Nevyarovich will select and approve the right figure. And the latter indeed has to respond, because time is passing. Yet advice from the senior commander at such a moment brings no credit to the submarine commander and places the senior commander in a false situation: is fear of misjudging the situation more important than the true effect of training?

What happened? Apparently, Ryazantsev simply dreaded to accept responsibility. And Capt 2d Rank Nevyarovich had never taught the submarine commander such a "maneuver."

Yes, a suggestion from the senior officer is sometimes simply necessary. Even a confident and knowledgeable commander may sometimes err. In such cases, too, the officer must be enabled to learn, to perceive latent possibilities. But in such a manner as to give him wings, so to speak, so that the superior's words would inspire his independent thinking instead of extinguishing whatever initiative he has.

...The torpedo attack ended successfully. The escort ships, of course, immediately began to pursue the submarine. But Capt 3d Rank Ryazantsev and his subordinates had expected an easy victory, as it turned out. One of the KBR members failed to prepare in time a table for averaging the data received at the command post. Another was slow in reporting. Willy-nilly, the submarine commander had to help them although more important matters were waiting. So it turned out that, instead of the smooth and well-coordinated work needed for the escape maneuver, the commander himself became occupied with extraneous matters and his subordinates became distracted and had to analyze many data by eye.

In the final analysis, the submariners did win the combat exercise. But not every victory brings satisfaction. Capt 2d Rank Nevyarovich sensed this when disembarking: that sea exercise demonstrated to him and his subordinates that there still remains a considerable unexploited potential for perfecting combat training. And it should be absolutely exploited during the final weeks of the training year so as to reach a high degree of combat readiness by the end of that year.

Submarines: Simulator Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Sep 82 p 2

/Article by Rear Adm Ye. Tomko, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Model and Template" under the rubric "Professional Qualities of the Officer"/

/Text/ In the torpedo attack room two ship crews are operating two trainers. A combat duel is under way. Both commanders are operating under equal conditions, both are equally experienced, and both have been taught by the same senior commanders and the same method. But the course of the combat exercise is running in favor of the KBR [ship combat-mission team] commanded by Capt 2d Rank B. Zul'karnayev. Even now, in advance of their future duel in the sea, it can be said that Zul'karnayev has much greater chances for victory.

Why? After all both crews underwent identical training. But the whole point is how the results of that training are utilized. For while to one commander the patterns of directing combat that he has mastered represent simply models which he readily adapts to the particular situation depending on its evolution, to another it is difficult to transform these patterns and he leans to applying them exactly as he has been taught, that is, in stereotyped form.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has shown what great price had sometimes been paid by commanders for attempts at blind emulation and rigid application of ready-made schemes in combat. And conversely it has demonstrated the outstanding accomplishments with which creative and calculating audacity could be crowned.

Incontestably, the stage of emulation cannot be excluded from the process of the training of young commanders. This is precisely how the assimilation of the experience of others begins. But the first stage should remain merely the first stage. It is to be followed by a thorough analysis of that experience as refracted through the prism of one's own tactical feeling and its utilization with allowance for a multiplicity of new factors as well as particular conditions. At this stage the commander is ready to reveal his abilities, his initiative and personal stamp.

Capt 2d Rank V. Voroshin was for the first time to attack on his own a group of "enemy" vessels. Earlier, during preliminary training, he was usually accompanied by his senior commanders in exercises at sea. The flagship captain formed a good opinion about the tactical knowledge of Capt 2d Rank Voroshin, but at the time there were no opportunities for the latter to display a creative approach, since he had spent too much time on secondary and sometimes superfluous tasks. For example, mistrusting the skills of the engineer-mechanic, Voroshin devoted too much attention to the technical aspects of maneuvering the ship. On the other hand, by not paying sufficient attention to the work of the combat information post, the commander did not sufficiently exploit its possibilities, meaning that he wasted too much time on clarifying the situation. This insufficient organization, this inability to focus attention on the main points, ultimately had fettered the commander and prevented him from mastering the situation in such a manner as to approach creatively its analysis and the adoption of decisions.

The senior commander meticulously enumerated all of Capt 2d Rank Voroshin's oversights while launching the attack and suggested to him ways of remedying them. And when, along with others, the submarine entered combat with the detachment of the "enemy" surface ships, Voroshin's attack proved to be the most effective. It was evaluated as bold in concept and interesting in execution. But perhaps the most important outcome of that combat exercise was the discovery of the talent of the young commander. Having learned to gain self-confidence, he displayed tactical flexibility, deriving from it genuine satisfaction.

Subsequently Capt 2d Rank Voroshin gained the reputation of a skillful tactical commander. His attacks have always been displaying originality and boldness of concept. But at the same time he has been most attentively studying the experience of his fellow commanders and attempting to apply it creatively by working out numerous variants of action while still on shore. And in the sea he felt free of the need to perform meticulous planning work on decisions to be made in typical situations and was able to concentrate his efforts and attention on achieving victory in the duel.

In modern combat this is highly important. Then, there is no time for pondering from "point zero" the situation that arises, including the analysis of standard tactical techniques--own techniques and those of the "foe"--or almost no time. This means that in every instance the commander should have a prepared model of a calculated and tested reaction, practiced so much that it is virtually automatic. Only then will he prove "master of the situation" and have at his disposal those seconds and minutes that are urgently needed to reach not just an approximate but the optimal decision. As pointed out by Mar SU D. F. Ustinov at the 6th All-Army Conference of the Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, it is mandatory for a military commander to have the ability to think and act within an extremely limited amount of time and under tremendous moral-psychological and physical stress.

The creative-minded commander needs a highly trained crew--and he will strive to have one. And in its turn, the highly trained crew will broaden the scope of the commanders flexibility of action. This results in an active mutual stimulation. The seamen can perceive that their labor bears fruit; they like to win and they become aggressive-minded in combat.

The effectiveness of this approach is exemplified by the same officer, V. Voroshin. After he had been reassigned for training, the ship crew remained the victor in the competitions and it is now the 6th year in a row that it has won an "Excellent" rating. This crew with its teamwork spirit has developed the remarkable tradition of always winning combat exercises and competitions.

But a good tradition is in itself not a stereotype of personal or collective behavior but a model of behavior presupposing growth and progress. I remember how I used to ponder this when I had for the first time taken over the command of a ship. It was an all-new ship, and there was this great desire to establish on it good solid traditions. Traditions of reliability, of desire to excel and experiment. Bearing in mind the power of the personal example, I had attempted to perform in a calculated manner even the most trivial activities and thoroughly consider all that must be done on the base and at sea without ever resorting to improvisation.

A memorable test of my skill in acting in a model manner at sea was my first independent cruise (without a senior commander on board) to the combat exercise area.

I had planned the entire route and considered various complications that might arise. And the first cruise was a success. Its consequences were far-reaching: I gained confidence in myself and the crew and, I believe, I grasped what it means to be a commander. The command, too, gained confidence in the new ship. Then it was time for the first deep-sea cruise. After a thorough inspection of the ship, the representative of the fleet headquarters asked the unit commander:

"Who will go as the senior commander with Tomko?"

The unit commander firmly declared: "Tomko will go alone. He is a good skipper."

After 4 years our excellent ship had already won for itself a solid and good reputation.

Once our submarine took part in a combat exercise with a detachment of vessels in the presence of an inspection by the USSR Ministry of Defense. We were assigned torpedoes for firing in a salvo. I had long ago conceived the idea of trying out, together with the crew, a more intricate variant of action. I submitted my proposal to the command, and it was approved. Only then I began to realize how much more I had complicated the task for myself. But the crew accepted the innovation enthusiastically. Both salvos proved to be precise.

Everyone was highly gratified. But life soon showed that no one's authority and no one's experience is enough unless there is progress. Any model, no matter how ingenious, becomes a stereotype if it is overestimated and used as a postulate rather than as the basis for a creative approach.

In that same year our submarine was entrusted with the task of participating in a VMF [naval] firing contest. Everything seemed to go swimmingly. We had rapidly detected the order of deployment and the main target and prepared to attack. All that remained was to choose the moment for firing the salvo with allowance for the pattern of the anti-submarine zigzagging of the group of ships. Fully confident of success, we launched the torpedoes. But once they were on their way toward the main target, it had quite unexpectedly to us sharply altered course. A miss. The second salvo, though it hit the target, earned our ship merely a "Good" rating which in such contests for championship is tantamount to a defeat.

The most vexing thing about all this was that the maneuver had been deliberate and planned in advance. Why did the "foe" upset our predictions? Was that sudden, atypical change in course accidental? Probably not. The surface ships knew with whom they were dealing and so they attempted to turn the table on us. We as the attacking side had failed to consider this.

It is likely that from time to time life teaches such lessons to all commanders. These lessons are, of course, hardly pleasant but extremely useful, causing revisions of previous and sometimes fossilized views of combat and strengthening psychological combat readiness.

There is hardly any commander who does not understand that a creative approach is the key to success while a stereotyped approach is the preliminary to defeat. But in order to make it an inner program of action and an inner necessity, it is not enough to train, convince and hector the officer--he also should be attracted and interested. Emphasis on creativeness and flexibility is a mighty catalyst for the tactical growth of the commander. It is important that the officer feel a bent toward creativeness at the very beginning of his career as a commander. Here the assistance of the senior commander is invaluable.

I remember how I had been assigned as a senior executive officer to the highly experienced and respected commander Capt 1st Rank V. Smaragdov. I began quite soon to feel that I enjoyed his complete confidence, and he left me a freedom of action such as I had never before experienced in my fairly long service in the same capacity on other ships. Only much later, when I myself became a ship captain, I realized that Viktor Vasil'yevich Smaragdov simply had immediately understood what I could do and in that sense left me freedom of action. But in matters in which I lacked confidence he instructed and supported me. He did it so naturally that I had not noticed it myself. As a result, I acquired a taste for independent command--the starting point of creative Command.

Combat on sight is now a thing of the ancient past. What is planned on shore and what goes with you to sea produces the anticipated results. But ready-made recipes do not replace the commander in combat; he is helped, instead, by thorough preliminary calculations and the freedom to apply them to the particular "foe," to actual combat conditions. Programming, prediction and simulation are the mathematical backbone of the living creativity of the commander in modern combat.

Importance of Military Regulations on Shipboard

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Oct 82 p 2

Article by Capt 2d Rank N. Rymorev, submarine commander: "A Fixed Line of Insistence: Regulations as the Law of Military Life"

Text Once I happened to overhear this conversation between two sailors:

"Hey, the duty officer today is not the same as yesterday. He's the kind who does not grant liberty."

"Yes," the other sailor agreed. "He's not a softie."

These sailors were young, just starting their service, so that it is difficult to tell whether they were praising or condemning the duty officer. I could not help wondering why is it that we officers, while performing our duties as rigorously prescribed by military regulations, sometimes differ in what we demand of our subordinates? Why is it that different commanders and chiefs differ in the severity with which they judge the same deeds and actions of servicemen? Is it permissible? Of course, not. After all, by being constantly aware and experiencing such differences in the requirements posed to them, the subordinates may grow psychologically accustomed to the idea that the attitude toward service may vary: one officer may

be a martinet and "nitpicker" before whom you have always to stand at attention, so to speak, while another is "all right"--with him one may behave more freely....Is not this the reason why in some military collectives there arise disturbances in the moral climate and in the orientation and effectiveness of public opinion concerning questions of discipline, along with disruptions in the maintenance of military regulations? Is not this the reason for the still insufficient effectiveness of educational work in some places?

In the struggle for a firm military discipline and adherence to regulations, a fixed line is needed--a uniformly demanding attitude to be actively displayed by all commanders--petty officers, sergeants and officers. Unfortunately, not all of them have a deep grasp of this truth. I once reprimanded an officer for softness and forbearance toward his subordinates and he had suddenly answered: "This is my style of work. Cannot one practice an individualized approach to educating people?"

Of course, every officer can and, what is more, should put a personal imprint on work with the subordinates; each of us has his own favorite and expert pedagogical techniques; each of us, finally, has his own temperament and character. All this is true. I myself, too, hold the opinion that sympathetic words and engaging in a thoughtful talk can accomplish more than the most rigorous interrogation. But empathy and closeness and attention to people, along with trustfulness, are one thing while lack of a principled approach to evaluating deeds, toleration of infractions of military regulations and familiarity toward one's subordinates are something completely different.

It is important to purposefully imbue fighting men with the awareness of the need to follow rigorously and precisely the provisions of their military oath, regulations and orders. Marshal S. M. Buzdakov observed at the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations that we should strive that the attitude of every member of the armed forces should be governed by the conviction that regulations and orders are a law that must be obeyed by all without exception, directly and unquestioningly!

The criteria for insistence on this obedience ensue from the norms of relations between superiors and subordinates as prescribed by military regulations, from the rights and duties of officials, and they are conditioned by the basic principles of the training and education of personnel. It is highly important that no officer, whatever the circumstances, waive these criteria and compromise his duty and conscience; all officers should guide themselves by the interests of the service and combat readiness.

In this connection, I recall the following example: One day in the unit of Engr-Capt Lt V. Dotsenko (at the time he had been group commander) a mechanism had malfunctioned through the fault of a sailor. Repairing the malfunction entailed a large number of problems which could have been solved only if due initiative and resourcefulness were displayed. But some of Dotsenko's subordinates, including the PO, began to claim that this could not be done with the group's own resources. A lot of time was wasted on such discussion and justifications without doing anything. This was the moment for officer Dotsenko to display firmness and mobilize his subordinates for solving the problem. But unfortunately he agreed with the slack group. I had to intervene personally and show that I was not going to tolerate such an attitude toward service.

I was rather outspoken toward Dotsenko. At first he felt offended as it seemed to him that I was reprimanding him too severely. But at least things started moving.

It needed this and other instances before ultimately Engr-Capt Lt Dotsenko learned to think in the manner of a true commander and became a genuinely demanding officer. On our submarine he now commands the electromechanical combat team. Dotsenko is wholeheartedly devoted to the intricate equipment entrusted to him and he will not take his liberty for any reason whatsoever if there is the least problem in his command. He also demands from his subordinates a conscientious and resourceful attitude toward their duties. Following the example of their superior, the midmen and petty officers are ever demanding toward service attitudes and the observance of the provisions of regulations and instructions.

Not so long ago the replacement of one of the shipboard mechanisms required an intricate job. It had seemed that outside help was indispensable. But the engineer-mechanic did not waste any time and himself directed the job, explored additional possibilities and mobilized his subordinates for the tense chore--and soon afterward he reported that the job was successfully completed.

A fixed line of insistence....It begins, in my opinion, with developing in officers the ability to view their everyday duties through the prism of combat readiness. It should be borne in mind that the regulations presuppose both a model conduct of service and an efficient organization of training and the maintenance and repair of equipment as well as correct mutual relations among military personnel, and also a conscious inner discipline in one and all. It is particularly important in this connection that all of us officers always and above all be primarily demanding toward ourselves.

When I had just assumed command of a submarine I encountered the following instance: At sea, during a gale, it was decided to conduct a training exercise for watch officers. I summoned bridge personnel and suddenly I heard voices of discontent: they wondered whether the exercise was needed in the presence of a gale when conditions already were difficult enough; why complicate things still further? It turned out that the crew had not previously been accustomed to training exercises during a gale and so it seemed to some that I was being excessively demanding. I decided, however, to adhere to my line. And in time all officers realized that, although gale exercises require additional expenditures of moral and physical effort, they pay off greatly. Moreover, now the officers pay more attention to training their subordinates how to act in the presence of difficult weather conditions.

A commander's fixed purpose and consistency in implementing regulations is of great educational importance. The line toward a more demanding attitude, as adopted by an officer, is to his subordinates like the sound of a tuning fork serving to test their service.

Here special mention should be made of the importance of an explicit formulation of the commander's requirements. Certain officers unfortunately underestimate it--and yet the manner in which an order is formulated and given often affects its execution.

The navigating officer on our submarine is Sr Lt N. Patin. We all have seen the devotion with which he does his job, meticulously and conscientiously. Despite all this for a long time the situation in his command had been uneven--achievements in

training and discipline alternated with dismaying and often puzzling oversights. We analyzed Sr Lt Patin's style of work, and it turned out that the orders he gave sometimes were worded like requests and fulfilled by his subordinates if they were in the mood, so to speak. The navigating officer's attention had to be drawn to these shortcomings.

I wish to emphasize that stressing adherence to regulations is important not only to the personal authority of one officer or another. The extent of consistency in the demanding attitude of every commander, political instructor and engineer affects the authority of the entire commissioned personnel. If some one individual is unjustifiably indulgent toward his subordinates or, conversely, abuses his power, he by the same token not only harms himself but discredits the normal stress on discipline displayed by his colleagues. The regulations apply to all. The line of insistence [on fulfilling them] also should be fixed for all.

Submarines: Year's Training Results Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Zhuravlev, commander of nuclear missile submarine, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "The Oceanic Maximum: Results of Training Year; the Experience of the Pace-Setters"]

[Text] Whatever mission may be assigned to a ship at sea, her captain and crew understand that its optimal implementation is required. For example, when a missile submarine is to breach the "foe's" anti-submarine defense, it is best to do it unnoticeably. If nevertheless combat has to be entered, it must be conducted strenuously on exploiting any possibility of evading the enemy. A deep understanding of the role of each stage in the fulfillment of the main mission and the ability to determine optimal solutions in every individual case maximize the effect of the ship's actions at sea. Operating experience and experience in service demonstrate that major accomplishments are scored not by a sudden leap but through intense, thorough and meticulous work. This concerns all the aspects of the life and activity of the combat collective....

At the beginning of our ocean cruise, which was a most important test to our crew, two combat shifts immediately singled themselves out in socialist competition. The first shift, headed by the watch officer Capt Lt A. Nosov, consistently set the pace while the second consistently remained among the laggards. When the ranks held by competitors change often, this points to a good spirit of comradely competition, but when they stay fixed, this is alarming. The party activists decided to help the laggards. But the results were insignificant. The shift could not attain higher than average indicators.

I and Capt 2d Rank Ye. Molochnikov, the executive officer for political instruction, counseled the party bureau members not to be hasty with conclusions. The matter required a thorough analysis of the style of work of the combat shift's leaders: the watch officer Capt Lt S. Voylov, the watch engineer-mechanic Engr-Capt 3d Rank B. Vakayev, and the party group organizer Capt Lt A. Lugovoy. It turned out that these officers incorrectly interpreted their organizing and leading role in the competition: they reduced work with the people to making appeals. But as for specifically focusing the efforts of the sailors, evaluating their activities, and creating an atmosphere favorable to competition and stimulating initiative, that was not done.

The party bureau members assessed the experience of the pace-setters. It became at once clear what should be done. Jointly with the leaders of the lagging combat shift, a plan for eliminating the shortcomings was drawn up. The party aktiv thoroughly monitored its implementation. Within two weeks the lagging combat shift scored its first success, and subsequently kept up good work.

In addition to this obvious result, there was another, perhaps no less important to the ship. The effectiveness of thorough and well-planned work to organize the competition, which pays for itself an hundredfold and brings great moral gratification, was yet again demonstrated. The competition, organized as skillfully as the activation of a reactor, released new energies and resources among the crew. Largely owing to this, the nuclear ship performed excellently during its ocean cruise.

But the achievements of the crew at present are, of course, due not only to the last few months of training. For several years our collective has been steadily augmenting its combat potential. In this connection, the more meticulously and tenaciously one attends to "trivia," the closer the height of perfection toward which naval personnel strain becomes.

This movement is nourished by the release of new internal potential. Hence, a maximum of yield, the optimal utilization of the efforts and resources of one and all, and the search for the most rational organization of labor at all levels have become the principal directions of activity of the crew during the winter and summer training periods. Such an approach has required a more demanding attitude toward all aspects of our life.

Thus, at a party meeting during the cruise was posed the question of enhancing still further the efficiency of some already leading specialists. Those subjected to criticism turned out to include the combat expert and party member Eng-Capt Lt S. Zhestkov. He proved himself to be a man who tenaciously works on himself to perfect his profession and is concerned for constantly perfecting his knowledge of ideology and theory. But a check showed that, despite his high ideological and professional potential, this officer was often of less benefit to the crew than he could have been, confining himself to the exercise of his duties. During a prolonged cruising period he had not once given political talks wot the seamen and stayed away from public activities.

The validity of the criticism was immediately admitted by Eng Capt Lt S. Zhestkov. And not only in words at that. Subsequently he took an active part in the public life of the crew and helped many officers, michmen and seamen to grow and fulfill their socialist pledges.

And here is an instance of a different kind. The ship's party aktiv once decided to sharpen its attention toward the existing shortcomings in the organization of ship-board life and solution of material and living problems. The party members deeply studied, in particular, the organization of after-watch recreation for such specialists as the hydroacoustic gear operators. As known, at sea these specialists have a particularly great work-load, and little can be done about it. This means that their recreational activities should offset as much as possible their exertions. But as it turned out, these activities did not fully meet this requirement. During brief sea cruises this was not noticed by the submariners. But during a prolonged

cruise the discomforts became obvious. It was no problem to change the recreational conditions for the hydroacoustic gear operators. But this minor detail led to a major increase in the combat readiness of the ship and in the secrecy and safety of the cruise.

When the opposing parties meet in fierce competitive combat, such "trivia" sometimes are of decisive importance. This is because mistakes, whether accidental or due to fatigue, are inexcusable. Consideration of these mistakes assures a more reliable performance by the crew. It represents adjustment, as it were, of an already smoothly operating mechanism. This adjustment leads to that perfection which enables the crew to feel confident in any situation, and the commander to exploit broadly and creatively the potential of the ship.

One of the most important results of the broad search for unexploited potential has been, in particular, the 6-percent reduction in the time needed to prepare the ship for combat and cruising. What stands behind this? Fine-tuning of the crew's activities with respect to just one of the orders of battle? No, this is not enough to enhance the overall combat readiness of the ship. It is possible to commence the cruise ahead of schedule without coping with other problems. Our endeavor was to make every indicator of our performance, every function performed, a facet of the comprehensive overall result of the increase in the training of the combat collective. Hence, the reduction in the time required to prepare the ship for combat and for sailing presupposed, like the other practical accomplishments of the crew, an increase in ideological maturity and awareness of the personnel, improvements in the combat mastery of all specialists and strengthening of discipline.

The qualitative changes in crew training enabled us during the year to largely reorganize combat training, experiment and pose goals which had previously not been feasible. The intensity of the conduct of training exercises on the ship has increased. New improved techniques of using weapons and armaments have been mastered. We posed and implemented the slogan "Raise the level of maintenance and repair to that performed by base specialists." This meant not just the competent elimination of minor malfunctions but deliberate preparations for repairing possible damage to equipment in the event of real combat situations. Following the example of the party members masters of the craft of combat michmen V. Drachinskiy and V. Kul'kov, all seamen acquired the necessary practical habits.

Incidentally when people say on our ship, "Following the example of communists," this means that by now a majority of the crew have adopted the new directives for action. This is a most important potential for further increasing the reliability of the combat collective. We regard as a great compliment to the performance of our party and Komsomol organizations the fact that the secretary of the ship party bureau Capt Lt V. Kolychev was honored with the right to participate in the deliberations of the 6th All-Army Conference of the Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations and the Komsomol committee secretary Capt Lt S. Nomerov became a delegate to the 19th Komsomol Congress.

The oceanic maximum--the optimum performance at sea--is achievable by those combat collectives which lack weak links. We attempted to avoid such links. Every third officer has taken qualifying tests for the exercise of functions associated with a rank higher than he holds. And the silver boat badge--the sign of eligibility for commanding the ship, is now worn by five other officers in addition to myself.

On the whole, the results with which the crew of the nuclear vessel is approaching the end of the training year cannot but please. But we have no right to relax our efforts. "Combat training must be perfected constantly and in an exceptionally responsible manner in view of the growing requirements," as emphasized by comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech to the conference of high military commanders. We submariners regard these words as the party's combat order. Today we view as our patriotic duty advancing to new higher frontiers of military competition during the next training year.

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL INFANTRY: AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 82 p 1

[Article by Maj S. Ivanisov, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "A Battalion Attacks from the Sea"]

[Text] The sea rhythmically rocks the landing ships, reflecting the stars. It seems some invisible person scattered enormous handfuls of sparks over the water.

But Capt V. Bazanov, a motorized rifle battalion commander, has no time for beauty. Bending over a chart, he peers fixedly at that point where a light blue color adjoins the yellow. This is the very shore on which the battalion is to land at dawn.

Now and then the battalion commander returns in his thoughts to the past day, analyzing whether or not everything had been done as necessary.

And much had been done. The procedure for disembarking from the landing ship and actions in capturing the beachhead had been practiced during tactical drill problems. Additional classes in driving while afloat had been held with APC drivers. Political workers senior lieutenants V. Lyapin and V. Savchenko together with party members of the subunits concerned themselves with creating a high offensive enthusiasm in the collective.

In particular, the fact that the regiment had participated during the Great Patriotic War in the assault crossing on the Dnepr was used skillfully. It was in the battle for the Dnepr that its personnel G. Shengeliya and M. Zolotukhin had become Heroes of the Soviet Union. At a personnel meeting the motorized riflemen pledged to act in a combat manner in the exercise and to take the example from their countrymen-heroes in everything.

A meeting with Nora Abbasovna Kosmodamianskaya left a great impression on the personnel. A participant of the legendary landing on Malaya Zemlya [The Novorossiysk base of operations], she told about the heroism displayed by her combat friends and called on everyone to be worthy continuers of the front-linesmen's traditions. Personnel of the company commanded by Nora Abbasovna's son, Sr Lt V. Kosmodamianskiy, listened to her especially attentively because the commander's mother was speaking to them and because they were the ones preparing to be first to step onto the shore occupied by the "enemy."

Then the battalion was at sea. It was to be ashore at dawn.

It was not only Bazanov who could not sleep. He saw how Capt-Lt A. Sokolov, commander of the landing ship, was working strenuously. That probably is how the commanders of other ships were working. The landing was to be at an unfamiliar spot. They had to study sailing directions carefully and find a place where the depth allowed approaching shore as closely as possible...

The battle broke out in the morning. It was hot. The "enemy" defended stubbornly. The attackers' aviation and ship guns "worked" thoroughly, hitting detected targets. But it was not for nothing that the "enemy" prepared defense of the shore in advance and camouflaged his positions thoroughly. Many of his weapons came alive at the moment when the APC's left the ships.

The motorized riflemen were ready for this. A system of observation worked up during the tactical drill problems helped detect the "enemy" weapon emplacements which came alive quickly and accurately in the very first seconds of combat.

The squad commanded by Komsomol member Sgt A. Sokhin was first to gain a "foothold" ashore. The wheels of the APC's stuck in the sand, but the drivers demonstrated high proficiency in driving the combat vehicles under conditions of desert terrain. In the very first meters of movement over the sand privates N. Muradyan, A. Nazirov and others reduced pressure in the APC's tires and it was as if new strength poured into the steel hearts of the combat vehicles.

Building up speed, the company commanded by Sr Lt Kosmodamianskiy rushed forward, exploiting the success won in the first minutes of combat. The company commander had no need to be concerned for his rear or flanks. The battalion commander's decision envisaged that the company commanded by Sr Lt V. Kolyako was to prevent the threat of flank attack and complete the destruction of small "enemy" groups. Questions of coordination between the subunits also were worked out in tactical drill problems. Therefore it was without any additional instructions that Lt G. Kopeliani quickly deployed his platoon in the necessary direction and detained the "enemy" who was attempting to counterattack Sr Lt Kosmodamianskiy's company from the right flank.

A little more than an hour had passed since the moment of the landing. The shoreline already was behind the motorized riflemen for a long while. It was only now they sensed that the beachhead was hot not only because of "enemy" fire. The sun was rising swiftly to the zenith, and seemed to draw the thermometer column after it.

Waves rolled onto the scorching sandy beach one after the other and, as if boiling up from its heat, they would roll back and hide in the cool depths of the sea. But only recollections of the sea remained for the motorized riflemen. They no longer felt its cool breath. There was only intense heat under their feet and above their heads. But there was joy in their eyes: They hadn't let people down; they had kept their word.

6904

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL INFANTRY: AMPHIBIOUS LANDING IN 'SHIELD-82' DISCUSSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 82 p 1

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Special Correspondent Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy: "Amphibious Landing"]

[Text] They were bent over the chart--Adm N. Khovrin, CIC of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, and Adm V. Yanakiyev, CIC of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Navy. They were clarifying final details in coordination of landing forces and fire support forces for the amphibious landing.

Experience of coordination among allied fleets at sea and during the landing of an assault force has been built up, improved and enriched over the years.

"We began to assimilate the experience of Soviet navymen," says Adm Yanakiyev, "immediately after the victory of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria. Soviet admirals and officers were our teachers. During joint exercises Bulgarian navymen mastered new tactics in employing weapons and equipment."

In Exercise "Shield-82" Soviet and Bulgarian seamen came armed with the foremost experience of conducting modern combat, welded by a high sense of international duty and animated by one desire--to accomplish the training missions excellently. Rallies of Bulgarian-Soviet friendship and cordial meetings between brothers in class and friends in arms aboard Soviet and Bulgarian ships and at enterprises and establishments contributed to the establishment of a fighting spirit.

Soviet and Bulgarian navymen again turned to the experience in landing assault personnel at Malaya Zemlya [the Novorossiysk base of operations]. I saw that many of them had the book by Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev entitled "Malaya Zemlya." Participants in the assault landing drew much of value for themselves by rereading again and again this remarkable book, which has become a textbook of experience for us.

"The military-political defensive alliance of socialist countries serves the peace faithfully," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. "It has everything necessary to defend the socialist achievements of nations reliably and we will do everything to see that this also is the case in the future!"

In Exercise "Shield-82" military personnel of Warsaw Pact nations demonstrate the heightened power of their armies and navies and their constant readiness to defend the cause of peace and socialism. The motto of the present exercise "Unified in peace and war in the defense of the cause of socialism!" is sewn in gold on the red banners which representatives of local party organizations of the fraternal country presented to Soviet navymen before the assault force was landed.

"It is the duty of patriot-internationalists," said Capt 2d Rank G. Shelpakov, commander of a large landing ship who spoke at the rally, "which obligates us to learn from the heroes of Malaya Zemlya. To act in a frontline manner in combat means to display boldness and resolve; it means to execute an order excellently."

The large landing ship commanded by Capt 2d Rank Shelpakov arrived for the exercise after a lengthy deployment in the Mediterranean. There in a difficult situation the navymen and naval infantrymen acquired high proficiency. It was not by chance that Bulgarian military personnel came to them for experience. Officer V. Rudenko, the commander of a naval infantry subunit, warmly greeted Bulgarian People's Army subunit commander Maj Gancho Draganov. The talk immediately turned to work. The officers discussed with interest features of the upcoming difficult combat work. Officer Rudenko knew a great deal about his combat friend and the schooling of his subordinates.

Soviet and Bulgarian seamen prepared thoroughly for the fight for the beachhead and it became clear from the first minutes of this fight that participants of the assault force were attuned only for victory.

Far off in the haze appeared a hilly shore. The landing ships with tanks and APC's aboard swooped toward the spot for the assault force landing. After fire preparation helicopters flew over the ships at low altitude. They landed the battalion commanded by 26th CPSU Congress delegate Maj V. Polosin on the unfamiliar, "enemy"-occupied shore. Hardly had the helicopters touched down when the naval infantrymen entered the practice action, functioning boldly and resolutely.

The landing ships neared shore. Approaches to it were mined. Without delay the minesweepers began clearing the channel of mines, then helicopters continued the sweeping.

Air cushion vessels delivered a group of naval infantrymen with tanks to the beachhead at high speed. One of these ships flying above the waves was commanded by Capt 3d Rank V. Bakonin, awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class. The crew pledged to take the ship among the outstanding ones and already were close to their goal.

The large landing ships proceeded in precise formation. They repulsed "enemy" air attacks and neutralized targets in the depth of his defenses. The large landing ship commanded by Capt 2d Rank Shelpakov, wearer of the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class, was first to complete the landing of the assault force after reducing the normative time

a little over twofold. This contributed to the rapid deployment and swift attack of the landing personnel.

Soldiers under the command of Capt Yu. Shabalin quickly made passages in the minefields. I could see clearly the entire panorama of combat from the large landing ship's control center. The subunit commanded by Officer V. Rudenko was fighting persistently to expand the beachhead. This officer is bold in his decisions and daring in the attack. "A match for his father!" would have been said by the frontlinesmen who knew the valorous regimental commander Col Igor' Vasil'yevich Rudenko during the Great Patriotic War.

Landing ships of the Bulgarian Navy pushed toward shore. I recognized from afar battalion commander Maj Gancho Draganov. He was in front of his fighting men, drawing them on by personal example. Then the Bulgarian landing personnel merged with the Soviet personnel in a single spirited rush and the attack saw new development.

Personnel of the company commanded by Capt V. Kovanev, also awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class, demonstrated a will to win, proficiency and tactical cunning.

While our ships were landing the assault force they were protected from possible "enemy" submarine attack by the Bulgarian Navy ASW ship commanded by Capt-Lt Dmitr Dimov. I met Dimov on the eve of the assault force landing. He told me that his crew had performed a large number of combat exercises, including firing against surface and underwater targets, in order to win the right to take part in this exercise.

"This is our best ship," Capt-Lt Persian Shopov, a party activist, told me. "And Officer Dimov is the leading officer in our division."

After breaking "enemy" defenses, the naval infantrymen linked up with an airborne assault force and continued the attack. Like other episodes in Exercise "Shield-82," the amphibious landing was vivid proof that the personnel of fraternal armies and navies, true to international duty, are ready to perform the most difficult missions successfully in defense of peace and socialism.

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NAVAL FORCES

PATROL SHIP 'BESSMENNY' SUPPORTS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Nov 82 p 1

[Article by Capt-Lt I. Anfert'yev, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "The 'Bessmennyy' Conducts Fire"]

[Text] The patrol ship "Bessmennyy" is known in the fleet for its masters of gunfire. Again personnel of the missile-gunnery department had to reaffirm this under especially difficult conditions.

In supporting an assault landing the ship was to neutralize shore targets, but the "enemy" was offering serious resistance. His patrol boats appeared at the moment the assault force was being landed. While supporting the naval infantry which had landed on the rocky shore with her guns, the "Bessmennyy" simultaneously had to enter battle against the patrol boats.

Capt 2d Rank V. Shchupak, the ship's commanding officer, was first to deliver a fire strike against the waterborne "enemy." At this time the "enemy" battery opened fire against the landing force. Intense electronic countermeasures interrupted the work with the shore spotting post. The ship's commander called in the spotter helicopter commanded by experienced pilot Capt V. Zanegin.

Even the air "enemy" did not hinder performance of the mission. The gunners repulsed all his attacks, destroying a diving target with the first round.

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